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Abstract
This thesis looks at different aspects of workers mobility, firms organization and
the political economy of elections. In the first chapter, I analyse—both theoreti-
cally and empirically—the effect of an exogenous credit supply shock to the or-
ganization of the firm. The understanding of these mechanisms is fundamental
to rationalize the real economic consequences of an aggregate negative shock at
the micro level and to understand how the organization of the firm can be the
target of specific policies that can attenuate the impact of capital shortage on the
real economy. The second chapter considers knowledge as a key determinant to
the competitiveness and the success of a firm. I start from the idea that firms and
their managers acquire knowledge via a variety of different channels, which are
often difficult to track down and quantify. By matching employer-employee data
with trade data at the firm level-which is itself a novelty in the trade literature-
the chapter sheds light on the nexus between the export experience acquired by
managers in previous firms and their current firm performance. The third chapter
embeds labor mobility in multi-country dynamic version of an Eaton and Kortum
framework to explain how migration, together with trade, affects the welfare of
natives and migrants in different regions in Europe. In the last chapter, I look
at the effect of higher turnout on political outcomes. I exploit the exogenous
variation in weather conditions on the day of elections and the geography of a
country—Italy—to instrument for turnout. Results of the instrumental variable
combined with a first difference model explain how a larger political participa-
tion affects the electoral outcome.
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1Chapter 1
Shocks and the organization of the
firm: who pays the bill?
What happens to firms’ organizational structure when they are hit by a negative
shock? By matching employer-employee data with firm loans and bank balance
sheets, I study firms’ reactions to a credit shock–the global financial crisis—and
compare it to a trade shock—the entry of China in the WTO. When hit by a credit
supply shock, firms reduce employment of higher-skilled workers more than
lower-skilled production workers, while no adjustment is found on the wages.
In contrast, a trade shock affects the hierarchy of the firm from the bottom to
the top: firms rescale the organization and reduce employment at all levels. Re-
sults support the existence of heterogenous complementarities between capital
and skills along the hierarchy of the firm: a shock to credit hits workers in the
middle of the hierarchy, while a trade-induced demand shock affects the scale of
the firm, hence all skills proportionally.
1.1 Introduction
Firms are usually treated as homogeneous entities when studying the transmis-
sion of shocks to the real economy. They are allowed to vary by size, productivity
2and shape, but the within-firm structure is considered homogenous. This paper
shows that the organization of the firm is crucial to understand differences in ag-
gregate responses to different shocks. The way a firm organize has been shown
to have an important impact on the distribution of wages in the economy, as well
as productivity,1 but we have little empirical evidence and understanding of firm
reorganizations in response to shocks. A key question is: what happens to firms’
organizational structure when they are hit by a negative shock and how does the
firm adjust and reorganize?
This is the first paper to causally identify the effect of a credit shock on the
organization of the firm. To measure the impact of lack of liquidity on the orga-
nizational structure of the firm, I exploit the differential exposure to the financial
crisis of Portuguese banks and the detailed bank-firm credit network to instru-
ment for firms’ credit supply. Moreover, I compare firms’ reactions to a credit
supply shock—the global financial crisis—to their reaction to a trade shock—the
entry of China in the WTO—and provide a simple mechanism to interpret the
different findings.
Results show that firms react differently to a credit shock than a trade shock.
Both induce the firm to cut overall employment, but the organization of the firm
reacts differently across the two shocks. When hit by a negative credit supply
shock firms shrink more the middle of the hierarchy, reducing employment of
higher-skill workers more than lower-skill production workers at the bottom. In
contrast, when hit by a negative trade shock the reduction is more pronounced
for lower-skill production workers and less pronounced as we rise along the hier-
archy of the firm.2 The empirical findings highlight a novel heterogeneity in the
1See for example (Liberti, 2017), (Garicano, 2000), (Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg, 2004) (Hub-
bard and Garicano, 2007), (Ichniowski et al., 1997), (Black and Lynch, 1997), (Bloom et al., 2012),
(Caliendo et al., 2015a).
2In both cases, there is no adjustment on wages: presumably, the contractual rigidities of the
Portuguese labour market allow little downward adjustments on the salaries. In line with this, I
show that labour market rigidities play an important role: firms with a higher share of workers
3degree of complementarity between working capital and each of the hierarchical
layers. A shock to one specific input of production—working capital—translates
into a stronger reduction of higher-skill workers, rather than production work-
ers, while top managerial positions are not affected. In contrast, a trade induced
demand shock affects the scale of the firm, therefore firms layoff in all layers.
Measuring firms’ organization and how firms react to different shocks is chal-
lenging. The empirical estimation builds on a novel dataset that brings together
a matched employer-employee, bank lending registry, and bank balance sheets
over 16 years for Portugal. Crucially, observing the task complexity of each oc-
cupation allows to precisely map workers into the hierarchy of the firm. I follow
(Caliendo et al., 2015b) and define layers to be representative of the vertical or-
ganization of the firm, with top managers, middle managers, supervisors and
production workers.3 Moreover, the length of the panel allows me to analyse
firms’ organizational reaction to a credit and a trade shock in the same economy.
Following (Paravisini et al., 2015b), the analysis of the credit shock is based on
two different pillars: I construct a firm-level instrument for the supply of credit
to the firm that combines information on the firm’s credit relationships with the
bank’s exposure to the foreign interbank market. In addition, I exploit the panel
dimension of the data by looking at the change in credit supply before and after
the Lehman collapse, which generated the biggest freeze in the interbank bor-
rowing market in recent years. In the second part of the paper, I examine how
exposure to rising competition from China affects the organization choice of Por-
tuguese firms. To analyze the effect of the trade shock on Portuguese firms, I
on temporary contracts before the crisis have a stronger reaction to negative shocks by reducing
employment more.
3Using the theory in (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), (Caliendo et al., 2015b) use French
manufacturing firms to describe how wages and the number of employees change when the firm
reorganize by adding layers. They show that the probability of adding a layer is increasing in
value added and that firms adding layers decrease average salaries in the layer by changing the
skill composition of workers employed in that layer. They provide several directions for further
research, mainly by looking at exogenous shocks that lead the firm to reorganize.
4construct a sectoral measure of import penetration of Chinese exports to high-
income economies excluding Portugal (as in (Autor et al., 2014a)) to instrument
for the drop in sales upon China’s entry in the WTO.
The empirical estimates return elasticities of organization to credit; a 10% drop
in the supply of credit predicts a 2% drop in the ratio of team leaders to produc-
tion workers, which in turns implies an increase in the span of control that team
leaders have over production workers. However, the observed increase in the
span of control can be driven by an increase in the number of production work-
ers, by a decrease in the number of team leaders, or by a decrease of both, with
the decrease in the number of team leaders being more pronounced than the de-
crease in the number of production workers. I find that the latter mechanism
drives the results. Employment of high skilled workers and team leaders drops
by 1.75% with a 10% drop in credit, while the elasticity of production workers to
a 10% drop in credit is 1.4%.
The transmission of a financial shock from banks to the real economy has
been widely documented, but very little is known on the heterogeneous effects
of a credit shock along the workers’ tasks and skills distribution. The work by
(Chodorow-Reich, 2014) documents the effects of a credit supply shock on the
employment level of firms connected to more or less healthy banks, but cannot
speak to the heterogeneous effects at the worker level due to data availability.
(Greenstone et al., 2014) look at the effect of credit reduction to small firms in the
US. They exploit geographical variation in the distribution of the local branches
of US banks to look at the effect of credit reduction on employment in coun-
ties differentially exposed to the shock. The recent paper by (Berton et al., 2017)
uses the methodology described in (Greenstone et al., 2014) to show that a neg-
ative credit supply shock has an impact on firms’ employment in one Italian re-
gion—Veneto—and the effect is heterogenous, and mostly concentrated among
5less educated workers. 4 I build on this literature and open the black box of the
firm, showing how the organization responds to a negative credit supply shock
and what the implications are for the different categories of workers.
Do firms react differently to a demand and a credit shock? A large literature
in economics has documented the firms’ employment response to a trade shock
that increases the level of domestic competition, and reduces demand for both
exporters as well as domestic producers. The paper by (Autor et al., 2014a) for
example, analyzes the effect of exposure to international trade on earnings and
employment of U.S. workers, from 1992 through 2007. The authors show that in-
dustry shocks to import competition in the aftermath of China’s entry in the WTO
and rise as a global exporter mostly affected workers in exposed industries and
that earning losses were larger for individuals with low initial wages, low initial
tenure, and low attachment to the labour force. Moreover, the paper documents
that high wage workers suffered less because of a higher ability to move across
employers, and eventually move out of manufacturing. These findings reveal
that import shocks unevenly affect workers along the skill distribution, being
tougher for blue collars than for white collars; however, the firm level mecha-
nisms determining the worker level outcomes in terms of cumulated earnings is
still unclear.
4Focusing on exporters, (Amiti and Weinstein, 2011) look at the effect of financial crisis on
Japanese exporters, while (Foley and Manova, 2015) explain that firms face more stringent capital
constraints because of higher up-front expenses to enter foreign markets, higher variable costs
related to delayed payments, shipment duties and freights, currency fluctuations and contrac-
tual risks. Moreover, (Chor and Manova, 2012) show that international commerce becomes more
sensitive to financial conditions during crises. In a similar vein, (Paravisini et al., 2015b) look
at the effect of bank credit shocks on the export behavior of Peruvian firms. They look at bank
pre-crisis ratios of foreign funding to assets and use the share of firm credit from banks with for-
eign exposure above the median as an instrument for the intensity of the financial shock to firms.
They find that capital shortage has a bigger effect on the intensive margin—quantity exported in a
destination-product market—than on the extensive margin—entry or exit of firms. Other scholars
focused on measuring the effect of banks’ exposure to the financial shock on their credit supply.
In this respect, (Jiménez et al., 2011) is one of the first papers to show how to link bank exposure
to financial shocks and firm credit supply while (Iyer et al., 2014) use Portuguese data and show
how banks with a high exposure to the interbank borrowing market reduced their credit supply
growth.
6(Guadalupe and Wulf, 2008) is one of the first papers to systematically look
at the firms’ internal organizational reaction to a trade shock. Along these lines,
(Friedrich, 2015) empirically estimates the effect of trade shocks on wage inequal-
ity, decomposing inequality using the lenses of organizational models. He uses
matched employer-employee data from Denmark to show that wage variation
across hierarchical layers constitutes a systematic component of overall wage in-
equality. Moreover, the paper exploits a trade shock to Danish exporters in 2005 -
the Cartoon crisis - to causally estimate how a drop in demand influences within
firm wage inequality. My results confirm the findings of (Autor et al., 2014a),
showing that the effect of a trade shock is more pronounced among lower-skill
workers and decreases with the task complexity of the occupation. Moreover, I
add on this literature by showing that these findings are consistent with a firm
reorganization mechanism: when hit by a negative trade shock, firms shift to
a different production scale and adjust their structure, laying off workers pro-
portionally along the hierarchy, to minimize the costs associated with the new
demand level.
Finally, a growing literature in economics explores how the organizational
structure of the firm determines its performance.5 Empirical studies are exploit-
ing the increasing availability of matched employer-employee data, as well as
information on managerial practices to describe the organization of the firm (see
(Bloom et al., 2011a)). Theoretical contributions have provided a set up to empiri-
cally study the nexus between firms’ organization and productivity (see (Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012) among others). This paper complements these works
by showing causal evidence on the nexus between credit and organization as well
as between trade and organization.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.4 describes the data
5(Caliendo et al., 2015b) explore the importance of production hierarchies in the French con-
text, while (Caliendo et al., 2015a) investigate the effect of organizations on productivity in the
Portuguese economy.
7used in the analysis, the mapping of workers in management layers and other
firm level measures of organization. Section 1.3 presents the analysis on the reac-
tion of firm organization to the credit shock and section 1.3.6 discusses the results
through the lenses of a simple theoretical framework. Section 1.4 presents the
analysis for the trade shock and discuss how the organizational reaction differs
across the two shocks. Section 1.5 reports additional margins of adjustment and
placebo tests of the identification strategy. Finally, section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Data and descriptives
An important innovation of this article is to link datasets of loans and within firm
organization to observe organizational changes of firms borrowing from different
banks. The analysis draws on a unique dataset constructed using Portuguese data
that brings together four different data sources: a matched employer-employee
dataset virtually covering the entire population of firms and their workers in Por-
tugal, a firm balance sheet dataset, a bank-firm loans dataset and a bank’s balance
sheet dataset. The dataset covers manufacturing and services firms of continental
Portugal for the years 1997-2013.6
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a
data set made available by the Ministry of Employment of Portugal that draws
on a compulsory annual census of all firms in Portugal employing at least one
worker. The data set has been widely used in the labour literature and contains
information on 350,000 firms and 3 million employees.7 Reported data cover the
6Information for the year 2001 for the matched employer-employee dataset was not collected
so my sample excludes the year 2001. For the moment, I constraint my sample between 2003 and
2013.
7See for example (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001) which compares the US and Portuguese
labour market looking at the unemployment duration and worker flows, (Cabral and Mata, 2003)
who study the evolution of the firm size distribution, (Mion and Opromolla, 2014) who show that
the export experience acquired by managers in previous firms leads their current firm towards
higher export performance, and commands a sizable wage premium for the manager or (Mion
et al., 2016) who look at how the knowledge a manager acquires spills over the new firm.
8firm itself, each of its plants and each worker employed by the firm. Variables
available in the data set include the firm’s location, industry, total employment,
and sales. The worker-level data cover information on all personnel working for
the reporting firms in a reference week in October of each year. They include
information on occupation, earnings, and hours worked (normal and overtime).
The information on earnings includes the base wage (gross pay for normal hours
of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other regularly paid components,
overtime work, and irregularly paid components.
The second dataset is Central do Balancos (henceforth, CB), a repository of
yearly balance sheet data providing economic and financial information on non-
financial corporations operating in Portugal. This dataset contains information
on all the firms in the Portuguese economy from 2006 onwards.8 The data con-
tains information on firm sales, material assets, cost of materials and third party
supplies and services.
The third dataset is Central de Responsabilidades de CrÈdito (henceforth, CRC), a
data base made available by Bank of Portugal containing all the credit exposures
above 50 euros reported monthly by the universe of Portuguese credit institu-
tions. The Reporting is mandatory and the objective is to increase the informa-
tion set available to participating institutions to improve the risk assessment of
potential borrowers. For each borrower, the dataset includes information on the
number of banking relationships, total outstanding debt with each single institu-
tion and loan status (regular credit, overdue, written-off or renegotiated).9
8Before 2005 CB was biased towards large firms; however, the value added and sales coverage
was high. For instance, in 2003 firms in the CB dataset accounted for 88.8% of the national account
total of non-financial firms’ sales.
9Potential credit refers to all the credit not yet materialized, Overdue credits are credits for
which the financial institution has a positive expectation of being reimbursed, Written-off credits
are credits for which the financial institution has no expectation of being reimbursed and rene-
gotiated credits are credits for which conditions have been renegotiated between the two parties.
Before 2009, the dataset does not include information on collaterals or credit duration.
9The fourth dataset is Balanco das institucoes monetarias and financeira (hence-
forth, BBS), a repository of monthly balance sheet data for all the financial insti-
tutions in Portugal. The dataset includes information on the instruments and the
counterparts of each transaction in the assets and liabilities for all the financial
institutions in Portugal. For each bank or financial institution in a month, the
dataset reports information on the transactions divided by maturity (for exam-
ple, credits up to 1 year maturity, credits with maturity between 1 and 2 years,
deposits with 90 days maturity, deposits up to 1 year maturity) the type of the
counterpart (Central banks, banks, other financial intermediator, local govern-
ment, regional government, national government and others), the location of the
counterpart (aggregate of countries outside the Eurozone which includes Lithua-
nia, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovenia, Slovak Republic, Spain, Estonia, Fin-
land, France, Greece, Netherlands, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Malta and
Portugal).
1.2.1 From individual classification to firm level variables
Table 1.1 reports descriptives for 2005; manufacturing and services firms in my
sample have on average 29 employees, and a wage bill of 522,801 euros. Firms
have on average 1.23 layers of management, with the average salary in the top
layer being 3.5 times higher than the average salary in the bottom layer.
In the bottom panel of table 1.1, I present descriptive statistics for credit and
firm-bank relationships. On average, firms borrow 208,165 euros as working cap-
ital (as an average across firms and years), while 294,582 for long term invest-
ments. Interestingly, Portuguese firms on average have 2.2 bank relationship; this
will provide useful variation to identify the credit supply shock and construct a
firm level instrument for the shock.
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To construct the occupational structure at the firm level I use the information
contained in the matched employer-employee dataset. Each worker, in each year,
has to be assigned to one of the 9 categories following a (compulsory) classifica-
tion of workers defined by the Portuguese law.10 Classification is based on the
task performed and skill requirements, and each category can be considered as
a level in a hierarchy defined in terms of increasing responsibility and task com-
plexity. The 9 levels’ hierarchy defined by the Portuguese law is detailed and
is rarely found in its entirety in a Portuguese firm. To make the classification
more representative of the reality of the Portuguese production network, I group
some of the categories according to the description of the tasks performed and the
wage distribution. I assign "Top executives (top management)" to occupation 3;
"Intermediary executives (middle management)" and "Supervisors, team leaders"
to occupation 2; "Higher-skilled professionals" and "Skilled professionals" to oc-
cupation 1; and the remaining employees, including "Semi-skilled professionals",
"Non-skilled professionals", and "Apprenticeship" to occupation 0. This classi-
fication provides a good picture on the hierarchical organization of the firm and
allows me to partition the available categories into management layers. The great
majority of the firms in the sample satisfy a hierarchy—see table 1.2—and firms
with a more complex organizational structure employ more workers, pay higher
salaries and use more external credit—both long and short term—to finance their
activity as it is clear from table 1.3.
I follow (Caliendo et al., 2015b) in translating the number of different occupa-
tions present in a firm into layers of management. A firm reporting c occupational
categories will be said to have L = c− 1 layers of management: hence, in the data
I will have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management. In terms of layers
within a firm I do not keep track of the specific occupational categories but sim-
ply rank them. Hence a firm with occupational categories 2 and 0 will have 1
10I use the Portuguese classification (Decreto Lei 121/78 of July 2nd 1978)
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layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer 0 correspond-
ing to some skilled and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to
intermediary executives and supervisors.11
Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of sales by organization type. Firms with a
higher number of management layers have a higher volume of sales. Table 1.3
shows how the hourly wage and the hours worked are increasing in the number
of management layers. Moreover, the last two columns of the table show that a
positive relationship exists also between the number of management layers and
credit—both short and long term.
1.3 Credit & organizations
In this section I document how the internal organization of the firm respond to a
credit shock—the financial crisis in 2009. First, section 1.3.1 describes a methodol-
ogy that combines an instrument for credit supply and a difference in difference
that allows to disentangle the effect of credit supply shock from the contempora-
neous drop in demand. The identification of the credit supply shock follows the
methodology described by (Paravisini et al., 2015b). The richness of the data al-
lows to open the black box of the firm and look within the organization of labour
of each firm before and after the credit shock. In section 1.3.6 I discuss the results
and propose a simple mechanims to interpret them. To test the proposed mech-
anism, section 1.4 presents the analysis of firms’ organizational reaction to the
exposure of the increase in Chinese competition that followed China’s entry in
the WTO in 2001. The methodology follows the work by (Autor et al., 2013a) and
11A potential concern of this methodology is that firms can have layers with occupations that
are not adjacent in the rank. In my sample however, 70% of the firms have adjacent layers and the
share goes up to 85% if I use hours worked as a weighting factor. I perform the estimations using
the categorization of occupation that define the managerial layers without filling non-adjacent
occupations with the occupation above in the rank and results hold. Results using occupation
can be found in the online appendix.
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construct a measure of Chinese import penetration to instrument for the increase
in competition for Portuguese producers.
1.3.1 The credit shock
The global financial crisis affected Portugal enormously and through different
channels. In a very first phase, the Portuguese economy was almost untouched
by the events happening in the US; the housing market did not suffer any bub-
ble and the financial markets did not react to the first signs of financial distress
in June 2007.12 The tension in the interbank borrowing market started to be ex-
tremely high in September 2008, when Lehman Brothers filed for Bankruptcy.
The Portuguese banking system relied heavily on foreign interbank funding
to finance loans to individuals and firms because of a low aggregate saving rate
of the Portuguese economy.13 Figures 1.3 and 1.4 show respectively the drop in
total short term credit in the Portuguese economy and the drop in total foreign in-
terbank borrowing of Portuguese banks. The decline in the total amount of short
term credit in the economy is remarkable (around 50%)14 and although some of
the drop of credit may be due to a drop in demand15, the magnitude of the inter-
bank borrowing decline suggests a potential important role played by the supply
channel. The two factors together, drop in supply and demand, created an un-
precedented tension in the labour market leading to extremely high unemploy-
ment levels; total unemployment rose up to 15% from 5% in 1998, while youth
unemployment rose up to around 43% from an initial level of 13% in 1998.
12The first episode of distress is the rescue by the investment bank Bear Stearns of a subsidiary
edge fund that had invested heavily in subprime mortgages in the US. See (Lourenço and Ro-
drigues, 2015) for evidence on the evolution of the Portuguese housing market.
13See the BIS dataset on the specific dependence of Portuguese banks (see
www.bis.org/statistics/about_banking_stats.htm)
14The liquidity crisis was unexpected across all European countries and not related to Por-
tuguese institutions.
15Demand certainly played an important role as well: both domestic and foreign demand for
Portuguese goods decreased sharply in the aftermath of Lehman collapse, and this led to a de-
crease in production and consumption.
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Three characteristics make the financial crisis unique and important to study
as a shock to the real economy: first, bank credit represent the major source of ex-
ternal financing for enterprises in Europe. The structure of the economy in many
European countries is dominated by small and medium sized enterprises that
do not reach a sufficient scale to access the financial market directly by issuing
corporate bonds.16 Second, lending relationships between firms and banks are
stable overtime, making it very difficult for firms to switch bank.17 Finally, the
2008-9 financial crisis began outside the corporate loan sector. These characteris-
tics help designing an empirical methodology to causally identify the effect of a
credit supply shock by making the shock orthogonal to the loan portfolio of the
firms in the economy and by ensuring that firms are heterogeneously hit by the
credit shock.
1.3.2 The empirical model
Studying the effect of a decrease in credit supply on firm level outcomes is chal-
lenging. The identification problem arises naturally because the amount of credit
received by the firm is an equilibrium outcome between the amount of credit de-
manded by the firm and the amount the bank supplies. To address this concern,
I follow (Paravisini et al., 2015b) and rely on two complementary methodologies:
first, I instrument for the supply of credit, using shocks to the balance sheet of the
banks lending to firm i. Second, to avoid to incur in a biased estimation due to
non-random matching of firms and banks, I use the firm-bank network observed
in a year out of the sample and I control for the unobserved heterogeneity in the
16The Survey on Access to finance for Small and Medium enterprises of the ECB shows how
SMEs use bank credit as main source of liquidity and financing; indeed, only 7% of the firms in
Europe use the equity market to finance their activity. Moreover, the structural difference in firms’
access to the financial market between US and Europe helps explaining why the banking system
in Europe is 2.5 times the GDP, while in the US is only 0.7 times.
17See (Bonfim and Dai, 2012) for evidence on relationship lending in Portugal.
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cross-section with firm fixed effects.18 Moreover, I allow demand shocks to be
varying across sectors and year and include sector-time fixed effect to account for
this possibility and isolate the variation that comes from the credit supply shock
only.
As a result, the estimation compares within firm variation in the hierarchical
organization, accounting for time varying sectoral demand shocks. Intuitively, I
compare the change in employment and organization of two identical firms pro-
ducing leather shoes, but one happens to be linked to a negatively affected bank
out of the n bank links the firm has, while the other has a lender portfolio that is
not affected. The identification assumption is that factors other than bank credit
that may affect the labour composition of the firm organization of leather shoes
producers are not related to the debt composition of their bank; in other words,
the debit composition of the bank affects labour choices of the firm only trough
credit after accounting for firm heterogeneity in the matching. The identifica-
tion assumption could be violated if a firm’s bank affiliation is correlated with
(i) labour demand for a specific product or (ii) non-credit firm-level shocks (e.g.
firms’ direct dependence on (foreign) funding not mediated by banks).
The latter concern can be immediately ruled out by two different observa-
tions. First, the Portuguese corporate bond market is very limited in size; very
few firms issue bonds to finance their activity, while the great majority of firms
rely on banks’ loan.19 Secondly, the average Portuguese firm in the sample has
20 employees; firms are too small to consider issuing bonds as a valid alterna-
tive to finance their activity. With respect to the first concern, if banks specialize
18In the appendix, I account for bank specialization in lending to firms in sector s following
(Paravisini et al., 2015a). Suppose that a specific bank specializes in lending to firms producing
leather shoes; then, if a trade shock hits all the firms in the leather shoes sector at the same time
during the crisis, I wont be able to disentangle the trade shock from the credit supply shock. In
section 1.5 I estimate the model using 2005 as a placebo shock. The exercise confirms that firms
connected to different banks are on parallel trends before the drop in credit supply in 2009.
19Looking at the ECB survey on access to finance for enterprises, only 7% of the firms in the
Portuguese economy report equity as a source of financing.
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in lending to firms producing a specific product and a dramatic demand shock
affects that product at the same time as the credit shock, the inclusion of 2 digit
sector-time fixed effects might not be enough to capture demand shocks. In fact,
the inclusion of sector-time fixed effects captures credit demand variation only
if changes in firms’ credit demand are in expectations equally spread across all
banks lending to the firm. In the appendix, I investigate whether banks special-
ize in a sector following the methodology in (Paravisini et al., 2015b) and I find
that accounting for bank specialization in a 2 digit sector does not change the
estimates.
The objective is to estimate the elasticity (η) of the organization (L) to credit
(C) and I do so using the following specification:
List = η ∗ ln(Cit) + δi + γst + ist (1.1)
In the baseline estimates, List measures the span of control across two adjacent
layers of firm i in sector s at time t, Cit is the sum of all outstanding credit of firm
i at time t, δi is a set of firm fixed effects accounting, for example, for manage-
rial ability in firm i or for time invariant firm characteristic that might determine
the bank-firm matching, γst accounts for unobserved heterogeneity of sector s at
time t, such as sector level demand shocks or changes in production costs due to
increase in intermediates input costs.
I estimate equation 1.1 using shocks to the banks’ balance sheet lending to
firm i to instrument for the amount of credit granted to firm i at time t.
1.3.3 Interbank borrowing shock and credit supply
When the crisis hit the Portuguese banks in 2009, the dry up in liquidity reduced
dramatically the funds available to the financial institutions. Moreover, because
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of a low aggregate saving rate in the economy, Portuguese banks heavily relied
on foreign interbank borrowing to give credit to firms.20
The hypothesis behind the IV is that the contraction in credit supply in 2009
was larger for banks that relied more on foreign interbank funding before the
crisis. To test this assumption, I use the following model:.
ln(Cibt) = βf(FDb) ∗ Postt + θib + µit + ibt (1.2)
where Cibt is the average outstanding debt of firm i with bank b before and af-
ter the shock (t = Pre,Post), Pre and Post are the 5 years before and after 2009.
FDb is the share (or a function) of foreign interbank funding over total asset of
bank b measured in 2003 while Postt is a dummy taking value 1 if the period is af-
ter 2009. θib and µit are firm-bank and firm-time fixed effects, aiming to capture all
the time invariant heterogeneity in the demand and supply of credit (the former)
and all the firm specific evolution of credit demand (the latter). The coefficient β
measures how credit supply changes with foreign interbank funding, under the
assumption that shocks to firms’ demand of credit are on average equally spread
across banks.
Equation 1.2 returns the within-firm estimator which compares the change in
the amount of lending by banks with different dependence on foreign interbank
funding to the same firm, before and after the interbank shock (2009).
I use the years from 2004 to 2013 to estimate equation 1.2 in first differences,
defining the pre-period to be from 2004 to 2008 and the post period from 2009 to
2013. I estimate the following equation that identifies the credit supply shock at
bank level:
20See the BIS dataset on the dependence of Portuguese banks
www.bis.org/statistics/about\_banking\_stats.html.
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ln(Cibpost)− ln(Cibpre) = βf(FDb) + µ′it + ib (1.3)
FDb is the value of interbank borrowing over total assets for bank b measured
in a year out of the sample, 2003, µ′it are before-after differences in firm fixed ef-
fects. I also inspect the relationship between foreign funding and credit supply
described in equation 1.3 non parametrically in the appendix.
In table 1.7 I show the results of the estimation of equation 1.3 using different
specification for the the interbank dependence. In column 1 I report results of
the estimation of equation 1.3 using a linear function of the foreign interbank
borrowing FD = f(FD). Column 2 shows the correlation between short term
credit and an indicator equal to 1 if the banks exposure to the to foreign interbank
borrowing market is above the median, while column 3 reports the coefficient for
banks with exposure above the average. In all the specifications, standard errors
are clustered at bank level. The coefficients are all significant and, focusing on
column 1, a magnitude of -1.831 implies that a one-percentage-point increase in
the fraction of foreign funding before the crisis predicts a 1.831-percentage-point
additional decline in credit supply, which in turn is a very big effect. Results
in table 1.7 show that the same firm borrowing from 2 different banks faces a
substantial drop in credit supply after 2009 from the bank that is more exposed
to the interbank borrowing market. The within firm estimation confirms that the
exposure of the bank to the foreign interbank borrowing market is an important
determinant for the reduction in credit supply to firms.
1.3.4 Instrument and First Stage
Results in section 1.3.3 confirm the importance of bank balance sheet in predicting
credit supply reductions: a higher exposure to the foreign interbank borrowing
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market leads to a higher reduction in the supply of credit by the bank. To estimate
the effect of a credit supply shock to the organization of the firm, I construct a
firm level instrument using shocks to the balance sheet of the banks, namely the
variation in banks dependence to the foreign interbank market. I construct the
firm level instrument in two steps: first, I use the average foreign dependence of
the firm’s banks, weighted by the fraction of credit from each bank, to instrument
for credit supply:
Zi =∑
b
wib ∗ FDb (1.4)
In equation 1.4, wib is the share of bank b in total credit of firm i, and FDb is
the foreign dependence on bank b, defined as the exposure to foreign interbank
borrowing market over total assets. I allow FDb to be a linear function, an indi-
cator function equal to one if the bank exposure to foreign interbank funding is
10% percent above the mean among all banks, or a non linear function.
I the second step, I interact the instrument with the Postt dummy:
ZiPost = Zi ∗ Post (1.5)
The first stage regression of equation 1.2 is estimated using the following spec-
ification after taking first differences at both sides:21
ln(CiPost)− ln(CiPre) = βZi + γ′s + νi (1.6)
21The Post dummy is equal to one for the years from 2009 to 2013, while it is equal to zero for
the years from 2004 to 2008. The foreign dependence of each bank b as well as the weights, defined
as the share of bank b credit to firm i over total credit of firm i are calculated in a pre-sample year,
namely 2003.
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where γ′s = γpost − γpre is the first difference of sector fixed effects controlling
for factors that affect the sector in which the firm operates.22
In the first stage I test if the firm level instrument is correlated with the to-
tal amount of credit received by the firm; moreover, constructing the instrument
with the firm-bank links in a out of the sample year, 2003, and estimating equation
1.6 at firm level accounts for the concern of firms switching lenders in reaction of
the negative shock.23
Results shown in table 1.8 confirm the relevance of the instrument. In columns
1 and 2 respectively, I define exposure to the foreign interbank borrowing market
using a dummy equal to one if the exposure of the bank is above the median or
the above the mean of the exposure of all banks in the year 2003; in column 3 I
use a linear function of FD, while column 4 reports results using a third degree
polynomial. All specifications show that the exposure to the foreign interbank
borrowing market predicts a decrease in credit; I use the linear function of FD as
defined in column 3 throughout the rest of the paper.24
1.3.5 From Credit to Workers
In the second stage I look at the effect of the instrumented credit supply shock
on the organization of the firm. I estimate equation 1.1 by first differencing so to
eliminate the firm fixed-effects:
ln(LisPost)− ln(LisPre) = η ∗ [ln(CiPost)− ln(CiPre)] + γ′s + ′is (1.7)
22Estimating equation 1.6 in first differences allows me to eliminate firm fixed effects.
23(Iyer et al., 2014) show that firms in Portugal do not switch bank when hit by a credit supply
shock.
24In the appendix I show results of the estimation of equation 1.6 by quartiles of the distribution
of the instrument to captures how the change in credit supply varies with different exposures
to the shock. Results confirm the intuition that the correlation between the instrument and the
change in short term credit increases in magnitude with the exposure of the firm to the shock.
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In equation 1.7 the sector fixed-effects γ′s = γsPost − γsPre capture demand
shocks specific to a sector s. The change in the amount of credit received by firm
i, [ln(CiPost)− ln(CiPre)] is instrumented with ZiPost defined in equation 1.5.
A formal test of the change in the hierarchical shape of the firm can be per-
formed by constructing measures of span of controls defined as the ratio of num-
ber of workers in two adjacent layers. In table 1.9 I present the results for the
estimation of equation 1.7 where the dependent variable is the change in the log
ratio of workers in layer L+ 1 on workers in layer L. In columns from 1 to 3, the
dependent variable is respectively the change in the ratio of team leaders to pro-
duction workers, middle managers to team leaders and top managers to middle
managers. When hit by a negative credit supply shock, firms shrink by reducing
the ratio of team leaders to production workers (column 1) while the span of con-
trol ratios for the layers at the top of the hierarchy are unaffected by a reduction
in the supply of credit (columns 2 and 3). The coefficients in table 1.9 are elastic-
ities of the spans of control to credit. A 10% drop in the supply of credit predicts
a drop in the ratio of team leaders to production workers of 2%, which in turns
implies an increase in the span of control (column 1).
However, the observed increase in the span of control can be driven by an
increase in the number of production workers, by a decrease in the number of
team leaders, or by a decrease of both, with the decrease in the number of team
leaders being more pronounced than the decrease in the number of production
workers. To better understand which of the above mechanisms is driving the
results, I estimate equation 1.7 focusing on each layer in the production structure.
This procedure allows to draw a portrait of firms adjustment to the credit supply
shock. Table 1.10 presents the results of the estimation of equation 1.7 for each
management layer of the firm: in panel A I look at the number of workers in
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each layer and I find the biggest elasticity for the middle layers—employment
of high skilled workers drops by 1.75% with a 10% drop in credit (column 1).
Production workers at the bottom of the hierarchy are less affected by the shock
(column 2), while non significant results are found for managerial layers at the
top of the hierarchy (columns 3 and 4).25 These findings are consistent with the
results in table 1.9 and highlight that the increase in the span of control observed
in coulum 1 is driven by a decrease in both team leaders and production workers,
with the drop in the former being more pronounced than the latter. In panel B of
table 1.10, I look at the intensive margin of adjustment within each layer, namely
the average salary of the workers in each layer of the production hierarchy. No
effect is found on wages for any of the layers; this is however not surprising given
the high level of unionization of the Portuguese labour market that impedes any
downward adjustment in the salaries (see (Addison et al., 2015) for evidence on
unionization and wage rigidity in Portugal).
Finally, I estimate equation 1.7 at firm level and check that the aggreagate re-
sults are in line with the literature on the effect of credit shocks on employment
(see for example (Chodorow-Reich, 2014)). Results are presented in table 1.11:
when hit by a negative credit supply shock, firms shrink by reducing the number
of workers and the total wage bill as well as the number of management lay-
ers. Indeed, the elasticity of number of workers and wage bill to a 10% drop in
the supply of short term credit is respectively of 1.82% and 1.99%.26 Comparing
the elasticities obtained with the instrumental variable procedure to the ones ob-
tained from the OLS estimation of equation 1.2, we notice a remarkable difference
25In the appendix I show the estimation of equation 1.7 for the groups of occupations used to
construct the hierarchical structure of the firm. Results confirm and reinforce the findings of table
1.10: a 10% reduction in short term credit is associated with a 3.82% reduction of employment
of high skilled production workers, while no effect is found on lower-skilled production workers
neither on top managers.
26Results are in line with the findings of (Caliendo et al., 2015b) and(Caliendo et al., 2015a):
firms systematically change the internal organization by reducing overall employment and the
total wage bill as well as the number of managerial layers.
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in the magnitude. The IV returns bigger coefficients and highlight the importance
of instrumenting for credit supply to account for the attenuation bias generated
by the contemporaneous drop in demand for firm credit.27
Two considerations are in order: first, in line with the previous literature on
the real effects of the credit shock, I find that firms shrink in response to a drop
in the supply of credit by reducing the number of workers employed and the
overall wage bill, as well as the number of management layers. Second, firms
change their organization by laying off more in the middle layers than at the very
top or at the bottom of the hierarchy: high skill workers and team leaders pay the
highes bill of reorganizational responses to the credit crisis.
These results further highlight the importance of credit in determining the
optimal organizational structure of the firm. In section 1.3.6 I provide a simple
mechanism to interpret and rationalize these findings, while in section 1.4 I test
the validity of the mechanism by showing how firm organizations react to a trade
shock.
1.3.6 Interpretation of the results
Models of firm organization—both knowledge-based hierarchies or incentive-
based hierarchies—suggest that the optimal number of hierarchy layers increases
with production scale. These models interpret managers as fixed costs that re-
duce marginal costs by making workers more productive; additional managers
will decrease average costs if production scale is sufficiently large. Adding hi-
erarchical layers has implications for the wage distribution within firms because
higher-level managers receive high wages due to their productive effect on a large
range of workers. At the same time, wages decrease for workers at the produc-
tion level because managers can be considered either as problem solvers whose
27The direction of the bias is discussed in detail in the appendix.
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knowledge reduces skill requirements of workers or supervisors whose monitor-
ing substitutes for wage incentives to prevent shirking. Both demand and credit
available affect production scale, but as shown in the previous section firms re-
spond to credit shocks by adjusting their internal structure in a very specific way.
The firm level response to the credit shocks is consistent with a working capital-
layer complementarity mechanism: a decrease in the amount of working capital
available to the firm has a differential effect on different layers, depending on
how much each layer is complementary with the working capital available to the
firm.28 The different elasticities shown in table 1.10 suggest that the degree of
complementarity is higher for the layer that includes higher-skill workers and
team leaders, while it is lower for production workers. This result is confirmed
in table 1.9, where the ratio in column 1 shows that the reduction in team leaders
is more pronounced than the reduction in production workers. A formal test of
the mechanism requires detailed information on the working capital use by layer,
which is not available in the Portuguese firm level data.29 However, In the next
section I test if a different type of shock—a trade induced demand shock—affects
the organization of the firm consistentently with the mechanism described above.
1.4 The trade shock
Do firms react differently when hit by a trade shock? Is the reaction consistent
with the working capital layer complementarity mechanism described in section
1.3.6? In this section, I exploit the entry of China in the WTO and its rise as a
global producer and exporter to understand and measure how Portuguese firms
28See (Krusell et al., 2000a) for a detailed description of the capital skill complementarity mech-
anism in a general equilibrium framework.
29As part of this research agenda, I am planning to conduct a firm level survey to gather addi-
tional information on working capital usage.
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adjust their internal organization in response to an increase in competition and a
drop in demand.
On the 11th of November 2001, China joined the World Trade Organization
(WTO); the process of accession started some years before, but only from the
end of 2001 WTO countries opened their markets to the Chinese exports without
charging extremely high tariffs. The entry of China in the WTO exposed Por-
tuguese firms to an unprecedented degree of competition, both in the internal
market and on the export markets. On the internal market, Chinese exports were
cheaper and potentially substitutes of products traditionally produced by Por-
tuguese firms. On the export markets, the inflow of Chinese products increased
the degree of competition for Portuguese exporters. The combination of the two
factors together generated a drastic drop in demand for Portuguese firms, both
exporters and non-exporters; together with the drop in demand for products,
firms also reduced the demand for credit.
I extend the sample to the years from 1998 to 2004 and add 2 digit sectoral
level trade data to estimate the impact of exposure to Chinese import competi-
tion on the organization of the firm. To account for possible correlation between
industry imports and industry domestic demand or productivity shocks, I follow
(Autor et al., 2013a) and instrument for the change in Portuguese imports from
China using import growth in other high-income countries within 20 harmonized
industries.30 Key to the identification strategy is that China’s rise as a global
produced was driven by rapid improvements in the production structure of the
country, including technology, infrastructure and urbanization, all contributing
to a fast and unprecedented growth in total factor productivity (TFP).31
30The sectoral definition in the matched employer-employee dataset is harmonized 2 digit CAE
classification and does not allow further level of detail. Moreover, data on firm-level trade trans-
actions are not available to merge in combination with the other datasets used in this project.
31See (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) and (Brandt et al., 2012) for evidence on China’s total factor
productivity growth.
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The theoretical intuition of the mechanism can be explained using a simple
model with two sectors, one exposed to the trade shock and one that is not. As
in the specific factor model, non labour factors are immobile across sectors, while
in the long run labour is mobile between sectors and can freely relocate across
regions. If productivity growth abroad causes product demand to fall for the ex-
posed sectors at home, firms will have a drop in the total sales and consequently
reduce labour demand. This in turn will cause a drop in nominal wages and force
some workers to relocate to non-exposed sectors. However, frictions in moving
labour between industries can slow the adjustments in the short run; nominal
wages in the exposed sector will remain below those in non exposed industries
during the transition until the economy fully adjust to the shock. The way firm
adjust their organizational structure during the transition determines the aggre-
gate employment outcomes.
Empirically, I follow (Autor et al., 2014a) and define a measure of trade expo-
sure as the change in the import penetration ratio for a Portuguese industry over
the period 1995 to 2004 as:
∆IPs,t =
∆MPt,Chinas,t
Ys,95 +Ms,95 −Es,95 (1.8)
where for a Portuguese sector s, ∆MPT ,CHINAs,t is the change in imports from
China over the period 1995 to 2004 and Ys,95 +Ms,95 −Es,95 is the initial absorp-
tion measured as industry shipments Ys,95 plus industry imports Ms,95 minus in-
dustry exportsEs,95. Trade data are available from 1995 onwards and this justifies
the choice of 1995 as the base year to compute changes in import penetration.32
32The empirical estimation will use values of import penetration from 1998 to 2004.
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Changes in import penetration as defined in equation 1.8 can be in part con-
taminated by demand shocks to Portuguese industries. To isolate the supply-
driven component of the Chinese import shock, I construct a measure of trade
exposure as:
∆IPOthers,t =
∆MOther,Chinas,t
Ys,95 +Ms,95 −Es,95 (1.9)
where ∆IPOthers,t is the change in imports from China from 1995 to 2004 in
non-Portugal other OECD countries.33 The motivation and identifying assump-
tion for the import penetration measure as defined in equation 1.9 is that OECD
economies are similarly exposed to the rise of Chinese imports but the industry
import demand shocks are weekly correlated across them.34
To measure the organizational reaction of firms to a drop in firms’ sales, I
would estimate the following equation:
ln(Lit) = βln(Salesit) + θst + µi + it (1.10)
where Lit is a measure of organization of firm i at time t as defined in section
1.2.1, θst are sector-time fixed-effects and µi are firm fixed-effects. I estimate equa-
tion 1.10 using the Chinese trade shock and the measure of import penetration
defined in equation 1.9 to instrument for the change in sales at the firm level after
the entry of China in the WTO.
The hypothesis behind the instrument is that firms in more affected sectors
33Details on the construction of the import penetration measure and the list of countries in-
cluded can be found in the appendix.
34In the appendix I show results using the instrument computed using only import penetration
from China to the U.S. to avoid that demand shocks in other countries can be correlated with
demand shocks to Portuguese producers. The rationale is that US is a small exporting market for
Portuguese manufacturers, and it is very unluckily that a drop in demand in sector s in the U.S.
market directly affects Portuguese exporters in a relevant manner.
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have a more pronounced drop in sales than firms in less affected ones holding
conditional on firm characteristics and business cycle fluctuations. The identi-
fication assumption of the instrument is that the exposure of Portuguese firms
to import penetration in sector s affects the organization of the firm and its em-
ployment in each hierarchical layer only through the change in firm’s sales once
accounting for time invariant firm specificities. The estimate of the coefficient β
of equation 1.10 returns the elasticity of the organization of the firm to a change
in sales induced by a change in import penetration from China.
I estimate equation 1.10 after taking first differences for the periods 1998-2001
and 2002-2004.35 The first stage is:
ln(SalesiPost)− ln(SalesiPre) = β
[
IPOthersPost − IPOthersPre
]
+ it (1.11)
where IPOthersPost − IPOthersPre is the average change in import penetration from
China to other non-Portugal countries between the Pre period defined as the
years from 1998 to 2001 and the Post period defined as the years from 2002 to
2004. 36
The second stage is:
ln(LisPost)− ln(LisPre) = β [ln(SalesiPost)− ln(SalesiPre)] + it (1.12)
35When analyzing the firm reorganization in response to the China shock, the sample is con-
straint to the years from 1998 to 2004 to exclude the great financial crisis. On the contrary, the firm
response to a credit shock is estimated with a sample that goes from 2004 to 2013.
36Following the methodology described in (Autor et al., 2014a), the average import penetration
in sector s in each period of the two stacked periods is defined as 1T ∑
J
j=1 IPj where T is the
number of years in each stacked period and J are the countries in Other used to construct the
instrument.
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where ln(SalesiPost)− ln(SalesiPre) is instrumented using IPOthersPost − IPOthersPre
and ln(LisPost)− ln(LisPre) are measures of the change in the organization of the
firm as described in section 1.2.1. Table 1.12 reports the baseline results of the OLS
estimation of equation 1.12 at firm level. A drop in log sales is correlated with the
shrinkage of the organization, both in terms of number of workers in the firm
(column 1), the total wage bill (columns 2 and 3) and the number of management
layers; moreover, firms reduce employment in all layers as well as the wage bill
(see table 1.13).
Table 1.16 presents the results for the instrumental variable estimation of equa-
tion 1.12 where the change in sales between the Pre and the Post 2001 is instru-
mented using the change in import penetration as defined in equation 1.9. In the
first column I report the result of the first stage regression (equation 1.11): a in-
crease in import penetration from China in other countries predicts a significant
reduction in the the log sales for the firms in the affected sectors in Portugal. In
columns from 2 to 5, the table presents the estimations of the firm level adjust-
ments to a change in sales. A 10% reduction in sales predicts a 15.7% reduction in
employment and a 16% reduction in the total wage bill. Zooming inside the firm
I find that firms reduce employment in all layers of the hierarchy except at the
very top level (panel A of table 1.15) Moreover, some adjustments are found also
on the wages; indeed, firms reduce the average wages both in the bottom layer
(production workers) and in the mid-managerial layer (panel B of table 1.15).37
In line with papers looking at employment effects of negative trade shocks (see
for example (Autor et al., 2013a), (Autor et al., 2013b) and (Autor et al., 2014a)),
37The wage rigidities in the Portuguese labour market suggest that firms adjust the average
wage in the layer by changing the composition of workers in the layers, hence firing the most
expensive(most tenured) ones. This is in line with the mechanisms found by (Caliendo et al.,
2015b) for French exporters.
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workers at the bottom of the hierarchy are more affected by a negative shock. In-
deed, I find that the elasticity of employment decreases in magnitude going up
in the hierarchy, with lower values for managers at the top of the pyramid. In
table 1.14 I formally test how a drop in sales induced by an increase in import
penetration from China changes the span of controls across adjacent layers in the
firm. The pattern of reorganization is clear from the estimates presented in table
1.14: the ratio of team leaders per production workers increases with a drop in
sales, suggesting that the firm reduces the demand for workers at the bottom of
the hierarchy more than in the layer of team leaders. Moreover, firms decrease
middle managers more than top managers (see column 3). This is consistent with
the framework described in section 1.3.6, where firms react to a negative demand
shock by adjusting the scale and the composition of the work force laying off
proportionally in each layer of the hierarchical organization.
1.5 Robustness
How do contract types play a role in the firms’ adjustment process to negative
shocks? How do the results change constraining the sample to manufacturing
only? In this section I explore the duality in contract types in the Portuguese
economy to provide evidence of the role played by contract flexibility in allow-
ing firms to reorganize more or less than less flexible counterparts. Moreover, I
perform a set of robustness on the identification strategy and the results obtained
in the previous sections.
Contract types
In a perfectly flexible and functioning labour market, firms could potentially reor-
ganize their production in reaction of a shock without any constraint. However,
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with labour market frictions, reorganizations can be more problematic. The Por-
tuguese legislation presents a wide contractual portfolio to choose from when a
firm decides to hire a new employee, but the two main categories are permanent
contracts and temporary contracts representing more than 95% of the entirety of
contract types in the sample. The main characteristic of permanent contracts in
southern European countries (Portugal, Italy, Spain and France) is the high de-
gree of protection for the employee; indeed, the costs of firing a worker with a
permanent contract are very high for the firm which is only willing to bear the
costs in extreme situations. On the other hand, temporary contracts present very
little protection for the workers.
The existence of a dual labour market - with permanent and temporary con-
tracts - creates heterogeneity across firms when looking at reorganizations: firms
with a high share of permanent contracts face higher frictions to reorganization
which can ultimately lead to a sub-optimal outcome, while firms that rely more
on temporary contracts can freely adjust to market changes in a more dynamic
way.
I exploit the heterogeneity in contract types and construct a measure of firm
flexibility that splits firms into flexible and non flexible. I define the following
measure of firm flexibility:
Flex =
Temporaryi,2003
Totali,2003
> ∑
i=1,N
Temporary2003
Total2003
N
(1.13)
The dummy Flex is constructed using pre-sample variation in intensity in tem-
porary contracts. For each firm in 2003 I measure the share of temporary contracts
over the total of temporary and permanent contracts and I define the dummy flex
to be equal to 1 if the firm share is above the mean of the sample (I will refer to
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this groups as of "flexible firms").38
I estimate equation 1.7 interacting the variable flex with the supply of credit
both in the first stage and then in the second stage. Tables 1.17 and 1.18 report re-
sults of the estimation at the firm level (table 1.17) and layer level (table 1.18). Sur-
prisingly, the coefficients of the interaction between the change in credit ∆ln(Ci)
and the variable flex in all columns of table 1.17 have a lower magnitude that the
coefficients for the change in credit ∆ln(Ci); flexible firms on average reduced
employment and their wage bill less than their less flexible counterparts in the
5 years after the financial crisis. This apparently counterintuitive result aligns
with the idea that flexibility increases the variance of firm employment by exac-
erbating immediate reaction to negative downturns, but also rehiring once out of
the negative conjuncture. Table 1.18 reinforces the results from table 1.10: when
looking inside the firm, the adjustment on the quantity of workers employed is
bigger in the middle layers, even more when the firm is flexible. Flexible firms
decrease less their total employment level 5 years after a negative credit supply
shock; however, they adjust their internal organization by reducing the number
of managers and middle managers more than non flexible firms, while the ad-
justment on the production workers side do not change across the two groups of
firms. 39
Placebo test of the parallel trends
A potential concern with the identification strategy presented in section 1.3.2 is
that firms connected to bad or good banks might be on different trends before the
38The average share of temporary contracts in my sample in the year 2003 is 20%.
39The share of workers with temporary contracts in each layer is respectively 21% for produc-
tion workers, 13% for team leaders, 8% for middle managers and 9% for top managers. This
further highlights that the reaction of the firm is not entirely driven by the contractual composi-
tion of the workers in each layer of production, but rather by an economic mechanism that drives
these adjustments.
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shock.40 One way to test the validity of the parallel trend assumption when using
shift-share type instrument in combination with a time varying shock is to define
a placebo timing for the shock.41 In this section I present a test of the parallel
trend imposing the shock to happen in 2005 instead of 2009.
I estimate the following first stage regression:
ln(CiPost)− ln(CiPre) = βZi + γ′s + νi (1.14)
where Pre is defined in the years 2004 and 2005 and Post is defined in 2006
and 2007. Using the years between 2004 and 2007 allows me to look at normal
periods with no shock in the time period; I define the placebo shock to happen
in 2005 and estimate the first stage defined in equation 1.14. Table 1.19 present a
not statistically significant coefficient with an f-test below 1. The placebo confirms
that in normal times there is no difference in the supply of credit to firms linked to
more or less exposed banks conditional on time invariant firm characteristic and
sector-time demand shocks. The result in table 1.19 provides strong evidence to
support of the random matching of firms and banks in 2003 conditional on firms’
time invariant characteristics; indeed, the identification strategy correctly isolates
a channel from banks to firms that is driven by a variation in bank’s exposure to
the foreign interbank borrowing market that is exogenous to the firm and to the
link between firms and banks.
40The potential endogeneity of the matching between firms and banks in the pre-sample is ac-
counted for by the firm fixed-effects. If highly productive firms are matched with highly produc-
tive banks in a specific year (2003), the inclusion of firm fixed-effects controls for any differences
across the two groups. However, firm fixed-effects cannot account for the possibility that the
matching in the pre-sample places firms on different trajectories.
41An alternative is to modify the instrument using randomly generated weights and test if the
instrument has predictive power in the first stage.
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Constraining the sample to manufacturing
A potential concern with the identification strategy presented in section 1.3.2 and
most importantly when comparing the reaction of the firm across the two differ-
ent shocks, the credit shock and the trade shock, is to have a sample of firms that
are hit by both shocks. Indeed, studying the demand drop induced by the rise of
China as a global producer and exporter of manufacturing products, constraints
the sample to be only of manufacturers.
To this end, I perform the estimations of sections 1.3.1 and 1.4 constraining the
sample on the 15 manufacturing sectors only. In tables 1.20 to 1.22 I report the re-
sults for the estimation of the effect of the credit shock on the manufacturing firms
only. Tables 1.20 and 1.21 confirm that the main finding of the paper holds when
conditioning the sample on manufacturing firms; firms react to a credit shock by
shrinking, but they do so especially in the middle of the organization by reducing
the number of high skill workers and team leaders more than production work-
ers.42 Moreover, in tables 1.23 and 1.24 I report the estimate of the China shock
on the manufacturing firms only. Results confirm that the firm readjust mainly
at the bottom, cutting production workers mainly. Indeed, when conditioning
on manufacturing firms, I find that the adjustment happens only at the bottom
of the hierarchy, while no effect is found on managerial positions of any level.
This further strenghten the mechanism described in section 1.3.6: credit is com-
plementary with workers, but the degree of complementarity is heterogeneous
across the layers of the hierarchy of the firm. A credit shock has a differential
effect on different layers depending on the degree of complementarity, namely
the elasticity of the workers in the layer to a change in working capital available
42The list of sectors does not include construction both when using the full sample in the main
analysis and when constraining the sample to manufacturing only. The reason is that the con-
struction sector had a dramatic drop in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2009, with a dra-
matic increase in sectoral unemployment rate; including construction would hugely increase the
estimates and drive most of the findings.
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to the firm. On the other hand, a trade shock that shifts the demand faced by
the firm, leads to a decrease in the quantity produced, which for a manufacturing
firm—with flatter organizational structures—immediately translates into a drop
in demand for low skill production workers.
Dynamics: permanent or temporary shock?
The organizational choice of the firm is the results of a complex process: first, the
enterpreneur observes the level of demand for the product she want to produce
and then decides how to organize production. Obviously, the investement in
the organizational structure by adding a layer of management depends on the
scale of the output, and it does not immediately respond to minor changes to the
demand level or input costs.43 Changes in the organization are associated with
permanent shocks: the firm is only willing to pay the fixed cost of adding a new
management layer if the demand is expected to stay on a higher level for more
than one period. On the other hand, the cost of restructuring by skrinking the
organization will be incurred by the firm if the shift in the production possibility
is permanent.44
A possible way to test the persistence of the shock is to look at the evolution
of the coefficient one year, two years, three years, four years and five years af-
ter the shock. In graph 1.5, I plot the coefficients obtained by constraining the
post period to one, two, three, four and five years in equation 1.7. The observed
pattern is reassuring and confirms the results of tables 1.9 and 1.10: firms imme-
diately react to the credit shock by laying off high skill workers and production
workers, and they consistently do so over the five years of the post period. This
43This is especially relevant in economies with labour markets rigidities, which augment the
costs of hiring as well as the costs of firing workers.
44Besides the costs of firing, when firms re-organize by decreasing the number of workers em-
ployed, they take into account the future costs of searching and hiring new workers when the
shock is reversed.
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confirms the persistence of the credit shock, and also help explaining why we
observe substantial firm reorganizations.
Long term credit
Section 1.3.6 describes a simple mechanism that links working capital financed
through short term credit to the organization of the firm, proposing a novel working-
capital layer complementarity. Moreover, section 1.4 shows that a demand shock
induces a different adjustment to the organization of the firm, while section 1.5
confirms that the differential adjustment does not depend on the transitory nature
of the credit shock. A formal test of the mechanisms requires detailed informa-
tion on the working capital use by layer, which is not available in the Portuguese
firm level data.45
A further step in understanding the mechanism can be done using credit ma-
turities: if long term credit has a similar effect on the organization, it would in-
validate the idea behind the mechanism. In this section, I test what is the effect
of a drop in supply of long term credit on the organization of the firm. Table 1.26
presents the estimates of equation 1.7 using credit with maturity above one year.
Results confirm that long term credit does not have any effect in predicting the
number of workers, the wage bill and the number of layers of the firm. Long term
credit is mainly used to finance long term investments in structures and or plant
expansions, so it is difficult to link with the investments in the labour component
of the organization of the firm.
45This paper is part of a broader reseach agenda that aims at understanding how the organiza-
tion of the firm affects firm performance. Future research aims at collecting new survey data on
the of working capital by layer, information technology used in the firm and R&D expenditures.
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1.6 Conclusion
This paper estimates the elasticity of the organization of the firm to credit sup-
ply shock and compares the organizational reaction of the firm to a trade shock,
namely the China shock. I find that a reduction to the supply of short term credit
affects the size of the firm and the organization of the workforce. Moreover, when
faced with a restriction in credit, firms adjust their hierarchies by reducing the
number of layers. In particular, firms shrink more in the middle of the production
hierarchy when hit by a credit shock, while the adjustment is proportional when
firms react to a trade shock; this reaction is consistent with a working capital layer
complementarity mechanism that forces the firm to adjust more on the high skill
production workers in reaction to a shrinkage in the availability of working capi-
tal. These effects reveal the importance of credit channels to the determination of
the organization of the firm and calls for further investigation to understand the
welfare effects of such reorganizations.
I follow (Paravisini et al., 2015b) and use an estimation strategy that exploits
the exposure of banks to the foreign interbank borrowing market to instrument
for the supply of credit. Moreover, the drop in the liquidity available in the in-
terbank market in the aftermath of Lehman bankruptcy provides an exogenous
shock to study the differential change in credit supply to more and less exposed
firms in the Portuguese economy. I reinforce the validity of the empirical strategy
by performing a set of robustness to check the validity of the instrument and the
importance of labour contracts.
The overall picture points at the importance of credit in the transmission of
shocks from banks to the real economy. When hit by a negative credit supply
shock firms shrink more in the middle of the hierarchy, reducing employment of
higher-skill workers more than lower-skill production workers at the bottom of
the hierarchy. In contrast, when hit by a negative trade shock the reduction is
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more pronounced for lower-skill production workers and decreases proportion-
ally going up to managerial positions. The empirical findings highlight a novel
heterogeneity in the degree of complementarity between working capital and
each hierarchical layers. A shock to one specific input of production—working
capital—translates into a stronger reduction of higher-skill workers than of pro-
duction workers, while top managerial positions are not affected. Consistent with
the framework, a trade induced demand shock affects the scale of the firm, hence
firms layoff proportionally in all layers. Further investigation is needed to better
understand the mechanism and provide a formal empirical test of its functioning.
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FIGURE 1.1: Distribution of firms’ hierarchy by sales
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Notes: This figure report kernel density estimates of the distribution of log sales by num-
ber of layers in the firm. One density is estimated for each group of firms with the same
number of layers.
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FIGURE 1.2: Distribution of firms’ hierarchy by credit
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Notes: This figure report kernel density estimates of the distribution of log short term
credit by number of layers in the firm. One density is estimated for each group of firms
with the same number of layers.
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FIGURE 1.3: Credit shock
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Notes: This figure report the total amount of short term credit with maturity up to one
year lended lended in the Portuguese economy for the firms and banks in the sample.
The red dotted vertical line in correspondence to year 2009 is the Lehman shock. Values
on the vertical axis are in Euros.
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FIGURE 1.4: Interbank market shock
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Notes: This figure report the total exposure of Portuguese banks to the foreign interbank
borrowing market. The red dotted vertical line in correspondence to year 2009 is the
Lehman shock. Values on the vertical axis are in Euros.
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FIGURE 1.5: Dynamics
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Notes: This figure report the evolution of the estimated elasticities (and the correspond-
ing confidence interval) of each layer to credit, respectively 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 years after the
shock in 2009. Values on the vertical axis are in percentages.
43
TABLE 1.1: Firm-level descriptives
Mean S.d Min Max Firm-year
Wage bill 522,801 4066829 5615.441 2.93e+08 1,471,063
# workers 30.28 191.25 1 15359 1,471,063
Tot. Sales 6,648,312 6.20e+07 5011.533 1.05e+10 1,471,063
# management layers 1.24 1.07 0 3 1,471,063
Tot. credits 294,582 3,488,805 0 1.03e+09 1,471,063
Short term Credit 208,165 2,280,285 0 7.11e+08 1,471,063
Bank x firm 2.23 1.57 1 8 1,471,063
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the regressions.
All the values in the table are an average over all the firms in the sample and all the years,
from 2004 to 2013. The wage bill is calculated adding the monthly base and overtime
wages plus regular benefits and multiplying by 14. I apply a trimming of the top and
bottom 0.5 per cent within each year. A firm wage bill is the sum of the annual wages
of all its workers. The number of workers is the sum total number of workers in the
firm in the year. A firm reporting c occupational categories will be said to have L =
c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have firms spanning from 0
to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)). In terms of layers within a
firm we do not keep track of the specific occupational categories but simply rank them.
Hence a firm with occupational categories 2 and 0 will have 1 layer of management, and
its organization will consist of a layer 0 corresponding to some skilled and non-skilled
professionals, and a layer 1 corresponding to intermediary executives and supervisors.
Short term credit computed summing all the bank credit with maturity up to 1 year for
a firm in a given calendar year. Bank per firm is the number of bank relationships each
firm has.
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TABLE 1.2: Percentage of firms that satisfy hierarchy in wages
# layers wlL ≤ wl+1L all l w0L ≤ w1L w1L ≤ w2L w2L ≤ w3L
1 0.82 0.82
2 0.70 0.85 0.85
3 0.61 0.90 0.87 0.82
Notes: This table reports the fraction of firms that satisfy a hierarchy in hours, grouping
firms by their number of layers of management (# number of layers). Hours N lL is the
number of hours reported in layer l in an L layers of management firm. For L = 1, 2, 3,
and l = 0, ...,L− 1 we say that a firm satisfies a hierarchy in hours between layers number
l and l + 1 in a given year if N lL ≥ N l+1L , i.e. if the number of hours worked in layer l
is at least as large as the number of hours worked in layer l + 1; moreover, we say that
a firm satisfies a hierarchy at all layers if N lL ≥ N l+1L ∀l = 0, ...,L− 1, i.e. if the number
of hours worked in layer l is at least as large as the number of hours in layer l + 1, for
all layers in the firm. Following these definitions, the top panel reports, among all firms
with L = 1, 2, 3 layers of management, the fraction of those that satisfy a hierarchy in
wages at all layers (first column), and the fraction of those that satisfy a hierarchy in
wages between layer l and l+ 1, with l = 0, ...,L− 1 (second to fourth column). All the
values in the table are an average over all the firms in the sample and all the years, from
2004 to 2013
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TABLE 1.3: Firm-level descriptives by number of layers
Mean
# layers Firm-year Sales Hours Hourly Short term Long term
wage credit credit
0 6,830 1,856,666 36,014 5.36 83,927 322,388
1 31,518 3,389,909 43,170 5.73 163,575 462,767
2 50,637 6,912,070 67,747 6.66 337,968 782,710
3 47,454 28,893,688 235,215 7.81 1,386,366 2,585,667
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics by number of layers. Each row shows the
average sales, hours worked, hourly wage and short term (maturity below 1 year) and
long term (maturity above 1 year) credit for firms with a certain hierarchical structure
(L = 0, 1, 2, 3). All the values in the table are an average over all the firms in the sample
and all the years, from 2004 to 2013.
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TABLE 1.4: Distribution of layers at t+ 1 conditional on layers at t
# of layers in t+ 1
Exit 0 1 2 3 Total
# layers t
0 32.16 45.20 18.85 3.44 0.35 100.00
1 27.55 6.20 52.78 12.20 1.27 100.00
2 21.41 1.06 12.80 55.96 8.77 100.00
3 13.74 0.21 2.00 14.48 69.57 100.00
New 87.26 2.62 5.46 3.41 1.24 100.00
Notes: This table reports the distribution of the number of layers of management at time
t+1, grouping firms according to the number of layers of management at time t. Among
all firms with L layers of management (L = 0,...,3) in any year from 2003 to 2012, the
columns report the fraction of firms that have layers 0, ..., 3 the following year (from 2004
to 2013), or are not present in the dataset, Exit. The table also reports, in the bottom row,
the distribution of the new firms by their initial number of layers. The elements in the
table sum to 100% by row.
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TABLE 1.5: Credit shock OLS - firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln # workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆ ln (Credit) 0.038*** 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001)
Observations 13,618 13,618 13,618 13,618
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the resultsof the within firm estimation of equation 1.2. The
independent variable, ∆ln(Credit) is the log change of short term credit with maturity
up to one year between a pre-period, namely from 2004 to 2009 and a post period, from
2009 to 2013. The dependent variables are log changes of the averages before and after
the shock. The number of workers employed in the firm is the total amount of workers
employed by the firm in the calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount of wages
(base plus overtime) payed by the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is
the total amount of workers employed by the firm in the calendar year de-trended using
a standard linear de-trending methodology to take out normal business cycle variation,
while the number of layers is the number of management layers in the firm. A firm
reporting c occupational categories will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management:
hence, in our data we will have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in
(Caliendo et al., 2015a)). Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.6: Credit shock OLS - layer level
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln (Ci) 0.026*** 0.041*** 0.025*** 0.016***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Panel B: change in the average wage in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (wage)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln (Ci) 0.002* 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Observations 13,618 13,119 10,322 5,253
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.7 at the
layer level. The independent variable, ∆ ln (Ci) is the log change of short term credit
with maturity up to one year between a pre-period, namely from 2004 to 2009 and a post
period, from 2009 to 2013. In panel A I look at the quantities, and the dependent variables
are log changes of the averages number of workers in each managerial layer before and
after the shock, while in panel B I look at the prices and the dependent variable is the
average wage in each managerial layer. The production workers are workers dealing
with simple well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no intellectual work) with
low complexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Workers in layer 1, namely
higher-skill workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate tasks, usually not
repetitive, and defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with the organization
and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and directly linked with the
executive work while workers in the top layer are in charge of the definition of the firm
general policy or consulting on the organization of the firm; strategic planning; creation
or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods or processes. Robust
standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.7: Identification of the credit supply shock
∆ ln (Cib)
(1) (2) (3)
FDb -1.831***
(0.108)
FDb > p50(FDb) -0.616***
(0.02)
FDb > mean(FDb) -0.480***
(0.02)
Observations 36,459 36,459 36,459
R2 0.467 0.475 0.470
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of equation 1.3 in first differences for the period
2004-2013. FDb is the measure of foreign dependence of bank b to the interbank borrow-
ing market as a share of total assets of the bank in a pre-sample year, 2003. I estimate
1.3 both using a linear function of FD, FDb as well as indicators for banks that have an
exposure to the foreign interbank borrowing market above the median of the banks in
2003, FDb > p50(FDb) or above the mean of the banks in 2003, FDb > mean(FDb). The
dependent variable, ∆ln(Credit) is the log change of short term credit with maturity up
to one year between a pre-period, namely from 2004 to 2009 and a post period, from 2009
to 2013. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.8: Credit shock - first stage
∆ ln (Ci)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∑bwib ∗ {FDb > p50(FDb)} -0.107***
(0.027)
∑bwib ∗ {FDb > mean(FDb)} -0.143***
(0.020)
∑bwib ∗ FDb -1.233*** 3.25***
(0.204) (0.90)
∑bwib ∗ FD2b -17.56***
(3.63)
∑bwib ∗ FD3b 14.72***
(3.41)
Observations 12,657 12,657 12,657 12,657
F-Statistic 10.17 15.77 36.38 35.40
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the first stage as defined in equation 1.6 in first
differences for the period 2004-2013. FDb is the measure of foreign dependence of bank
b to the interbank borrowing market as a share of total assets of the bank in a pre-sample
year, 2003. I estimate 1.6 both using a linear function of FD, FDb as well as indicators
for banks that have an exposure to the foreign interbank borrowing market above the
median of the banks in 2003, FDb > p50(FDb) or above the mean of the banks in 2003,
FDb > mean(FDb). wib are the shares of funding from each bank over the total loans
of firm i. The dependent variable, ∆ln(Credit) is the log change of short term credit
with maturity up to one year between a pre-period, namely from 2004 to 2009 and a post
period, from 2009 to 2013. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.9: Credit shock IV - span of control
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln
Team leaders Middle manager Top manager
Prod. workers Team leaders Middle manager
∆ ln Ĉi 0.215* -0.156 0.065
(0.129) (0.118) (0.124)
Observations 11,123 8,506 5,533
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.7. The
independent variable, ∆ ln Ĉi is the predicted change in credit to firm i instrumented
using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the instrument. The dependent variables
are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The ratios are computed using
the total number of workers in each occupation category. In column 1 the dependent
variable is the log change in the ratio of team leaders to production workers; in column
2 is the log change in the ratio of middle managers to team leaders; in column 3 is the
log change in the ratio of top managers to middle managers. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.10: Credit shock IV - layer level
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.140* 0.175** 0.037 -0.006
(0.075) (0.084) (0.058) (0.075)
Panel B: change in the average wage in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (wage)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.01 0.032 0.022 -0.016
(0.013) (0.028) (0.030) (0.039)
Observations 12,657 12,657 12,657 12,657
First stage F-Stat 34.30 34.30 34.30 34.30
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7
in first differences for the period 2004-2013 at the layer level. ∆ ln Ĉi is the predicted
change in credit to firm i instrumented using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct
the instrument. In panel A I look at the quantities, and the dependent variables are log
changes of the averages number of workers in each managerial layer before and after the
shock, while in panel B I look at the prices and the dependent variable is the average
wage in each managerial layer. The production workers are workers dealing with simple
well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no intellectual work) with low com-
plexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Workers in layer 1, namely higher-skill
workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate tasks, usually not repetitive, and
defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with the organization and adaptation of
the guidelines established by the superiors and directly linked with the executive work
while workers in the top layer are in charge of the definition of the firm general policy or
consulting on the organization of the firm; strategic planning; creation or adaptation of
technical, scientific and administrative methods or processes. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.11: Credit shock IV - firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln # workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.182*** 0.199*** 0.189*** 0.137**
(0.049) (0.052) (0.053) (0.059)
Observations 12,657 12,657 12,657 12,657
First stage F-Stat 42.63 42.63 42.63 42.63
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7
in first differences for the period 2004-2013. ∆ ln Ĉi is the predicted change in credit
to firm i instrumented using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the instrument.
The dependent variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The
number of workers employed in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the
firm in the calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime)
payed by the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of
workers employed by the firm in the calendar year de-trended using a standard linear
de-trending methodology to take out normal business cycle variation, while the number
of layers is the number of management layers in the firm. A firm reporting c occupational
categories will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will
have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.12: Trade shock OLS - firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln # workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆ ln (Salesi) 0.254*** 0.271*** 0.271*** 0.134***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.006)
Observations 12,285 12,285 12,285 12,285
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.10. The
independent variable, ∆ln(Salesi) is the log change of de-trended sales between a pre-
period, namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to 2004. The dependent
variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The number of
workers employed in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the firm in the
calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime) payed by
the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of workers
employed by the firm in the calendar year detrended using a standard linear de-trending
methodology to take out normal business cycle variation, while the number of layers is
the number of management layers in the firm. A firm reporting c occupational categories
will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have
firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)). Robust
standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.13: Trade shock OLS - layer level
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ln (Salesi) 0.227*** 0.194*** 0.129*** 0.089***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014)
Observations 12,285 11,629 8,280 3,961
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: change in the average wage in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (wage)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln (Salesi) 0.010*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.027***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 12,285 11,629 8,280 3,961
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.10 at
the layer level. The independent variable, ∆ln(Salesi) is the log change of de-trended
sales between a pre-period, namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to
2004. The dependent variables are log changes of the averages number of workers in
each managerial layer before and after the shock. The production workers in column 1
are workers dealing with simple well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no
intellectual work) with low complexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Work-
ers in layer 1, namely higher-skill workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate
tasks, usually not repetitive, and defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with
the organization and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and di-
rectly linked with the executive work while workers in the top layer are in charge of the
definition of the firm general policy or consulting on the organization of the firm; strate-
gic planning; creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods
or processes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.14: Trade shock IV - span of control
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln Team leaders Middle manager Top manager
Prod. workers Team leaders Middle manager
∆ ln ̂Salesi -0.826*** -0.142 -0.469***
(0.129) (0.124) (0.171)
Observations 10,785 7,164 4,268
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.12. The
independent variable, ∆ln( ̂Salesi) is the log change of de-trended sales between a pre-
period, namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to 2004. The dependent
variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The ratios are com-
puted using the total number of workers in each occupation category. In column 1 the
dependent variable is the log change in the ratio of team leaders to production workers;
in column 2 is the log change in the ratio of middle managers to team leaders; in column
3 is the log change in the ratio of top managers to middle managers. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.15: Trade shock IV - layer level
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln (Ŝalesi) 1.395*** 0.604*** 0.238*** -0.020
(0.125) (0.078) (0.077) (0.102)
Observations 12,285 11,629 8,280 3,961
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: change in the average wage in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (wage)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln ( ̂Salesi) 0.125*** 0.037 0.128*** -0.089
(0.025) (0.032) (0.044) (0.068)
Observations 12,285 11,629 8,280 3,961
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.10 at
the layer level. The independent variable, ∆ln( ̂Salesi) is the log change of de-trended
sales between a pre-period, namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to
2004. The dependent variables are log changes of the averages number of workers in
each managerial layer before and after the shock. The production workers in column 1
are workers dealing with simple well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no
intellectual work) with low complexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Work-
ers in layer 1, namely higher-skill workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate
tasks, usually not repetitive, and defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with
the organization and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and di-
rectly linked with the executive work while workers in the top layer are in charge of the
definition of the firm general policy or consulting on the organization of the firm; strate-
gic planning; creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods
or processes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.16: Trade shock IV - firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ln (sales)
∆ ln
# workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆IPOthers,t -0.177***
(0.016)
∆ ln ( ̂Salesi) 1.572*** 1.631*** 1.626*** 0.040
(0.129) (0.134) (0.134) (0.082)
F-test 118.99 118.99 118.99 118.99 118.99
Observations 12,285 12,285 12,285 12,285 12,285
Notes: In column 1 the table reports the first stage regression as defined in equation 1.11;
the independent variable is ∆IPOthers,t and the dependent variable is the change in log
sales. From column 2 to column 5 I report the estimation of equation 1.12. The indepen-
dent variable, ∆ln(Salesi) is the log change of de-trended sales between a pre-period,
namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to 2004 and is instrumented us-
ing the definition of import penetration in equation 1.9. The dependent variables are log
changes of the averages before and after the shock. The number of workers employed
in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the firm in the calendar year, the
wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime) payed by the firm in each
calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of workers employed by the
firm in the calendar year de-trended using a standard linear de-trending methodology
to take out normal business cycle variation, while the number of layers is the number of
management layers in the firm. A firm reporting c occupational categories will be said
to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have firms spanning
from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)). Robust standard errors
in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.17: Credit shock IV - temporary contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln # workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.241*** 0.266*** 0.257*** 0.119*
(0.054) (0.057) (0.059) (0.070)
Temporary -0.040* -0.047** -0.045* -0.009
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.029)
∆ ln Ĉi * Temporary 0.200* 0.233** 0.228** -0.037
(0.104) (0.111) (0.115) (0.139)
Observations 13,225 13,225 13,225 13,225
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7
in first differences for the period 2004-2013 interacting the instrument with the measure
of intensity in temporary contracts as defined in equation 1.13. FDb is the measure of
foreign dependence of bank b to the interbank borrowing market as a share of total assets
of the bank in a pre-sample year, 2003. I estimate 1.7 with the interaction for the intensity
in temporary contracts using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the instrument.
The dependent variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The
number of workers employed in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the
firm in the calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime)
payed by the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of
workers employed by the firm in the calendar year de-trended using a standard linear
de-trending methodology to take out normal business cycle variation. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.18: Credit shock IV - temporary contracts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.204** 0.327*** 0.109 -0.015
(0.087) (0.093) (0.077) (0.104)
Temporary -0.026 -0.094* -0.018 0.034
(0.036) (0.038) (0.031) (0.043)
∆ ln Ĉi * Temporary 0.196 0.578*** 0.318** 0.005
(0.175) (0.186) (0.155) (0.203)
Observations 13,225 12,247 10,080 5,167
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7 in
first differences for the period 2004-2013 interacting the instrument with the measure of
intensity in temporary contracts as defined in equation 1.13 at the layer level. FDb is the
measure of foreign dependence of bank b to the interbank borrowing market as a share of
total assets of the bank in a pre-sample year, 2003. I estimate 1.7 with the interaction for
the intensity in temporary contracts using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the
instrument. The dependent variables are log changes of the averages number of workers
in each managerial layer before and after the shock. The production workers in column
1 are workers dealing with simple well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no
intellectual work) with low complexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Work-
ers in layer 1, namely higher-skill workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate
tasks, usually not repetitive, and defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with
the organization and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and di-
rectly linked with the executive work while workers in the top layer are in charge of the
definition of the firm general policy or consulting on the organization of the firm; strate-
gic planning; creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods
or processes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.19: Placebo using 2005
∆ ln (Ci)
∑bwib ∗ FDb -0.159
(0.163)
Observations 13,534
F-test 0.94
Sector FE Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the first stage as defined in equation 1.14 in first
differences for the period 2004-2007. I use the instrument constructed using information
in 2003 to test if it has predictive power when used to a different period of time and a
placebo shock defined in the year 2005. FDb is the measure of foreign dependence of
bank b to the interbank borrowing market as a share of total assets of the bank in a pre-
sample year, 2003. The dependent variable, ∆ln(Credit) is the log change of short term
credit with maturity up to one year between a pre-period, namely from 2004 to 2005 and
a post period, from 2006 to 2007. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
TABLE 1.20: Credit shock IV - span of control - manufacturing only
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln
Team leaders Middle manager Top manager
Prod. workers Team leaders Middle manager
∆ ln Ĉi 0.401* -0.190 0.017
(0.230) (0.185) (0.141)
Observations 4,825 3,627 2,303
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.7. The
independent variable, ∆ ln Ĉi is the predicted change in credit to firm i instrumented
using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the instrument. The dependent variables
are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The ratios are computed using
the total number of workers in each occupation category. In column 1 the dependent
variable is the log change in the ratio of team leaders to production workers; in column
2 is the log change in the ratio of middle managers to team leaders; in column 3 is the
log change in the ratio of top managers to middle managers. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.21: Credit shock IV - layer level - manufacturing only
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.163* 0.298* 0.102 -0.037
(0.095) (0.166) (0.084) (0.080)
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (wage)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.061** 0.128** 0.089* 0.017
(0.028) (0.056) (0.050) (0.049)
Observations 5,340 5,166 4,116 2,195
First stage F-Stat 18.83 18.83 18.83 18.83
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7
in first differences for the period 2004-2013 at the layer level. ∆ ln Ĉi is the predicted
change in credit to firm i instrumented using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct
the instrument. In panel A I look at the quantities, and the dependent variables are log
changes of the averages number of workers in each managerial layer before and after the
shock, while in panel B I look at the prices and the dependent variable is the average
wage in each managerial layer. The production workers are workers dealing with simple
well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no intellectual work) with low com-
plexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Workers in layer 1, namely higher-skill
workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate tasks, usually not repetitive, and
defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with the organization and adaptation of
the guidelines established by the superiors and directly linked with the executive work
while workers in the top layer are in charge of the definition of the firm general policy or
consulting on the organization of the firm; strategic planning; creation or adaptation of
technical, scientific and administrative methods or processes. Robust standard errors in
parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.22: Credit shock IV - firm level - manufacturing only
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln # workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆ ln Ĉi 0.190*** 0.249*** 0.232*** 0.020
(0.068) (0.078) (0.079) (0.085)
Observations 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340
First stage F-Stat 18.83 18.83 18.83 18.83
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7
in first differences for the period 2004-2013. ∆ ln Ĉi is the predicted change in credit
to firm i instrumented using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the instrument.
The dependent variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The
number of workers employed in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the
firm in the calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime)
payed by the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of
workers employed by the firm in the calendar year de-trended using a standard linear
de-trending methodology to take out normal business cycle variation, while the number
of layers is the number of management layers in the firm. A firm reporting c occupational
categories will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will
have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.23: Trade shock IV - span of control - manufacturing only
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln Team leaders Middle manager Top manager
Prod. workers Team leaders Middle manager
∆ ln ̂Salesi -1.168*** 0.083 -0.830
(0.413) (0.356) (0.506)
Observations 4,878 3,263 1,875
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.12. The
independent variable, ∆ln( ̂Salesi) is the log change of de-trended sales between a pre-
period, namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to 2004. The dependent
variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The ratios are com-
puted using the total number of workers in each occupation category. In column 1 the
dependent variable is the log change in the ratio of team leaders to production workers;
in column 2 is the log change in the ratio of middle managers to team leaders; in column
3 is the log change in the ratio of top managers to middle managers. Robust standard
errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.24: Trade shock IV - layer level - manufacturing only
Panel A: change in the number of workers in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (number)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln (Ŝalesi) 1.141*** 0.139 -0.158 -0.200
(0.348) (0.195) (0.212) (0.263)
Observations 5,572 5,217 3,744 1,807
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: change in the average wage in each layer
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln (wage)
Production Team Middle Top
workers leaders managers managers
∆ ln ( ̂Salesi) 0.315*** 0.124 0.099 -0.294
(0.116) (0.096) (0.122) (0.204)
Observations 5,572 5,217 3,744 1,807
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the results of the within firm estimation of equation 1.10 at
the layer level. The independent variable, ∆ln( ̂Salesi) is the log change of de-trended
sales between a pre-period, namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to
2004. The dependent variables are log changes of the averages number of workers in
each managerial layer before and after the shock. The production workers in column 1
are workers dealing with simple well defined tasks, mainly manual or mechanical (no
intellectual work) with low complexity, usually routine and sometimes repetitive. Work-
ers in layer 1, namely higher-skill workers or team leaders, deal with complex or delicate
tasks, usually not repetitive, and defined by the superiors. Middle managers deal with
the organization and adaptation of the guidelines established by the superiors and di-
rectly linked with the executive work while workers in the top layer are in charge of the
definition of the firm general policy or consulting on the organization of the firm; strate-
gic planning; creation or adaptation of technical, scientific and administrative methods
or processes. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.25: Trade shock IV - firm level - manufacturing only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆ ln (sales)
∆ ln
# workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆IPOthers,t -0.203***
(0.060)
∆ ln ( ̂Salesi) 1.690*** 1.864*** 1.700*** 0.490
(0.479) (0.526) (0.479) (0.382)
F-test 13.65 13.65 13.65 13.65 13.65
Observations 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572 5,572
Notes: In column 1 the table reports the first stage regression as defined in equation 1.11;
the independent variable is ∆IPOthers,t and the dependent variable is the change in log
sales. From column 2 to column 5 I report the estimation of equation 1.12. The indepen-
dent variable, ∆ln(Salesi) is the log change of de-trended sales between a pre-period,
namely from 1998 to 2001 and a post period, from 2002 to 2004 and is instrumented us-
ing the definition of import penetration in equation 1.9. The dependent variables are log
changes of the averages before and after the shock. The number of workers employed
in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the firm in the calendar year, the
wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime) payed by the firm in each
calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of workers employed by the
firm in the calendar year de-trended using a standard linear de-trending methodology
to take out normal business cycle variation, while the number of layers is the number of
management layers in the firm. A firm reporting c occupational categories will be said
to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have firms spanning
from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)). Robust standard errors
in parenthesis.
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TABLE 1.26: Trade shock IV long term credit - firm level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln
# workers wage bill wage bill det. # layers
∆ln(LongTermCredit) -2.534 -3.027 -2.854 -1.824
(8.275) (9.858) (9.319) (6.031)
First stage F-test 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Observations 9,766 9,766 9,766 9,766
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equa-
tion 1.7 in first differences for the period 2004-2013. The independent variable
∆ln(LongTermCredit) is the predicted change in long term credit to firm i instru-
mented using a linear function of FD, FDb to construct the instrument. The dependent
variables are log changes of the averages before and after the shock. The number of
workers employed in the firm is the total amount of workers employed by the firm in the
calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount of wages (base plus overtime) payed by
the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill de-trended is the total amount of workers
employed by the firm in the calendar year de-trended using a standard linear de-trending
methodology to take out normal business cycle variation, while the number of layers is
the number of management layers in the firm. A firm reporting c occupational categories
will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will have
firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in (Caliendo et al., 2015a)). Robust
standard errors in parenthesis.
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Chapter 2
The Diffusion of Knowledge via
Managers’ mobility
Better managers and managerial practices lead to better firm performance. Yet,
little is known about what happens when managers move across firms. Does a
firm hiring a good manager improve its performance? If yes is there some valu-
able knowledge the manager has acquired and successfully diffused to the new
firm? In order to answer these questions we use information related to specific
activities the manager was involved in when working for previous firms: export-
ing. Crucially, we exploit the end of the civil war in Angola as an event study to
account for the endogeneity of the matching between managers and firms. Our
data is rich enough to allow controlling for both manager and firm unobservables
and wash out any time-invariant ability of the manager as well as overall firm
performance. We find that the export experience gained by managers in previous
firms leads their current firm towards higher export performance, and commands
a sizable wage premium for the manager. We further refine our analysis by look-
ing at different types of managers (general, production, financial and sales) and
show how specific export experience interacts with the degree of product differ-
entiation and/or the financial vulnerability of a firm’s products as well as with
rising import competition from China.
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“Managers are conductors of an input orchestra [...] Just as a poor conductor can
lead to a cacophony rather than a symphony, one might expect poor
management to lead to discordant production operations.”
Chad Syverson, What Determines Productivity (2011)
The enormous variation in firm performance has become a focus of empiri-
cal and theoretical interest throughout the social sciences, including economics.
Recent empirical studies have exploited the increasing availability of informa-
tion on managerial practices and managers’ characteristics to establish a strong
connection with firm—as well as country—productivity and other dimensions
of performance. More specifically, (Bloom and Van-Reenen, 2010), (Bloom et al.,
2013), (Bloom et al., 2016) and (Guiso and Rustichini, 2011) among others, have
established that better managers and managerial practices lead to better firm per-
formance. We believe the next question is what happens when managers move
from one firm to another. Does a firm hiring a good manager improve its perfor-
mance? If yes is it due to the manager simply being a good manager or is there
some valuable knowledge the manager has acquired and successfully diffused to
the new firm? The objective of this paper is to provide answers to these questions.
These questions have long since attracted substantial interest in the business
and management literature. For example, (Argote and Ingram, 2000) argues that
the creation and transfer of knowledge are a basis for competitive advantage in
firms while (Tsai, 2001), and subsequent related literature, emphasises knowl-
edge transfer within an organization and highlights the importance of network
position and absorptive capacity. However, empirical evidence about knowledge
transfer within the business and management literature has so far been primarily
focused on within-organization flows by means of rather limited data ((Chang
et al., 2012), (Richards and Duxbury, 2015)). A noticeable exception is (Song
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et al., 2003) where, in order to investigate the conditions under which learning-
by-hiring (or the acquisition of knowledge through the hiring of experts from
other firms) is more likely, they study the patenting activities of engineers who
moved from U.S. firms to non-U.S. firms. In the same spirit there are, within the
urban economics literature on spill-overs, some contributions showing how job
hopping help sustain the competitiveness of local industry clusters like Silicon
Valley1 while recent contributions to the international trade literature also high-
light knowledge diffusion: (Artopoulos et al., 2013) explain how the diffusion of
business practices from export pioneers to followers can lead to sustained export
growth, while (Atkin et al., 2016) document a knowledge flow between interme-
diaries and foreign buyers leading to improvement in product quality.
These questions are certainly fascinating to many fields and scholars but one
fundamental issue is that answering them is rather difficult: First, it is challenging
to separate a manager’s intrinsic capabilities from the knowledge and abilities she
has learned in previous firms. Second, it is empirically difficult to show that such
acquired knowledge and abilities impact current firm performance and it is even
more complicated to solve the matching problem between firms and workers. In
order to overcome the first challenge we draw on information related to specific
activities the manager was involved in when working for previous firms. More
specifically, we build on employer-employee data and firm-level trade data span-
ning several years to recover information on whether the manager has worked in
the past for firms exporting to a specific destination country or a specific product.
Our data is rich enough to allow controlling for both manager and firm unobserv-
ables and wash out any time-invariant ability of the manager as well as overall
firm performance.
1(Fallick et al., 2006) argue that job hopping is important in computer clusters because it fa-
cilitates the reallocation of talent and resources toward firms with superior innovations. Using
detailed data on labor mobility, they find higher rates of job-hopping for college-educated men in
Silicon Valley’s computer industry than in other computer clusters.
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To tackle the second challenge we then relate this destination-specific or product-
specific measure of acquired knowledge to the current firm trade performance in
these specific destinations or products. In doing so we deal with the endogeneity
of hiring in two complementary ways. First, we explore the differential perfor-
mance of firms with and without managers with specific export experience in the
wake of an exogenous event: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002.
This is the first paper to exploit a conflict related event to obtain a quasi random
allocation of managers to firms conditional on firm observables and fixed-effects.
Second, we draw on the panel nature of the data and use information on whether
the firm had managers with destination-specific or product-specific export ex-
perience 3 years prior to evaluating firm-performance in those destinations or
products. We further refine our analysis by looking at different types of man-
agers (general, production, financial and sales) and show how specific export ex-
perience interacts with the degree of product differentiation and/or the financial
vulnerability of a firm’s products as well as with rising import competition from
China.
We find that the export experience gained by managers in previous firms leads
their current firm towards higher export performance, and commands a sizable
wage premium for the manager. Moreover, export knowledge is decisive when it
is market-specific: managers with experience related to markets (where by markets
we mean destinations or products) served by their current firm receive an even
higher wage premium; firms are more likely to enter markets where their man-
agers have experience; exporters are more likely to stay in those markets, and
their sales are on average higher. While it is reasonable to expect managers to
learn valuable skills from their previous jobs and transfer them, the magnitudes
we find are stark. Managers’ export experience is a first-order feature in the data
explaining more variation in firm export performance than size and productivity.
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At the same time, we show that the experience premium accrued by different
types of managers (general, production, financial and sales) aligns with a knowl-
edge diffusion story. More specifically, we show that financial managers enjoy
a basic export experience wage premium but no robust product- or destination-
specific experience wage premium. General and production managers receive
both a product- and a destination-specific experience premium but little or no
basic experience premium. Sales managers benefit from a destination-specific ex-
perience premium while general managers get the largest premia in most cases.
Furthermore, we find market-specific experience to be more valuable in terms of
trade performance to firms selling products that are more differentiated and/or
financially vulnerable while at the same time experience seems to help some firms
coping with increasing import competition from China.
Our analysis stands on three solid pillars: reliable data on one country (Portu-
gal) covering the universe of firms and their workers for several years, includ-
ing rich information on the characteristics of both; the possibility of tracking
workers—and in particular managers—as they move from firm to firm; a research
design that accounts for unobserved heterogeneity, omitted variables, and, more
broadly, endogeneity.
Our work relates to a number of strands in the literature. First, we contribute
to the above cited empirical literature on management by showing how man-
agers can diffuse knowledge and good practice across firms. Second, our work
relates to the literature looking at the relationship between trade and tasks ((Blin-
der, 2006), (Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008)). Such literature suggests that
the complexity of the tasks involved in the different stages of production process
(design, manufacturing of parts, assembly, R&D, marketing, commercialization,
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etc.) is key to understand recent trends in international trade. Managers are dif-
ferent from other workers and likely to be particularly important for trade activ-
ity because they are responsible for the most complex tasks within a firm. Third,
the role played by managers’ mobility across firms in our analysis contributes to
the recent debate about the channels via which knowledge diffusion takes place
((Balsvik, 2011), (Parrotta and Pozzoli, 2012), (Mion and Opromolla, 2014)). Last,
but not least, our wage analysis contributes to the literature devoted to explaining
the determinants of managers’ pay ((Gabaix and Landier, 2008), (Guadalupe and
Wulf, 2008)), and to the literature that studies the internal organization of the firm
and how this relates to a firm’s characteristics such as export status ((Caliendo
and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012), (Caliendo et al., 2015b)).
With specific reference to (Mion and Opromolla, 2014) we expand upon own
research in several ways. Crucially, we provide evidence on the causal impact of
knowledge diffusion by exploring the differential performance of firms with and
without managers with specific export experience in the wake of an exogenous
event: the sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002. Moreover, while (Mion
and Opromolla, 2014) focuses on the destination-specific export experience of
managers this paper offers a comprehensive treatment of knowledge diffusion:
we consider different types of experience (product and destination), different
types of managers, the role of financial vulnerability and product differentiation,
as well as rising import competition from China. Last but not least, we explore if
knowledge remains in the firm once the experienced manager leaves.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the
data. In Section 2.1.1, after defining some key variables, we show raw data evi-
dence positively associating a manager’s export experience with his/her wage
and firm export performance. These descriptive results are confirmed by the
econometric testing of Sections B.5 and 2.3. Section 2.4 concludes and provides a
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number of policy implications. Additional details about the data are provided in
the Appendix. The Tables Appendix provides complementary Tables.
2.1 Data and descriptives
Our data combines information resulting from two panel datasets: international
trade data at the firm-country-product level and matched employer-employee
panel data. International trade data are collected by Statistics Portugal and—
besides small adjustments—aggregate to the official total exports and imports of
Portugal. For the purpose of this research, we use data on export transactions
only, aggregated at the firm-destination-product-year level, for the period 1995-
2005.
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal (henceforth, QP), a
dataset collected by the Ministry of Employment, drawing on a compulsory an-
nual census of all firms in Portugal that employ at least one worker. Reported
data cover the firm itself, as well as each of its workers. Each firm and each
worker entering the database are assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying
number which we use to follow firms and workers over time. Currently, the data
set collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees. As for the trade
data, we were able to gain access to information from 1995 to 2005. We describe
the two datasets and their merging in more detail in the Appendix.
The dataset allows to follow workers—especially managers—as they move
from firm to firm; moreover, knowing firms’ trade status in each year, allows
the identification of workers’ export experience. This is possible thanks to an
exhaustive coverage of firms, their workers, and their trade activity as well as a
high degree of reliability. The richness of the data also makes it possible to control
for a wealth of both worker and firm characteristics as well as for unobserved
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heterogeneity by means of various fixed effects. We provide in the Appendix
more information about the way we have constructed some of the covariates.
TABLE 2.1: Selected Summary Statistics, Wage Sample, 2005
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N
Worker-level
Hourly Wage (log) 1.351 0.518 436,351
Age (Years) 38.206 10.695 436,351
Education (Years) 7.449 3.586 436,351
Tenure (Years) 10.043 9.277 436,351
Manager (0/1) 0.067 0.250 436,351
Manag. X Export Exp. (0/1) 0.015 0.122 436,351
Manag. X Matched Dest. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.012 0.109 436,351
Manag. X Matched Prod. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.011 0.104 436,351
Current firm-level
Firm Size (log) 2.339 1.142 25,681
Firm Productivity (log) 10.480 0.908 25,681
Firm Age (log) 2.461 0.816 25,681
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.024 0.154 25,681
At Least One Manag. (0/1) 0.274 0.446 25,681
At Least One Manag. with Export Exp. (0/1) 0.083 0.276 25,681
At Least One Manag. with Matched Dest. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.050 0.218 25,681
At Least One Manag. with Matched Prod. Export Exp. (0/1) 0.046 0.209 25,681
Previous firm-level
Firm Size (log) 2.125 1.164 4,583
Firm Productivity (log) 6.740 5.016 4,583
Notes: This Table shows summary statistics, relative to 2005, for a subset of worker-level and firm-level variables used
in the regressions of Section B.5 and 2.3. Statistics refer to observations for which all covariates in the wage regression
sample of Section B.5 are jointly available. Firm-level variables subdivide into those relative to the worker’s current
firm and to those relative to the previous firm. Variable names followed by "(0/1)" refer to dummy variables. In the
last column, "N" refers to the number of workers for worker-level variables, and to the number of (current or previous)
firms for firm-level variables.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics, for 2005, of the main worker-level and
firm-level variables—both for the worker’s current and previous firm—referring
to observations for which all covariates are jointly available. The top panel of
Table 2.1 indicates that, in 2005, our sample includes 436,351 workers, with an
average (log) hourly wage of 1.35 euros, an average age of 38.2 years, an average
education of 7.45 years, and an average firm tenure of 10 years.2 The middle
2(Carneiro et al., 2012) find that average (log) hourly earnings (in real Euros) are 1.34 for men
and 1.13 for women, in the 1986-2005 period. Workers’ tenure and wage are described in the
Appendix.
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panel of Table 2.1 shows that these workers are employed by 25,681 firms, and
reports the average firm (log) size, (log) productivity, (log) age, and the share of
foreign-owned firms (2.4 percent). Finally, the bottom panel provides the average
(log) size and productivity of the 4,583 firms previously employing the workers in
our sample.
TABLE 2.2: Number of Exporters and Average Exports, by Country-group, Trade Sample,
2005
Markets
IT-UK Other Other
Variable Spain FR-DE EU OECD CPLP China ROW
# of Exporting firms 1,696 1,711 1,285 1,401 1,097 204 1,227
—with Export Exp. 838 833 644 711 558 127 651
—with Matched Dest. Export Exp. 717 736 524 624 455 57 547
Avg. Exports 2,322 4,046 1,454 1,244 301 596 950
Notes: This Table shows the number of firms exporting to each of the seven markets we consider and their average exports (in
thousands euros) for the 2005 sample year. The number of exporters further subdivides into those having at least one manager
with export experience and those having at least one manager with matched (destination) export experience. Statistics refers to
observations for which all covariates in the trade performance analysis sample of Section 2.3 are jointly available. CPLP is the
Portuguese acronym for the Community of Portuguese Language Countries.
TABLE 2.3: Number of Exporters and Average Exports, Seven largest product groups, Trade
Sample, 2005
Markets
Textiles Wearing Paper Industrial Machinery Electrical Transport
Variable apparel products chemicals exc. electrical machinery equipment
# of Exporting firms 515 508 316 368 739 324 228
—with Export Exp. 272 205 195 225 393 187 143
—w. Mat. Prod. Exp. 194 149 122 152 327 135 92
Avg. Exports 1,940 2,125 2,813 2,593 2,389 5,779 10,940
Notes: This Table shows the number of firms exporting to each of the seven largest, in terms of total exports, product groups in
our sample, and their average exports (in thousands euros) for the 2005 sample year. The number of exporters further subdivides
into those having at least one manager with export experience and those having at least one manager with matched (product)
export experience. Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates in the trade performance analysis sample of Section 2.3
are jointly available. The number and full titles of the product groups are 384 "Transport equipment", 383 "Electrical machinery
apparatus, appliances and supplies" 382 "Machinery except electrical" 322 "Wearing apparel, except footwear" 321 "Textiles" 351
"Industrial chemicals", and 341 "Paper and paper products". See the Appendix for details on the product definition.
77
Tables 2.2 and 2.3 report selected summary statistics—for 2005—referring to
the trade performance sample. In Section 2.3 we model a firm’s entry and con-
tinuation into a specific destination, or into a specific product market, m, and
analyze both the probability to start and continue exporting as well as the value
of exports conditional on entry/continuation. When considering destinations,
we partition countries into seven groups: Spain (the most frequent destination),
other top 5 export destination countries (Italy, UK, France, and Germany), other
EU countries, OECD countries not belonging to the EU, countries belonging to
the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP in Portuguese), China,
and the rest of the World. Table 2.2 shows, for each of the seven destinations,
the number of exporting firms and average exports (in thousand euros). When
considering products, we partition markets into 29 Isic rev.2 groups. The largest
groups, in terms of total exports, are 384 "Transport equipment", 383 "Electrical
machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies" 382 "Machinery except electrical"
322 "Wearing apparel, except footwear" 321 "Textiles" 351 "Industrial chemicals",
and 341 "Paper and paper products" Table 2.3 shows, for each of the seven largest
product groups, the number of exporting firms and average exports (in thousand
euros).
2.1.1 Definitions and evidence from raw data
In this Section we draw the distinction between managers and non-managers,
we define export experience as well as its two refinements: experience in a des-
tination and experience in a product. We also show raw data evidence on the
existence of an export experience wage premium for managers.
Managers
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In our analysis, we partion workers into managers and non-managers. As it is
effectively captured by the quote of (Syverson, 2010) at the beginning of the paper,
managers are responsible for strategic decisions taken within the firm including
the organization of the firm, planning, and the shaping of technical, scientific and
administrative methods or processes.
In practice, we identify managers using a (compulsory) classification of work-
ers, according to eight hierarchical levels, defined by the Portuguese law (Decreto
Lei 121/78 of July 2nd 1978). Classification is based on the tasks performed and
skill requirements, and each level can be considered as a layer in a hierarchy de-
fined in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. Managers are
defined as the workers belonging to one of the top two hierarchical levels: “Top
management” and “Middle management”; non-manager are workers belonging
to lower hierarchical levels. Table 2.1 shows that, in the wage sample in 2005, 6.7
percent of the workers are managers and 27.4 percent of the firms have at least
one manager.
We then take a deeper look into the professional status of the manager by
analysing the exact occupation within a firm. Using the four digit ISCO classi-
fication in Quadros de Pessoal, we look at the professional status of the managers
specifically focusing on directors, the category to which the vast majority of man-
agers belong to. We end up with 4 groups: general managers, production man-
agers, financial managers and sales managers. We lump managers covering other
occupations into a fifth group (other managers).
Figure 2.1 confirms that the distinction between managers and non-managers
is relevant when considering a firm’s trade activity; in fact, it shows that the ex-
porter wage premium seems to come essentially from managers.3 More specif-
ically, Figure 2.1 shows the kernel density of the log hourly wage distribution
3A large literature tries to identify and explain a wage premium paid by exporting firms ((Frias
et al., 2009), (Munch and Skaksen, 2008) (Schank et al., 2007)). (Martins and Opromolla, 2012),
show that Portugal is not an exception to this robust empirical finding.
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FIGURE 2.1: Wage density for managers and non-managers, by firm
export status, 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers (left panel) and
non-managers (right panel), broken down by firm export status (exporters and non-exporters). Statistics refers to observa-
tions for which all covariates in the wage regression sample of Section B.5 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov
and the kernel width is the Stata default one.
in our 2005 wage sample, both for managers and non-managers, broken down
by firm export status (exporters and non-exporters). The wage density referring
to managers employed by exporting firms clearly lies to the right of the one for
managers employed by non-exporters. The evidence for non-managers is instead
much weaker.
Export experience
Managers are not all alike: their set of skills and knowledge can be tightly
connected to the experience they faced along their careers. In particular, only
some managers have the chance to be involved in export activities. To the extent
that experience acquired in exporting firms substantially improves the capacities
and skills of a manager it should correspond to a wage premium. Furthermore,
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such experience is potentially valuable to all firms, but in particular to exporters,
who might expect an improvement of their trade performance.
We exploit the matched employer-employee feature of our dataset to track
workers over time: for each firm-year pair, we identify the subset of (currently
employed) workers that have previously worked in a different firm. Moreover,
we exploit the trade dataset to single-out those workers that were employed in
the past by an exporting firm. We define such workers, and in particular managers,
as having export experience.4
We further refine export experience in two ways. First, we define market spe-
cific export experience, where a market indicates either a destination d or a prod-
uct p.5 A worker is labeled with market specific export experience if she has pre-
viously worked in a firm exporting in market d or product p. Second, we define
a worker as having matched export experience if she has export experience and
has market (or product) specific export experience in at least one of the markets
(or product) the current employing firm is actually exporting.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 provide raw wage data evidence supporting the idea that
the distinction between managers with and without export experience is relevant
when considering a firm’s international activity. Furthermore they also highlight
the importance of destination and product experience and that the distinction
holds for all of the five categories of managers we consider.
4We exploit the mobility of workers across firms to define experience, so we do not consider the
export experience potentially acquired by the manager within the same firm. Table 2.1 indicates
that about 23 percent of the managers (0.015/0.067) have export experience, while 8.3 percent of
firms—i.e. 30% of the firms with at least one manager—have at least one manager with export
experience.
5The former refers to one of the seven markets listed in Section 2.1 while the latter to one of
the 29 product groups defined using the Isic rev2 classification (see the Appendix)
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FIGURE 2.2: Wage density of managers distinguishing by: manager
type and export experience (in a destination), 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers, broken down by
manager type and degree of export experience (in a destination). Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates
in the wage regression sample of Section B.5 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the
Stata default one.
2.2 The civil war and the evolution of trade in Angola
Angola is the fastest growing developing economy in the world, despite has been
plagued by three decades of civil war until very recent. In fact, following its
independence from Portugal in 1974, Angola has been tormented by a long civil
war between the Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA) and the
Uniao Nacional para a Indipendencia Total de Angola (UNITA). As a result of the
national elections held in September 1992, the leader of MPLA Jose Eduardo dos
Santos became prime minister with a very small margin; indeed, the UNITA’s
leader Jonas Savimbi never recognised his rival’s victory and initiated a civil war
almost entirely driven by his desire of political power.
The Angolan civil war had several phases that went hand in hand with struc-
tural transformations of the economy from a centrally-planned economy between
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FIGURE 2.3: Wage density of managers distinguishing by: manager
type and export experience (in a product), 2005
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Notes: This Figure shows the kernel density of the (log) hourly wage distribution in 2005 for managers, broken down by
manager type and degree of export experience (in a product). Statistics refers to observations for which all covariates in
the wage regression sample of Section B.5 are jointly available. The kernel is Epanechnikov and the kernel width is the
Stata default one.
1975 and 1992 to a market-oriented economy from 1992 to 2002. Indeed, the latter
period was characterised by large privatisations of public enterprises from man-
ufacturing industry to agriculture and commerce which essentially benefitted a
small group of emergent entrepreneurs and economic groups closely related to
the MPLA, the ruling political party. The immense privileges to these groups of
people – including access to credit and hard currency – pushed out of the market
any potential competitor. Moreover, The "Dutch disease" phenomenon contin-
ued, as did rent-seeking, by far the easiest way to profitably accumulate private
capital. This sort of economic nepotism became a formidable barrier to entry for
any new economic activity.
The Angolan civil war suddenly ended with the death of the rebels’ leader,
Jonas Savimbi, on February 22, 2002 followed by the cease fire signed a few weeks
later, on April 4. This in turn implied an opening of the Angolan market to other
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firms which is one of the key drivers of Angola’s rise as a developing economy.
Figure 2.4 reports the evolution of aggregate exports to Angola from 1996 to 2005,
while figure 2.5 shows the evolution of exports from Portugal towards Angola
and the other ex-colonies. The political instability, together with the economic
nepotism have represented a substantial barrier to exports to Angola before 2002,
as it is clearly shown in the figure. The end of the civil war came together with
a new peace agreement between the two old parties – MPLA and UNITA – but
also with a new attention to the growth of the country and a gradual removal
of barriers to new economic agents. Indeed, figure 2.4 shows a clear growth of
exports from 2002 onwards and figure 2.6 confirms the reduction of the barriers
to new firms in the market. 6
As discussed in (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007), the end of Angolan civil war
was completely unexpected and represents an exogenous conflict-related event
in which one party gained an unambiguous victory over the other and restored
order. Furthermore, Angola is particularly relevant in our case because it is a
former Portuguese colony still having strong ties with Portugal while being part
of the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLC). In this respect, it
is a well known export destination for Portuguese firms and with a significant
amount of trade occurring before, during and after the civil war.
2.2.1 The econometric model
Studying the effect of a manager’s knowledge on firm performance is challeng-
ing. The identification problem arises naturally because hiring a manager with
destination-specific experience can be a strategic decision in preparation for ex-
porting. To address this concern, we follow the event study literature and the pa-
per by (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007) and exploit an exogenous shock to solve
6Data for 2001 are not available and a linear interpolation has been performed to construct the
figure. In the actual analysis, the year 2001 is not included in the sample
84
FIGURE 2.4: Aggregate exports to Angola, normalized to one in 1996
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Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of exports from Portugal to Angola. Values have been normalised to one in 1996.
Information for the year 2001 in the matched employer-employee dataset are missing, hence the trade flows for cannot be
computed for the relevant set of firms. For this reason, the export value for 2001 is a linear interpolation between the year
2000 and the year 2002. The interpolated values for 2001 are not included in the regression.
the firm-manager matching problem. The randomness of the event generates
a quasi random allocation of managers to firms conditional on firms observables
and unobservables characteristics. Indeed, the end of the civil war in Angola was
completely unexpected to the firms;
As a result, the estimation compares two identical firms in all respect except
that one happens to have a manager with destination-specific export experience
(also) in Angola, while the other has a manager with destination-specific export
experience in other markets but Angola.
In our event study, we model a firm’s likelihood to start exporting a specific
product or to a specific destination and the value of exports conditional on entry.
We consider the sample of firms with at least one manager and index firms by
f and time by t. At each point in time we observe whether firm f exports: (i) to
Angola or one of our seven destination groups; (ii) one of our 29 Isic rev2 product
85
FIGURE 2.5: Aggregate exports to Angola and to other ex-colonies,
normalized to one in 1996
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Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of exports from Portugal to Angola and to the other ex colonies. Values have been
normalised to one in 1996. Information for the year 2001 in the matched employer-employee dataset are missing, hence
the trade flows for cannot be computed for the relevant set of firms. For this reason, the export value for 2001 is a linear
interpolation between the year 2000 and the year 2002. The interpolated values for 2001 are not included in the regression.
groups. We model a firm’s entry and continuation into Angolan market and ana-
lyze the probability to start exporting as well as the value of exports conditional
on entry.
The following selection model is estimated:
Entryft = 1[Entry∗ft>0],
Entry∗ft = δ1 + β1(ManExpft ∗ Y eart) + Z ′1fΓ1 + η1t + ζ1ft, (2.1)
Exportsft = δ2 + β2(ManExpft ∗ Y eart) + Z ′2fΓ2 + η2t + ζ2ft,
where ManExpft—our main variable of interest—is a dummy indicating the
presence of (at least) one manager with export experience and/or specific ex-
port experience, Z1f and Z2f are two vectors of firm varying covariates affecting,
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FIGURE 2.6: Aggregate exports to Angola, Entering vs. Continuing
Firms, normalized to one in 1996
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Notes: This Figure shows the evolution of exports from Portugal to Angola for firms that export for the first time in Angola
vs firms that continue to export in the Angolan market. Values have been normalised to one in 1996. Information for the
year 2001 in the matched employer-employee dataset are missing, hence the trade flows for cannot be computed for the
relevant set of firms. For this reason, the export value for 2001 is a linear interpolation between the year 2000 and the year
2002. The interpolated values for 2001 are not included in the regression.
respectively, entry and exports conditional on entry that are captured with either
observables or firm fixed effects, and η1t and η2t are year dummies.
2.2.2 Results
We explore the differential performance of firms with and without managers with
destination-specific export experience in the wake of an exogenous event: the
sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002. As discussed in Section 2.2, the
Angolan civil war suddenly ended with the death of the rebels’ leader, Jonas Sav-
imbi, on February 22, 2002. The event was completely unexpected and represents
an exogenous conflict-related event in which one party gained an unambiguous
victory over the other and restored order. Furthermore, Angola is particularly
relevant in our case because it is a former Portuguese colony still having strong
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ties with Portugal while being part of the Community of Portuguese Language
Countries (CPLC). In this respect, it is a well known export destination for Por-
tuguese firms and with a significant amount of trade occurring before, during
and after the civil war.
FIGURE 2.7: Export entry rates in Angola
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Notes: This Figure shows export entry rates in Angola, defined as the ratio between the number of firms starting to export
in Angola at time t and the number of firms not exporting to Angola at time t-1, for two groups of firms: those that have
no managers with export experience in Angola at time t and those that have at least one manager with export experience
in Angola at time t.
The war started many years prior to our observational period (1997-2005) and
ended suddenly in 2002. This means that, right after the shock, exporting firms
did not have the time to prepare themselves to take advantage of the opportuni-
ties offered by the new politically stable setting by, for example, hiring managers
with export experience. Yet, some firms in 2002 had managers with export expe-
rience in Angola while others had not. In this respect, Figure 2.7 shows export
entry rates for firms with at least one manager with specific export experience
in Angola and firms without such managers. Crucially, there is a sudden spike
in export entry rates for firms with at least one manager with export experience
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in Angola in 2002. The situation is then a bit mixed after 2002 which can be un-
derstood with other shocks taking place as well as firms having had the time to
adjust to the new situation.
TABLE 2.4: Probability to Start Exporting in Angola
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1 pse 2 pse 3 pse 4 pse
Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) 0.014a 0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Year>=2000 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) -0.001
(0.007)
Year>=2002 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) 0.013b 0.021b
(0.005) (0.009)
Year>=2003 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) -0.010
(0.007)
Year>=2004 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) -0.001
(0.006)
Year>=2005 * Manag. w/ Spec. Exp. (0/1) 0.004
(0.005)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
Firm FE X X X
Observations 28,420 28,420 28,420 28,420
R2 0.024 0.383 0.384 0.384
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core
covariates of our model of firm’s entry into a foreign destination (2.2). Estimation
results for all other covariates are provided in the Tables Appendix. The dependent
variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting to Angola at time t. The key
independent variable is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with
specific export experience in Angola. Specifications in columns (2), (3), and (4) include
firm fixed effects. Firm-time controls are firm size, productivity, share of skilled work-
ers, age, foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and education
of firm f managers, mean and standard deviation of worker fixed effects correspond-
ing to the managers of firm f coming from the wage analysis, and industry-level ex-
ports. See the Appendix for more details. All covariates have been divided by their
respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric. Standard errors
clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
In order to establish the statistical significance of the 2002 spike and control
for other factors we run our export entry model (2.2) focusing on Angola as a
destination. Data is only varying across firms and time so we include year dum-
mies; at the same time, we employ firm fixed effects as opposed to firm-time fixed
effects used in section 2.3.1 while always using firm-time controls. We consider
export experience alone as well as interacted with year dummies to detect time
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breaks in the data. Key columns are 3 and 4. Column 3 shows specific export ex-
perience significantly matters only post 2002. At the same time, column 4 makes
use of additional time dummies to show this can be fully attributed to the year
2002, i.e., the year the conflict suddenly ended. No effect is found when looking
at export volumes conditional on entry; indeed, results point towards a reduction
in the fixed cost of exporting.
These results point towards an explanation consistent but with the one pro-
posed by (Guidolin and La Ferrara, 2007): the end of the civil war represents
the end of the economic nepotisms created by the conflict between MPLA and
UNITA that favoured few politically connected firms and left most of the other
firms out of the market. The opening of the market represent a reduction in the
fixed cost of exporting, a finding that is clear from figure 2.6 as well as from the
results of table 2.4. No gains are found for firms that previously exported in An-
gola, as well as for firms in specific sectors, such as the ones linked with resources
or extraction. The next section presents additional results based on the panel data
estimation that confirm the ones presented in section 2.2 and shed further light
on the link between the specific knowledge of a manager and the export perfor-
mance of the firm.
2.3 Panel data results
This section assesses whether export experience brought by managers has an im-
pact on a firm’s trade performance in the whole sample. Based on the model
discussed in section 2.2.1, we model a firm’s likelihood to start/continue export-
ing a specific product or to a specific destination and the value of exports condi-
tional on entry/continuation. We control for endogeneity in a variety of ways,
including firm-year fixed effects and market-year dummies to account for unob-
servables.
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We consider the sample of firms with at least one manager and index firms by
f , time by t and export markets bym, wherem could either indicate a destination
d (experience in a destinations regressions) or a product p (experience in a prod-
uct regressions).7 At each point in time we observe whether firm f exports: (i) to
one of our seven destination groups; (ii) one of our 29 Isic rev2 product groups.
We model a firm’s entry and continuation into market m and analyze both the
probability to start and continue exporting as well as the value of exports condi-
tional on entry/continuation. We now describe the entry model with the one for
continuation being its mirror image.
For each firm f and time t ∈ [1996, 2005], we consider all the markets m to
which the firm was not exporting in t− 1. We construct the binary dependent
variable Entryfmt taking value one when firm f starts exporting to market m at
time t (and zero otherwise). In each period, each firm decides whether or not to
enter into one or more of the markets (destination or product groups) in which
it was not present in the previous year. We then define the continuous depen-
dent variable Exportsfmt equal to (log) exports of firm f to market m at time t.
Exportsfmt is observed when Entryfmt=1.
The following selection model is estimated:
Entryfmt = 1[Entry∗fmt>0],
Entry∗fmt = δ1 +ManExpfmtβ1 + Z
′
1ftΓ1 + η1mt + ζ1fmt, (2.2)
Exportsfmt = δ2 +ManExpfmtβ2 + Z′2ftΓ2 + η2mt + ζ2fmt,
7Our trade performance analysis is representative of larger and more organizationally struc-
tured firms that account for the bulk of trade in Portugal. Firms with at least one manager repre-
sent (in 2005) 53.6 percent of exporting firms, account for 91.8 percent of exports, and 61.5 percent
of manufacturing employment. See Section 2.1 for further details.
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where ManExpfmt—our main variable of interest—is a dummy indicating the
presence of (at least) one manager with export experience and/or specific export
experience, Z1ft and Z2ft are two vectors of firm- and time-varying covariates
affecting, respectively, entry and exports conditional on entry that are captured
with either observables or firm-year fixed effects,8 and η1mt and η2mt are market-
year dummies.
We consider separately export experience and specific export experience and
estimate one specification of equation (2.2) for the former—in which we allow
for firm fixed effects—and three specifications for the latter—in which we allow
for either firm or firm-year fixed effects and also consider IV. We use market-year
dummies in all specifications. We run separate regressions for destination- and
product-specific experience. At the same time we provide results obtained from
more sophisticated specifications where: (i) we interact experience in a product
with a measure of the degree of differentiation of product p as well as the de-
gree of financial vulnerability of product p; (ii) we break down the data at the
firm-time-product-destination level and interact experience in a destination with
a Chinese import penetration measure – based on (Autor et al., 2014b) – for prod-
uct p in destination d at time t.
In our analysis we show that basic export experience does not significantly
affect trade performance in any of the margins we consider. What does impact
trade performance is specific export experience and the evidence is quite rich
and consistent. The presence of (at least) one manager with specific (destination
or product) export experience positively affects both the probability to start and
continue exporting, with the magnitude being particularly sizeable for the for-
mer. Destination- and product-specific export experience substantially increase
8Observables are firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers, age, foreign ownership,
mean and standard deviation of both age and education of its managers, mean and standard
deviation of the worker fixed effects corresponding to its managers and coming from the wage
analysis, and industry-level exports. See Section 2.1 and the Appendix for further details.
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the value of exports conditional on continuation while product-specific experi-
ence also seems to have an impact on export values conditional on entry. Further-
more, we find experience to be more valuable to firms selling products that are
more differentiated and/or financially vulnerable while at the same time export
experience seems to help some firms coping with increasing import competition
from China.
These results add to the evidence provided in Section 2.2 and, along with
the existence of a wage premium for managers with matched export experience,
are consistent with the hypothesis those managers carry valuable export-specific
knowledge increasing their wage, and that such knowledge has a strong destination-
and product-specific nature. Later on in Section 2.3.4, we discuss a number of
caveats potentially applying to our analysis, including reverse causality.
2.3.1 Results
Tables 2.5 to 2.8 report key covariates estimates of our model of a firm’s likeli-
hood to start/continue exporting a specific product or to a specific destination
and the value of exports conditional on entry/continuation. More specifically,
Tables 2.5 for destinations and 2.6 for products refer to the probability to entry
(left panel) and to continue (right panel) exporting to a specific market while in
Tables 2.7 for destinations and 2.8 for products we consider the (log) value of
exports conditional on entry (left panel) and continuation (right panel). All the
other covariates are displayed in the Tables Appendix.
The overall picture stemming from Tables 2.5 to 2.8 can be summarized as fol-
lows:
The presence of basic export experience does not increase trade performance. Columns
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TABLE 2.5: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting to a Specific Destination
Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unconditional Prob. 0.051 0.051 0.050 0.061 0.870 0.870 0.877 0.871
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.002)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.013a 0.018a 0.040a 0.005a 0.014a 0.046a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.013)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 166,860 166,860 166,860 62,392 52,124 52,124 52,124 24,859
R2 0.175 0.176 0.338 — 0.256 0.257 0.420 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model
of firm’s entry and continuation into a foreign destination (2.2). Estimation results for all other covariates are provided
in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting to a new (left panel)
or continues exporting to a current (right panel) destination d at time t. The key independent variable in columns (1)
and (5) is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export experience. In columns (2) to (4) and
(6) to (8), the key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific
export experience. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the export experience (and its refinements).
Specifications in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects while specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8) include
firm-year fixed effects. Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer
to an OLS estimator. The instrument is the value of the dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager
with destination-specific export experience at time t− 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller
estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
TABLE 2.6: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting a Specific Product
Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Unconditional Prob. 0.017 0.017 0.017 0.021 0.732 0.732 0.702 0.727
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.000 -0.002
(0.000) (0.004)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.008a 0.009a 0.018a 0.031a 0.048a 0.120a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Product-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 775,675 775,675 775,675 313,369 40,125 40,125 40,125 17,647
R2 0.070 0.073 0.128 — 0.205 0.214 0.364 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model of
firm’s starting and continuing exporting a specific product (2.2). Estimation results for all other covariates are provided
in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting a new (left panel) or
continues exporting a current (right panel) product p at time t. The key independent variable in columns (1) and (5) is a
dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export experience. In columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8), the key
variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export experience. See
Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the export experience (and its refinements). Specifications in columns
(1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects while specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8) include firm-year fixed effects.
Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The
instrument is the value of the dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export
experience at time t− 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller estimation sample. Standard
errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE 2.7: (Log) Value of Exports to a Specific Destination Conditional on Entry or
Continuation
Exports Condit. Entry Exports Condit. Contin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.025 0.017
(0.044) (0.011)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.043 -0.026 -0.043 0.059a 0.157a 0.452a
(0.034) (0.080) (0.251) (0.011) (0.031) (0.112)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 6,732 6,732 6,732 1,463 45,023 45,023 45,023 21,414
R2 0.478 0.478 0.597 — 0.506 0.507 0.544 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our
model of firm’s entry and continuation into a foreign destination (2.2). Estimation results for all other covariates are
provided in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable is equal to the (log) exports value of firm f to destination
d at time t. This variable is observed only if firm f starts (continues) exporting to destination d at time t. The key
independent variable in columns (1) and (5) is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export
experience. In columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8), the key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at
least one manager with destination-specific export experience. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and
the export experience (and its refinements). Specifications in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects
while specifications (3), (4), (7) and (8) include firm-year fixed effects. Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ
an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The instrument is the value of the dummy
indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific export experience at time t− 3. This
information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the firm-
level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
TABLE 2.8: (Log) Value of Exports of a Specific Product Conditional on Entry or Con-
tinuation
Exports Condit. Entry Exports Condit. Contin.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Manag. w/ Export Exp. 0.077c 0.032
(0.040) (0.023)
Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.104a 0.107a 0.118 0.190a 0.379a 1.084a
(0.018) (0.024) (0.082) (0.016) (0.031) (0.119)
Firm-Year Controls X X X X
Product-Year Dummies X X X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 11,853 11,853 11,853 4,403 29,033 29,033 29,033 11,358
R2 0.419 0.421 0.558 — 0.440 0.445 0.411 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model
of firm’s starting and continuing exporting a specific product (2.2). Estimation results for all other covariates are
provided in the Tables Appendix. The dependent variable is equal to the (log) exports value of firm f of product p at
time t. This variable is observed only if firm f starts (continues) exporting product p at time t. The key independent
variable in columns (1) and (5) is a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with export experience. In
columns (2) to (4) and (6) to (8), the key variable is instead a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager
with product-specific export experience. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the export experience
(and its refinements). Specifications in columns (1), (2), (5), and (6) include firm fixed effects while specifications (3),
(4), (7) and (8) include firm-year fixed effects. Specifications in columns (4) and (8) employ an IV estimator while
other specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The instrument is the value of the dummy indicating whether the firm
has at least one manager with product-specific export experience at time t− 3. This information is sometimes missing
so leading to a smaller estimation sample. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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(1) and (5) in the four Tables strongly indicate that just having one or more man-
agers with basic export experience neither increases the probability to start or
continue exporting a specific product or in a specific market not implies higher
export values.
The presence of specific export experience does increase trade performance. Columns
(2) to (4) and (6) to (8) in the four Tables strongly indicate that having one or
more managers with specific export experience increases the probability to start
and continue exporting a specific product or in a specific market and goes along
with higher export values. In terms of the latter the estimated IV impact in col-
umn (8) is 57% (exp(0.452)− 1) for export to a specific destination conditional on
continuation and a stunning 195% for export of a specific product conditional on
continuation. As far as the value of exports conditional on entry is concerned we
do not find robust evidence of a boost effect. There is some evidence of a positive
impact for product-specific experience but it does not survive in the IV specifica-
tion. Moving to probabilities of entry and continuation we find strong evidence
of a positive effect across the board. When compared to the raw probabilities re-
ported in the top part of Tables 2.5 and 2.6, IV estimates in columns (4) imply that
both destination-specific and product-specific experience almost double the prob-
ability to start exporting. When looking at the probability to continue exporting
(column 8), the magnitudes relative to raw probabilities are instead in the range
of 5-15%. There are many ways of rationalizing a smaller impact on continuation
with respect to entry: A possible explanation is that firms that already export to
a given market are likely to have managers without specific export experience
who helped the firm to enter to that market in the past. Therefore, the impact of
having a manager with specific export experience might well be positive for such
firms (as suggested by our analysis) but not as important as for firms who wish
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to start exporting.
Furthermore, when confronting the coefficients corresponding to the pres-
ence of specific export experience with those (see Tables Appendix) of more es-
tablished covariates used in the trade literature, like firm size and productivity,
we find that specific (destination or product) experience always matters more
than productivity while firm size explains more variation than specific experi-
ence only for the probability to continue exporting to a specific destination. In
the remaining 3 cases destination-specific experience matters more than firm size
while product-specific experience always explains more variation than firm size.
2.3.2 Managers arriving and leaving
The analysis presented so far focuses on the presence of managers with experi-
ence in a firm at a given point in time. In what follows we present some addi-
tional results about the arrival and departure of managers with experience. More
specifically, we consider sub-samples of the observations used in the estimations
provided in Tables 2.5 and 2.6 to better isolate the arrival of specific export knowl-
edge into a firm and the departure of specific export knowledge from a firm. We
use firm-time fixed effects and market-time dummies in all estimations.
In terms of arrival we consider, as in column (3) of Tables 2.5 and 2.6, firms
who are not exporting in t− 1 and look at whether they export in t or not depend-
ing on whether there is in the firm at least one manager with specific export expe-
rience in t. However, unlike in Tables 2.5 and 2.6, we now only consider firms that
in t− 1 have no managers with export experience (neither general nor specific)
while further imposing that all firms in t have managers with export experience—
though not necessarily specific to the considered market. This means we compare
the probability to start exporting to a given destination or to start exporting a spe-
cific product—for firms without experienced managers in t− 1—depending on
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whether the managers arriving in t have export experience that is specific to the
destination/product or not. In both cases, managers with export experience have
arrived in t but in one case the knowledge is specific while in the other it is not.
In the case of the knowledge leaving a firm we consider, as in column (7) of
Tables 2.5 and 2.6, firms who are exporting in t − 1 and look at whether they
export in t or not conditional on whether there is in the firm at least one man-
ager with specific export experience in t. However, unlike in Tables 2.5 and 2.6,
we now only consider firms that in t − 1 do have managers with specific ex-
port experience while further imposing that all firms in t have managers with
export experience though not necessarily specific to the considered market. This
means we compare the probability to continue exporting to a given destination or
to continue exporting a specific product—for firms with managers with specific
experience—depending on whether the managers that work in the firm in t have
export experience that is specific to the destination/product or not. In one case,
specific export experience remains in the firm while in the other it leaves the firm.
The slice of the data we use to perform these analyses is quite peculiar and
subject to clear selection biases. Therefore, we do not claim any causality for the
effects we find but still believe they are interesting to look at and compared with
previous findings. Results, reported in Table 2.9 below, portrait an captivating
picture. As far as the arrival of specific export knowledge is concerned, columns
(1) and (2) point to a positive and significant effect with a magnitude larger than
the comparable column (3) of Tables 2.5 and 2.6 and broadly in line with IV re-
sults in column (4) of Tables 2.5 and 2.6. Turning to specific knowledge leaving
a firm column (4) suggests that when product-specific knowledge departs the
probability to continue exporting a specific product substantially decreases. The
magnitude we find is in line with the IV impact we obtain in column (8) of Table
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2.6. However, when looking at destination-specific knowledge there is no sig-
nificant impact. This is in line with a scenario in which the destination-specific
knowledge of the manager leaving the firm has been fully transferred to the firm
who does not experience any reduction in trade performance.
TABLE 2.9: Probability to Start and Continue Exporting to a Specific Destination
or a Specific Product Depending on Whether Specific Export Experience Arrives or
Leaves a Firm
Prob. Start Exporting Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Experience Dest. Prod. Dest. Prod.
Arrival or Departure of Manag. w/ Specific Export Exp. 0.048a 0.034a 0.032 -0.109a
(0.007) (0.003) (0.025) (0.029)
Market-Year Dummies X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
Observations 12,231 54,179 14,190 6,772
R2 0.331 0.145 0.454 0.365
Notes: This Table reports OLS coefficients and standard errors for the core covariates of our model of firm’s starting
and continuing exporting a specific product or to a specific destination (2.2). The dependent variable takes value
one when a firm f starts exporting to a new (left panel) or continues exporting to a current (right panel) market m
at time t. The key independent variable is a dummy indicating if managers with specific export experience have
arrived into (left panel) or left from (right panel) a firm. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the
export experience (and its refinements). All specifications include firm-year fixed effects and market-time dummies.
Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
2.3.3 Additional findings
We now come back to analyzing the impact of the presence of managers with ex-
port experience and report in Tables 2.10 and 2.11 a number of additional find-
ings. In Table 2.10 we look at whether specific export experience interacts with
the degree of product differentiation and/or the financial vulnerability of a firm’s
products. In this respect we believe export experience should be relatively more
valuable to firms selling more differentiated products, i.e., products whose at-
tributes are more difficult to observe, and products needing more financing, for
example because of longer production processes and larger mismatch between
investments and profits requiring more managerial effort and expertise. We also
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believe this should be particularly the case for firms starting to export. In Table
2.10 we thus look at entry probabilities and focus on experience in a product to
examine the interaction between the presence of specific export experience with
a measure of product differentiation and a measure of external financial depen-
dence. We consider only our two most demanding specifications (firm-time fixed
effects and IV). The positive and significant interaction coefficients do suggest
that export experience is more valuable to firms selling more differentiated prod-
ucts and products needing more external financing.
TABLE 2.10: Probability to Start Exporting a Specific Product; Inter-
actions with External Financial Dependence and Product Differenti-
ation
Prob. Start Exporting
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. 0.007a 0.008a 0.014a 0.013a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. * Ext. Fin. Dep. 0.029a 0.041a
(0.004) (0.011)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. * Prod. Diff. 0.008b 0.029a
(0.003) (0.008)
Product-Year Dummies X X X X
Firm-Year FE X X X X
IV X X
Observations 775,675 775,675 313,369 313,369
R2 0.128 0.127 — —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the core
covariates of our model of firm’s starting exporting a specific product (2.2) further enriched
with product-specific measures of external financial dependence and product differentiation.
Estimation results for all other covariates are provided in the Tables Appendix. The depen-
dent variable takes value one when a firm f starts exporting a new product p at time t. The key
independent variable in columns (1) and (3) is the interaction between a dummy indicating
if the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export experience and our measure
of external financial dependence. In columns (2) an (4) the key variable is the interaction be-
tween a dummy indicating if the firm has at least one manager with product-specific export
experience and our measure of product differentiation. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition
of a manager and the export experience (and its refinements) as well as for the description
of the external financial dependence and product differentiation measures. All specifications
include firm-year fixed effects and product-year dummies. Specifications in columns (3) and
(4) employ an IV estimator while other specifications refer to an OLS estimator. The instru-
ments for the two reported covariates are built on a dummy indicating whether the firm has
at least one manager with product-specific export experience at time t − 3. This informa-
tion is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller estimation sample. All covariates, except
product-year dummies, have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order
to deliver a comparable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses:
ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
We perform in Table 2.11 a related exercise. The recent literature on China and
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trade has documented9 many instances in which increasing imports from China
put western firms and labour markets under competitive pressure generating a
number of negative (employment cuts, firm death) and positive (skill and tech-
nological upgrading) reactions. Within this increasingly difficult environment
we believe managerial export experience should be particularly valuable. To this
end we break down our data at the firm-time-product-destination level and in-
teract experience in a destination with a Chinese import penetration measure –
based on (Autor et al., 2014b) – for product p in destination d at time t. Our
Chinese import penetration measure proxies for the increasing degree of compe-
tition faced by a firm in exporting its products to a particular destination. We
focus on firms that are already established and thus estimate a model of export
continuation while including both destination-time and product-time dummies
along with firm or firm-time fixed effects. Results shown in Table 2.11 suggest
that import competition from China reduces continuation probabilities. At the
same time the interaction with experience in a destination is positive and signif-
icant in the two non-IV specifications while being very close to significance in
the IV specification; with the latter drawing on a much smaller sample. Though
not extremely robust, these finding may suggest a connection between increasing
import competition from China and the importance of specific export experience.
2.3.4 Endogeneity and other issues
Reverse causality. Does a firm hire managers with export experience to im-
prove its trade performance or does the firm decide (based for example on some
positive shocks) to export and then hires managers with export experience? In
other words, how important is the issue of reversed causality in our analysis?
9See, for example, (Autor et al., 2014b), (Bernard et al., 2006), (Bloom et al., 2011b) and (Mion
and Zhu, 2013).
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TABLE 2.11: Probability to Continue Exporting a Specific Product
to a Specific Destination; Interaction with Chinese Import Penetra-
tion
Prob. Continue Exporting
(1) (2) (3)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. 0.003 0.012a 0.046a
(0.002) (0.004) (0.014)
Manag. w/ Spec. Export Exp. * Imp. Penetr. China 0.004a 0.005a 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
Imp. Penetr. China 0.105 -0.017a -0.023a
(0.998) (0.006) (0.006)
Product-Year Dummies X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X
Firm FE and Firm controls X
Firm-Year FE X X
IV X
Observations 1,514,409 1,514,409 757,654
R2 0.302 0.518 —
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard errors for the
core covariates of an enriched version of our model of firm’s continuation into a foreign
destination (2.2). Estimation results for all other covariates are provided in the Tables Ap-
pendix. The dependent variable takes value one when a firm f continues exporting product
p to a current destination d at time t. The key independent variables are a dummy indi-
cating if the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific export experience, a
measure of Chinese import penetration in destination d of product p and time t and the in-
teraction between the two. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the export
experience (and its refinements) as well as for our measure of Chinese import penetration.
The specification in columns (1) includes firm fixed effects and the firm-time covariates
discussed in the previous Tables while specifications (2) and (3) include firm-year fixed
effects. The Specification in columns (3) employs an IV estimator while other specifica-
tions refer to an OLS estimator. The instruments for the first two covariates are built on a
dummy indicating whether the firm has at least one manager with destination-specific ex-
port experience at time t− 3. This information is sometimes missing so leading to a smaller
estimation sample. All specifications include destination-year and product-year dummies.
All covariates, except destination-year and product-year dummies, have been divided by
their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric. Standard er-
rors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
First, it is important to consider that managers with export experience cost
more and the more so if they have an export experience matching the market
portfolio of a firm.10 Therefore, such managers should in all likelihood improve
firm performance along some margins and it would be difficult to argue that
export performance (especially when related to specific experience) would not be
part of those margins. Whether the magnitudes we get here are lower or higher
than the causal effect is another question.
Second, shocks pushing a firm to start/continue exporting that have been so
10See Section B.5 of the Appendix
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far considered by the international trade literature (Bernard et al., 2012) are firm-
time specific (e.g. productivity, skill intensity, R&D intensity, quality). We fully
allow for such shocks and in particular our framework allows such shocks to be
arbitrarily correlated with the presence of managers with specific export experi-
ence by means of firm-year fixed effects.
Third, in order to be an issue in our IV analysis, the more general case of firm-
time-market shocks/omitted variables should be such that those unobservables
are correlated with specific export experience at time t as well as at time t− 3. In
this respect there is substantial evidence – including (Das et al., 2007), (Iacovone
and Javorcik, 2012) and (Moxnes, 2010) – that there are large sunk investment
costs firms have to incur in order to export in a given market and that the time
frame corresponding to firm’s decisions today affecting export performance to-
morrow (like setting up or increasing investments in quality and/or productivity)
is about two yeas. Therefore, ManExpfmt−3 should be uncorrelated with a firm’s
shocks and investments in between t− 2 and t; those eventually leading the firm
to improve its trade performance in t.
Fourth, in order to further address the issue of reverse causality we exploit the
exogeneity of the sudden end of the Angolan civil war in 2002. The shock was
unanticipated and right after the shock exporting firms did not have the time
to prepare themselves to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the new
politically stable setting by, for example, hiring managers with export experience.
However, some firms in 2002 had managers with export experience in Angola
while others had not and we show later on this makes a difference.
Finally, IV estimates in our analysis are typically larger than non-instrumented
one. We believe this is consistent with substitutability being at work between hir-
ing a manager with export experience and other export performance-enhancing
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forms of investments. More specifically, suppose that a firm is interested in en-
tering (or staying, or improving its performance) in market m. The firm can
either hire a manager with market-m export experience or undertake another
costly activity, Afmt, unobservable to us. Suppose that both choices affect the
firm trade performance with respect to market m. Both choices are costly: in
particular, our wage analysis shows that hiring a manager with specific export
experience entails paying an extra wage premium. If the distribution of the un-
observable Afmt across firms, markets and time is positively (negatively) cor-
related to ManExpfmt, the estimated coefficient of the latter will be upward
(downward) biased. A positive correlation means that the A activity and hir-
ing a manager with specific export experience are complementary. A negative
correlation instead reveals that the two forms of investment are substitutes. The
empirical international trade literature (Bernard et al., 2012) has no clear stance
towards investments improving trade performance being substitutes or comple-
ments. Therefore, the sign of the bias is a priori ambiguous and our IV findings
point towards substitutability.
Selection. The value of exports is observed only if a firm starts or continues
to export to a market. We cope with the issue of firm selection into a market
by using firm-year fixed effects and market-year dummies; most of the determi-
nants of export entry emphasized by the trade literature are either at the firm-time
or market-time level. A more recent strand of the literature, including (Morales
et al., 2012), is exploring other determinants of firm export behavior which are
truly firm-time-market specific and are related to a firm’s past activity in “re-
lated” markets. We could certainly incorporate such determinants in our analysis
to better address selection but, so far, it is not clear whether they provide valid
exclusion restriction, i.e. whether they affect entry and/or continuation but not
the value of exports.
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Alternative definitions of entry and continuation. Though characterized by
an overall strong degree of persistency over time, export activity can be erratic,
especially when considering "young exporters". (Eaton et al., 2008) show, using
Colombian data, that nearly one half of all new exporters stops exporting after
just one year, and total exports are dominated by a small number of large and
stable exporters.11 (Békés and Muraközy, 2012) shows, using Hungarian data,
that temporary trade is a pervasive feature of the data which is characterized by
a number of specificities in terms of the firms, markets, and products involved.
Therefore, a concern could be whether our results are sensitive to the the presence
of short-lived export participation. In unreported results, available upon request,
we have experimented with more stringent definitions of continuing and new
exporters in a given market, based on the firm activity both in t− 1 and in t− 2
as in (Eaton et al., 2008), finding very similar results.
Alternative way of dealing with reverse causality. As an alternative way of
dealing with reverse causality we construct an additional manager with specific
experience dummy. We consider such dummy being equal to one if the firm has
at least one manager with specific experience in t with the additional constraint
that the managers should have been hired by the firm either in t− 1 or t− 2 or
t− 3. In unreported results, available upon request, we have used such a dummy
as an alternative instrument. Estimations confirm our previous findings.
2.4 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper exploits a unique dataset for Portugal that allows to finely measure
firm trade performance and managers’ wages as well as to draw a sharp portrait
of managers’ mobility across firms. Crucially, we exploit the end of the civil war
11See (Amador and Opromolla, 2012) for similar findings using Portuguese data.
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in Angola as an event study to account for the endogeneity of the matching be-
tween managers and firms. The paper shows that the export experience gained
by managers in previous firms leads their current firm towards higher export per-
formance, and commands a sizeable wage premium for the manager. Moreover,
export knowledge proves to be very valuable when it is market-specific: managers
with experience related to markets served by their current firm receive an even
higher wage premium; firms are more likely to enter markets where their man-
agers have experience; exporters are more likely to stay in those markets, and
their sales are on average higher. At the same time, we show that the experience
premium accrued by different types of managers (general, production, financial
and sales) aligns with a knowledge diffusion story. We also find market-specific
experience to be more valuable in terms of trade performance to firms selling
products that are more differentiated and/or financially vulnerable while at the
same time experience seems to help some firms coping with increasing import
competition from China.
There are several policy implications stemming from our analysis. Our find-
ings point to the importance of the presence of market-specific knowledge within
the firm as a way to achieve competitiveness over and beyond firm productiv-
ity and scale. Improving firms’ productivity and scale of operations is notori-
ously difficult and can be very expensive. Therefore, policies fostering knowl-
edge exchange and diffusion of best practices among firms might be a more cost-
effective tool that the Portuguese government might wish to employ in order to
increase Portuguese firms’ competitiveness and performance. Our findings also
point to the existence of sizeable knowledge diffusion across firms via the mo-
bility of managers. The presence of such knowledge flows means that policies
directly affecting managerial skills and knowledge in some firms will sooner or
later spill-over to other firms. With specific reference to the export activity, this
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has profound implications for the design and evaluation of export promotion pro-
grammes. Indeed, existing firm-level quantifications of the benefits of export pro-
motion activities ((Mion and Muûls, 2015), (Broocks and Van Biesebroeck, 2017))
focus on benefits directly enjoyed by supported firms so neglecting spill-overs
effects on other firms.
107
Chapter 3
Trade and Migration: A Quantitative
Assessment
The economic effects from labor market integration are crucially affected by the
extent to which countries are open to trade. In this paper we build a multi-
country dynamic general equilibrium model to study and quantify the economic
effects of trade and labor market integration in the context of the 2004 European
Union enlargement. In our model, trade is costly and features households of dif-
ferent skills and nationalities facing costly forward-looking relocation decisions.
We use the EU Labour Force Survey to construct migration flows by skill and
nationality across 17 countries and a constructed rest of the world for the period
2002-2007. We exploit the timing of the change in policies due to the 2004 EU
enlargement to identify the corresponding changes in labor mobility costs. We
apply our model and use these estimates, as well as the observed changes in tar-
iffs, to quantify the effects from the EU enlargement. We find that new member
state countries are the largest winners from the EU enlargement, and in particular
low-skilled labor. We find smaller welfare gains for EU-15 countries. However, in
the absence of changes to trade policy, the EU-15 would have been worse off af-
ter the enlargement. We study even further the interaction effects between trade
and migration policies, the importance of the timing of migration policy, and the
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role of different mechanisms in shaping our results. Our results highlight the im-
portance of trade for the quantification of the welfare and migration effects from
labor market integration.
3.1 Introduction
The aggregate and distributional consequences of economic integration are a cen-
tral theme of debate in many countries, especially regarding the effects of trade
and labor market integration. In this paper we study the general equilibrium
effects of both goods and labor market integration and provide a quantitative as-
sessment of the 2004 European Union enlargement. We do so by first constructing
a new micro-data on gross migration flows by nationality and skills to study the
migration effects associated to an actual change in policy. Second, we exploit a
unique policy variation associated to the 2004 EU enlargement: the sequential
changes to migration costs that each European country followed in the enlarge-
ment process. We use this timing variation in the changes to migration policy to
identify policy-related changes in migration costs. Finally, given the sequential
nature of the change in migration policy following the EU enlargement, migration
decisions associated to the policy were inherently forward looking and dynamic.
Accordingly, we develop a multi-country quantitative general equilibrium model
of trade and migration policy with dynamic migration decisions.
The model features households of different skills and nationality with forward-
looking relocation decisions. In each period, households consume and supply
labor in a given country and decide whether to relocate in the future to a differ-
ent country or not. The decision to migrate depends on the households location,
nationality, skill, migration costs that are affected by policy, and an idiosyncratic
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shock ‡ la ArtuÁ, Chaudhuri, and McLaren (2010).1 As mentioned above, taking
into account the dynamic decision of households on where and when to migrate
is particularly important in the context of the EU enlargement since countries re-
duced migration restrictions sequentially over time. Moreover, it turns out that
the possibility to move in the future to another country whose real wages have
increased adds to the welfare of a worker by raising her option value of being in
a given location. In fact, even if migrants and natives obtain the same real wage
they value each location differently since they face different continuation values
as a result of different migration costs.
The production side of the economy captures the large degree of heterogene-
ity between old and new EU member states in terms of technology, and factor
endowments. It features producers of differentiated varieties in each country
with heterogeneous technology as in (Eaton and Kortum, 2002). In addition, we
allow technology levels to be proportional to the size of the economy in order
to capture the idea that there are benefits from firms and people locating next to
each other.2 Production requires high-skilled and low-skilled labor. Firms also
demand local fixed factors (structures, land) and, as a result, increases in popula-
tion size put upward pressure on factor prices that can mitigate the benefits from
having a larger market. Goods are traded across countries subject to trade costs
which depend on geographic barriers and trade policy (tariffs) as in (Caliendo
and Parro, 2015). As a consequence, a change to trade policy impacts the terms
of trade which in turn influences the effect of a change to migration restrictions.
All these features shape the economic effects of trade and labor market in-
tegration. Countries that experience a net inflow of migrants can be better off
1Keeping track of each household’s nationality is relevant in the context of changes to migra-
tion policies. For instance, if the U.K. eliminates migration restrictions to Polish nationals, Polish
households can freely move to the U.K. regardless of the location they are currently residing in.
However, unless other EU countries drop migration restrictions to Polish nationals, Polish nation-
als can’t migrate from the U.K. to another EU country as British nationals can.
2In this sense, we follow (Krugman, 1980), (Jones, 1995), (Kortum, 1997), (Eaton and Kortum,
2001), and (Ramondo et al., 2016).
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because of higher productivity (scale effects) and from an increase in the supply
of high- and low-skilled workers. However, they can also suffer from congestion
effects associated to the straining of the local fixed factors, and from a worsening
of the terms of trade associated to a downward pressure on wages. Changes in
trade policy have the standard gains from trade effects, but in addition they also
affect migration decisions. Understanding the overall contribution of these chan-
nels, as well as the role played by each channel in shaping the aggregate results,
is a quantitative question that we answer in the context of an actual change in
policy.
We apply our framework to quantify the welfare and migration effects of the
2004 EU enlargement. The 2004 EU enlargement is an agreement between mem-
ber states of the European Union (EU) and New Member States (NMS) that in-
cludes both goods market integration, and factors market integration. On the
integration in the goods market, tariffs were reduced to zero starting in 2004,
and the NMS countries resigned to previous free trade agreements (FTAs) and
joined EU’s FTAs.3 On factors market integration, migration restrictions were
eliminated although, as described in detail later on, the timing of these changes
to migration policies varied across countries.
Evaluating the effects of the EU enlargement requires information on how
trade and migration costs changed due to the policy. For the case of trade policy
one can directly observe the change in tariffs; however, policy-related changes in
migration restrictions are not directly observed. To identify the changes in migra-
tion costs due to the change in policy, we exploit the cross-country variation in
the timing of the adoption of the new migration policy.4 Our identification strat-
egy has a difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) flavor, and relies on the
3While tariffs applied to many goods were already zero by 2004 between the EU and NMS
states, the average tariff rates applied across countries were far from zero. Section 2 documents
the effective applied rates across countries before and after the enlargement.
4We estimate the whole set of changes in migration costs due to the EU enlargement over the
period 2002-2007. That is, for NMS nationals that migrate from NMS countries to EU countries,
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assumption that the trend in migration costs between countries that change mi-
gration policy and those that do not would have been the same in the absence of
the EU enlargement. We confirm our identifying assumption by running several
placebo tests and checking pre-treatment trends.
To estimate the changes in migration costs due to the EU enlargement and
to compute our model we require data on bilateral gross migration flows by na-
tionality and skill. We use raw data from the European Labour Force Survey
(EU-LFS) to construct these yearly migration flows for a group of 17 EU countries
and the rest of the world for the period 2002-2007.5 To evaluate the changes to
trade policy, we collect tariff data over the period 2002-2007.
To compute the effects of the EU enlargement we also need estimates of the
migration cost elasticity, the elasticity of substitution between low and high-skilled
workers, and the trade elasticity. We estimate the migration elasticity across coun-
tries using the two-step PPML estimation approach developed by (Artuç and
McLaren, 2015) to study occupational mobility within the United States. We use
our data on gross migration flows and wages across countries to estimate the in-
ternational migration elasticity across European countries. In order to estimate
the elasticity of substitution between low and high-skilled workers we use de-
tailed matched employer-employee data for Portugal. We instrument the relative
supply of high- to low-skilled labor by using information on displaced workers,
located in the same region but in different industries, that are forced to change
firm because of firm closure. Finally, we obtain the trade elasticity from (Caliendo
and Parro, 2015).
Using our model, estimated changes in migration costs, observed changes in
tariffs, and estimated migration, trade, and substitution elasticities we proceed to
for NMS nationals that migrate across NMS countries, and for EU nationals that migrate from EU
countries to NMS countries.
5We collect data up to the year 2007 in an attempt to exclude the effects of the 2008 global
financial crisis.
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our empirical analysis. We compute our model using the structural differences-
in-differences approach (dynamic hat algebra) developed in (Caliendo et al., 2017a).
The method, which consists on expressing the time-differenced equilibrium con-
ditions of a counterfactual economy relative to a baseline economy, has two main
attractive properties. First, one can solve the model and perform counterfactual
analyses without needing to estimate the set of exogenous state variables, (here-
after referred to as fundamentals). In our application, we solve for a counterfac-
tual economy where we hold trade and migration policy unchanged relative to
a baseline economy which contains the actual evolution of policies (i.e. the EU
enlargement). Second, since the baseline economy is calibrated using time series,
when feeding into the model the actual changes in policy we match exactly the
observed gross migration flows, trade flows, as well as the observed labor market
allocations and wages. This also means that in our application, fundamentals like
technology and the non-policy component of trade and migration costs are time
varying.
We first evaluate the migration effects of the EU enlargement. We find that
the full impact of the EU enlargement on the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15
countries is realized very gradually over time. For instance, three years after the
EU enlargement (that is, in 2007) the stock of NMS nationals in EU countries in-
creases by 0.03 percentage points, while ten years after the implementation, the
stock raises by 0.23 percentage points. We find that in steady state, the stock of
NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.63 percentage points or by about
3.3 million. Across skill groups, we find that the EU enlargement primarily in-
creases migration of low-skilled NMS workers to EU-15 countries, and to a much
lesser extent the migration of high-skilled workers. We also find that migration
would have been larger in the absence of changes to trade policy. For instance, the
stock of NMS workers in EU-15 countries would have been about 300 thousands
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people larger in the steady state.
Turning to the welfare effects, we find that on aggregate all groups of countries
gain, and in particular NMS countries: NMS countries welfare increases by 1.41%,
EU-15 countries welfare increases by 0.14%, while for Europe as a whole welfare
increases by 0.36%. We further study the aggregate welfare effects along three
dimensions. First, we show that the welfare effects of the EU enlargement are
quite heterogeneous across countries and skills. Second, we show that the timing
of changes to migration policy has important distributional effects. Third, we
show that the level of trade integration has a quantitative impact on the welfare
effects of changes to migration policy. We discuss each of these three findings in
turn.
Across skilled groups, the largest winners from the EU enlargement are the
low-skilled workers in NMS countries. The welfare of low-skilled workers in
NMS countries increase by 1.46%, as opposed to an increase of 0.97% for high-
skilled workers. On the other hand, EU-15 countries experience smaller welfare
gains, that are mostly concentrated on high-skilled workers: welfare increases by
0.23% for high-skilled and 0.12% for low-skilled workers. The simultaneous re-
duction in migration and trade costs that characterized the enlargement is crucial
for EU-15 countries: we show that, in the absence of changes to trade policy, the
EU-15 countries would have been worse off.
When looking at the welfare impact on specific countries, we find that Poland
and Hungary are the largest winners from the EU enlargement. The only group
of workers that experiences a welfare loss are the low-skilled workers from the
United Kingdom, with a welfare loss of 0.17%. This is mainly due to the increase
in labor market competition due to the relatively larger inflow of low-skilled mi-
grants. These losses more than offset the welfare gains associated to the reduction
in tariffs.
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The timing of changes to migration policy matters. We find that opening to
trade and delaying opening to migration would have benefited EU-15 low-skilled
workers more compared to EU-15 high-skilled workers. We also find that NMS
countries would have been worse off compared with the actual gains; yet welfare
gains are still positive.
We find that the level of trade integration has a quantitative impact on the
welfare effects of changes to migration policy. Countries that receive migrants
gain more under costly trade than under free trade while the reverse happens to
the countries that experience an outflow of workers. For instance, welfare gains
from reductions in migration restrictions for NMS countries would have been
13% higher under free trade compared to autarky. The intuition is that the labor
market competing effects of migrants on wages pass-through less to local prices
the more open the economy is.
We also extend our model to account for potential congestion effects from
public goods. We find that in the presence of public goods migration effects from
the EU enlargement are somewhat lower as immigration strains public goods and
reduces incentives to migrate. Welfare gains are larger in NMS countries that ex-
perience a net outflow of workers that help decongest public goods, and smaller
in EU-15 countries that experience a net inflow of workers. We also evaluate the
quantitative importance of the mechanisms that operate in the model and find
that abstracting from trade, congestion effects, and scale effects results in a signif-
icantly different welfare evaluation of trade and migration policies.
Our paper brings together two different but complementary elements in the
analysis: on the one hand, we use a reduced-form analysis that exploits migra-
tion policy changes to identify changes in migration costs associated to the EU
enlargement; on the other hand we use a rich dynamic general equilibrium model
that includes all the mechanisms described above to quantify the migration and
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welfare effects of actual changes to trade and migration policies.
We now briefly discuss the connection of this study to the literature. Our re-
search is complementary to studies that have employed static models of trade and
migration to investigate different mechanisms in which trade and migration are
interrelated. For instance, the effects of immigration in a Ricardian model with
technology differences across countries studied in (Davis and Weinstein, 2002),
the welfare effects of migration through remittances in (di Giovanni et al., 2015),
and crowding out effects and labor market adjustments to immigration across
tradable and non-tradable occupations in (Burstein et al., 2017). In addition, our
result extend the key insight of (Davis and Weinstein, 2002) that in a Ricardian
model with technology differences countries experiencing immigration always
loose with respect to a free trade baseline.
Our paper also complements studies that focus on the impact of immigration
on wages and employment of native workers, a question that has been exten-
sively studied in the literature (e.g. (Hanson and Slaughter, 2002), (Hanson and
Slaughter, 2016); (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012b); (Ottaviano et al., 2013); (Hong and
Mclaren, 2016); and many more).
We also build on quantitative trade literature for trade policy analysis, such as
(Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare, 2014), (Ossa, 2014), and in particular on (Caliendo
and Parro, 2015). We depart from these studies by adding labor market dynamics
and policy-dependent mobility frictions. In this sense, our paper relates to stud-
ies that evaluate the impact of trade shocks on labor markets, like (Artuç et al.,
2010); (Dix-Carneiro, 2014); (Dix Carneiro and Kovak, 2017); (Cosar, 2013); (Cos¸ar
et al., 2016); (Kondo, 2013); (Menezes-Filho and Muendler, 2011), (McLaren and
Hakobyan, 2015), and (Galle et al., 2017). For a recent review with the advances
in this literature, see (McLaren, 2017).
This study relates to quantitative research where labor reallocation plays an
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important role in order to analyze the spatial distribution of economic activity,
such as in (Ahlfeldt et al., 2015), (Redding and Sturm, 2008), (Redding, 2016),
(Allen and Arkolakis, 2014), (Caliendo et al., 2017b), (Fajgelbaum et al., 2015),
(Monte et al., 2015), (Tombe and Zhu, 2015).6
There is a fast-growing literature using spatial dynamic general equilibrium
models that we also contribute to. Our framework with labor market dynamics
builds on (Artuç et al., 2010), and it is particularly close to the general equilib-
rium model of trade and labor market dynamics developed in (Caliendo et al.,
2017a) (hereafter CDP). CDP focus on studying the dynamic adjustments of labor
markets to a trade shock, while in this paper we focus on quantifying how coun-
terfactual dynamic responses to migration and trade policy change the distribu-
tion of economic activity. Also, different from CDP, we bring into the analysis
households of different skills and nationalities, and policy-dependent migration
costs. Other papers, notably (Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg, 2014), employ spatial
dynamic models to understand how the distribution of economic activity shapes
the dynamics of local innovation and growth by determining the market size of
firms. Following this research, (Desmet et al., 2016) study how migration shocks
shape the dynamics of local innovation and growth.7
Our paper also connects with studies that have used the EU enlargement (as
an ex-ante and ex-post evaluation) to study the economics implications of the in-
tegration (e.g. (Baldwin, 1995), (Baldwin et al., 1997), (Dustmann and Frattini,
2011), and (Kennan, 2017)). Our approach departs in several ways, and in partic-
ular by employing new quantitative techniques to study the general equilibrium
effects of the enlargement in a model of costly trade and migration.
Finally, we mention other mechanisms in the literature that will not be part
6 For a review of new developments in quantitative spatial models see (Redding and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2016).
7See also (Klein and Ventura, 2009), who study the effects on output, welfare, and capital
accumulation of removing labor mobility barriers in a neoclassical growth model.
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of our analysis. Some studies have focused on the substitution between migrants
and natives in production, although the results on the value of the elasticity of
substitution are contrasting, as documented by (Borjas et al., 2012). As explained
above, in our paper natives and migrants are perfect substitutes in production
but they still value locations differently as a result of facing different migration
restrictions. That is, when deciding to migrate and where to live, the option value
for a migrant and a native vary and as a consequence migrants could in fact trade-
off lower wages for a higher option value.
We will also abstract from explicitly modeling selection effects in the migra-
tion decisions coming from unobserved heterogeneity in labor market skills. Se-
lection effects could lead to an increase in productivity by better sorting mi-
grants across location (e.g. (Borjas, 1987), (Young, 2013), (Lagakos and Waugh,
2013), (Bryan and Morten, 2017)). In our model, immigration fosters productiv-
ity through agglomeration forces as explained later on. (Diamond, 2016) has also
found that the internal migration of college graduates leads to increases in ameni-
ties in U.S. higher skill cities over the period 1980-2000. We abstract from endoge-
nous amenities in our model, but we believe that this mechanism is somehow less
relevant in the context of the EU enlargement as we quantify the effects of inter-
national migration, and as we will document later on, most of the migration due
to the enlargement was low-skilled. Still, studying the impact of immigration on
amenities at the country level is a promising avenue for future research.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the main
migration and trade policy changes as a consequence of the EU enlargement. We
also describe the data to construct gross migration flows across European coun-
tries by skill and nationality, and present some reduced-form evidence on the
change in migration flows after the 2004 EU enlargement. In Section 3 we develop
a dynamic model for trade and migration policy analysis that accounts for the
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main features of the EU enlargement and the migration data. Section 4 describes
other data construction and sources needed to compute the model, the estimation
of changes to migration costs due to the EU enlargement, and the estimation of
the relevant elasticities of the model. In Section 5 we compute the migration and
welfare effects from the EU enlargement and discuss the results. Finally, section 6
concludes. The Appendix includes a detailed description of the EU enlargement
process, of the data, and of the different methodologies employed throughout the
paper.
3.2 The 2004 Enlargement of the European Union
On May 1st 2004 ten new countries with a combined population of almost 75 mil-
lion officially joined the European Union (EU) bringing the total number of mem-
ber states from 15 to 25 countries.8 The New Member States (NMS), are: Czech
Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia,
and Slovakia. Country size and the relative endowment of skilled workers were
very heterogeneous within NMS countries and between NMS and EU-15 coun-
tries. For instance, the NMS countries were very heterogeneous in terms of pop-
ulation size, ranging from 0.4 millions in Malta to 38 millions in Poland in 2004.
In addition, the relative endowment of low-skilled worker was much higher in
NMS countries than in EU-15 countries. In particular, on average, the ratio of
low-to-high-skilled labor was 3.8 in EU-15 countries, and 5.2 in NMS countries in
2004.
In this section we highlight the features of the 2004 enlargement that directly
affect the international migration of workers within Europe and international
8The existing EU-15 member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece,
Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, and the United King-
dom.
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trade both between the enlarged set of EU members and between the EU and
the rest of the world.9
3.2.1 Migration Policies
The freedom of movement of workers is considered as one of the four fundamen-
tal freedoms guaranteed by EU law (acquis communautaire), along with the free
movement of goods.10 EU law effectively establishes the right of EU nationals
to freely move to another member state, to take up employment, and reside, as
well as protects against any possible discrimination, on the basis of nationality, in
employment-related matters.11
The Accession Treaty of 2003 allowed the “old” member states to temporar-
ily restrict, for a maximum of 7 years, the access to their labor markets to citizens
from the accessing countries, with the exception of Malta and Cyprus. These tem-
porary restrictions were organized in three phases according to a 2+3+2 formula.
During an initial period of 2 years, member states, through national laws, could
regulate the access of workers from all new member states; member states could
then extend their national measures for an additional 3 years, and an additional
extension for other 2 years was possible. The transitional arrangements were
scheduled to end irrevocably seven years after accession, i.e. on April 30th, 2011.
The decision about the timing to eliminate migration restrictions was mainly po-
litical, and therefore, the potential migration effects unlikely influenced this tim-
ing. For instance, initially and until only three months before the enlargement,
9Appendix C.1 describes the steps of the EU membership process, and reports additional in-
formation on the accessing countries.
10As effectively and concisely defined by Article 45 (ex Article 39 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the freedom of
movement of workers entails “the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers
of the member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment”.
11Once a worker has been admitted to the labor market of a particular member state, commu-
nity law on equal treatment as regards remuneration, social security, other employment-related
measures, and access to social and tax advantages is valid.
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EU-15 countries had decided to eliminate migration restrictions all in 2004. In
addition, this was an unprecedented enlargement given that it was the first one
to include countries at very different stages of development. As a result, there
was little evidence on the potential migration effects of the enlargement, with a
large range of estimates.12
We now briefly summarize the phase-in period of the accession. Appendix
C.1 presents further details.
Before 2004. Workers could flow freely within the EU-15 member states but
not between EU-15 and NMS as well as between NMS countries.
Phase 1. In 2004, the U.K., Ireland, and Sweden open their borders to NMS
countries, which reciprocate by opening their borders to British, Irish and Swedish
citizens. All the other EU-15 countries keep applying restrictions to NMS coun-
tries, except to Cyprus and Malta. All NMS countries decide to open their borders
to EU-15 member states, except for Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia which apply
reciprocal measures. NMS countries lift all restrictions among each others.
Phase 2. In 2006, Italy, Greece, Portugal, and Spain lift restrictions on work-
ers from NMS countries. As a consequence, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia drop
their reciprocal measures towards these four member states. Slovenia and Poland
dropped the reciprocal measures altogether in 2006 and 2007, respectively, while
Hungary simplified them in 2008. During phase 2, The Netherlands and Luxem-
bourg (in 2007), and France (in 2008) also lift restrictions on workers from NMS
countries.
Phase 3. Belgium and Denmark opened their labor market to NMS countries
in 2009, while Austria and Germany opened their labor markets at the end of the
transitional period, in 2011.
12 See for instance Fihel, Janicka, Kaczmarcyk, and Nestorowicz 2015, “Free Movement of
Workers and Transitional Arrangements: Lessons from the 2004 and 2007 Enlargements”.
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As we can see, there is considerable variation in terms of which countries open
to which over time across the phases. This variation is going to result useful for
us in order to identify the changes in migration costs due to migration policy. Yet,
phase 3 of the agreement was in the middle of the 2008 great financial crisis and
this can interfere with our identification of the effects of the change in policy. As
a result, in our quantitative analysis, we focus on the effects of the enlargement
accounting for the first two phase-in periods. We now briefly describe the change
in trade policy.
3.2.2 Trade Policies
As part of the enlargement process, NMS became part of the European Union
Customs Union, and of the European common commercial policy. As a result,
tariffs between NMS and EU-15 countries were reduced to zero starting in 2004.
Figure 3.1 presents the change in tariffs applied to EU-15 countries and to NMS
countries as a consequence of the EU-enlargement. The average tariff rate before
the enlargement was about 4.3 percent between NMS countries, the average tariff
applied by NMS to EU-15 countries was about 5 percent, and the average tariff
applied by EU-15 to NMS countries was about 4.2 percent. After the accession,
from 2004 on, tariffs between all EU-25 countries are zero. Also, as a consequence
of the EU enlargement process, NMS automatically entered into the trade agree-
ments to which the EU is a party, and resigned their own existing agreements.13
This resulted in additional changes in trade policy for NMS. We use all these tariff
changes in our quantitative assessment later on.
13In Appendix C.1.2 we provide more detail on the trade policy implemented after the EU
enlargement.
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FIGURE 3.1: Average tariff changes due to the EU enlargement
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Note: Average (trade weighted) tariff changes from 2003 to 2004. The figures show the set of
EU-15 and NMS countries used in our empirical analysis. Source WITS.
3.2.3 Gross Migration Flows by Nationality and Skill
In order to quantify the migration and welfare effects of changes in migration
policy, data on migration flows across European countries before and after the
EU enlargement are needed. In particular, we need migration flows by nation-
ality and skill since, as discussed above, the mobility restrictions that EU15 and
NMS nationals face are quite different, and the level of educational attainment is
very heterogeneous across all the countries involved in the enlargement. Given
that the existing migration data are mostly based on census sources and contain
information only on stocks of migrants, we proceed to construct gross migration
flows by nationality and skill across European countries.
We construct bilateral gross migration flows for European countries from 2002
to 2007 using information contained in the European Labour Force Survey (EU-
LFS), a large household survey providing confidential quarterly or annual results
on labor participation of people aged 15 and over, as well as on persons outside
the labor force from 1983 onward. The EU-LFS is currently conducted in the 28
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member states of the European Union, two candidate countries and three coun-
tries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).14 The main strength of the
EU-LFS is to use the same concepts and definitions in every country, follow Inter-
national Labour Organization guidelines using common classifications (NACE,
ISCO, ISCED, NUTS), and record the same set of characteristics in each country.
Because of these features, the EU-LFS is the basis for unemployment and educa-
tion statistics in Europe.
The survey contains information on a representative sample of the labor force
in each country. Individuals are assigned a weight to represent the share of people
with the same characteristics in the country. For each individual in a specific year,
we have information on age, nationality, skills and, crucially for our purpose,
country of residence 12 months before. We use the information on country of
residence in the previous year to construct bilateral gross migration flows by year,
country of origin, nationality and skill for a group of 17 EU countries.15
We group migrants in three broad nationality categories that follow immedi-
ately from the 2004 European enlargement: EU-15 nationals, NMS nationals, and
Other nationals (rest of the world). Moreover, we follow the international stan-
dard classification of education (ISCED 1997) and define high skill labor as college
educated and low skill labor as individuals with high school degree or less. We
constraint our sample to include only individuals of working age—between 15
and 65 years old—and only countries with consistent information on nationality,
skills and country of origin over the period 2002-2007. We end up with a total
of 17 countries, ten former EU members, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark,
14The national statistical institute of each country in Europe conducts surveys that are centrally
processed by Eurostat; each national institute is responsible for selecting the sample, preparing
the questionnaires, conducting the direct interviews among households, and forwarding the re-
sults to Eurostat in accordance with the requirements of the regulation.
15As an example, looking at the U.K. survey in 2004, we know if a Polish high-skilled worker
moved to the U.K. from Poland in the previous 12 months. Migration shares, µijn,s,t are computed
as the share of migrants that moved to a specific destination country over a population defined
by country of origin, nationality and skills.
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Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom, and seven NMS,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland. Our
group of countries covers 91 percent of the 2004 EU-25 population.16
As an illustration, Figure 3.2 plots the gross flows and stocks of NMS migrants
in EU15 countries that arise from our constructed gross migration flows data. As
we can see from the panels, the largest fraction of migrants was low-skilled.17
3.2.4 Reduced-Form Evidence
With the constructed gross migration flows, we can now proceed to provide a first
evidence on the migration effects of the EU enlargement by presenting reduced-
form evidence on the change in migration flows of NMS nationals to EU-15 coun-
tries after the 2004 enlargement. In particular, we explore whether there was
a significant change in migration flows after 2004, controlling by country charac-
teristics and time effects. As an example, we use our constructed data on bilateral
gross migration flows to estimate a simple difference-in-difference (DD) model to
evaluate the change in the flow of NMS nationals migrating to the U.K. after 2004.
We choose the U.K. since it is the only EU-15 country in our sample that elimi-
nated migration restrictions immediately in 2004. We consider the NMS nationals
as the treated group and the EU-15 and Other nationals as the control group, and
run the following regression,
logF i,UKn,t = λi,t+αNMS+β03I (UK, 2003)+β04I (UK, 2004)+β05I (UK, 2005) +
+β06I (UK, 2006) + β07I (UK, 2007) + εin,t,
16Country surveys for Ireland, Malta, Netherlands, Sweden, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Lux-
embourg, Romania and Finland do not contain sufficient information to compute migration flows
consistently between 2002 and 2007, so we assign these countries to the rest of the world (RoW).
More information on each case is contained in Appendix C.2.1.
17Appendix C.2.2 describes in greater detail how we construct the gross migration flows, and
provides a set of external validation statistics.
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where the dependent variable logF i,UKn,t is the (log) flow of nationality n mi-
grants from NMS country i to the U.K. in year t, λi,t is a set of origin-year fixed
effects that captures origin-time-specific factors, and αNMS is a fixed effect that
captures possible difference between NMS nationals and the control group prior
to the EU enlargement. The coefficients {β0t}t=3−7, interacted with an indicator
function equal to one for the year t capture the change in the flow of NMS mi-
grants to the U.K. after the enlargement relative to the control group. We expect
β04− β07 to be positive and significant, pointing to an increase in the flow of NMS
nationals migrating to the U.K. after the EU enlargement, controlling by country
characteristics and time effects.18
Figure 3.3, reporting the estimated βs, as well as the 99th, 95th, and 90th per-
centiles confidence intervals, provides evidence of a significant change in mi-
gration flows of NMS nationals after the EU enlargement. In particular, the
difference-in-difference estimates show that the flow of NMS nationals to the U.K.
jumps up in 2004, and the NMS migrants steadily increases in the years following
the enlargement.
Besides an increase in the flow of NMS nationals migrating to the EU-15 coun-
tries, the EU enlargement also had heterogeneous migration impacts on individ-
ual destinations for NMS migrants. Figure 3.4 reports a stark example of this
diversion effect: Germany had been, for several reasons throughout history, the
main European destination for Polish migrants. After the enlargement, the share
of Polish migrants moving from Poland to Germany has been constantly decreas-
ing, with the U.K. progressively becoming the top destination for Polish migrants.
18The coefficient β03 instead allows us to carry on a test for causality in the spirit of Granger
(1969): a non-significant β03 is consistent with the opening of the U.K. labor market to NMS
nationals causing the change in F i,UKn,t , but not vice-versa.
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Section C.2.2 in the Appendix uses our gross migration data to depict other ex-
amples of migration patterns.
We next turn to a structural analysis, where we will capture the aspects of the
EU enlargement discussed in this section: the sequential change in migration pol-
icy, the significant and gradual change in migration flows after the enlargement,
and the heterogeneity of destination countries. To do so, in the next section we
develop a structural model of trade and migration with multiple countries, and
households of different nationalities and skills making forward-looking migra-
tion decisions. Later on, we will also use the changes in migration flows across
countries after the enlargement to identify the policy-related changes in migra-
tion costs, not only for the case of the U.K., but also for all countries that changed
migration policy. After doing so, we will feed these policy-related changes in mi-
gration costs into our structural model to quantify the general equilibrium effects
of the EU enlargement.
3.3 A Dynamic Model of Trade and Labor Markets
Integration
In this section, we develop a dynamic general equilibrium model for trade and
migration policy analysis that accounts for the main features of the EU enlarge-
ment and the migration data outlined above. The world is composed of N coun-
tries, indexed by i and j. Each country represents a competitive labor market
where a continuum of firms produce goods with heterogeneous productivities.
A fraction of goods are traded across countries, and the movement of goods is
subject to trade costs. As we will see later on, a component of trade costs is tar-
iffs, which are affected by trade policy in each country. As in (Eaton and Kortum,
2002) productivities have a FrÈchet distribution with a dispersion parameter θ
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which, as we will see below, is also the trade cost elasticity. Production of goods
in a given country requires high-skilled and low-skilled labor, which are imper-
fect substitutes, and fixed factors that we call structures.
In the model, time is discrete and households have perfect foresight. House-
holds make forward-looking labor relocation decisions subject to migration costs
and idiosyncratic preferences. Each period they decide whether to stay in the
same country or to move to a different country, a decision that depends on real
wages and expected continuation values. Migration policy in each country has
an impact on migration costs, and therefore on households’ decisions.
We start by describing the problem of the households, we then set up the
production structure in each country, and finally, we derive the market clearing
conditions. After doing so, we define the equilibrium of the model.
3.3.1 Households
Households are forward-looking, observe the economic conditions in all coun-
tries and optimally decide where to work. Households face costs of moving
across countries and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks that affect their moving
decision. If they begin the period in a country, they work and earn the market
wage. As described above, households in a given country are of different nation-
alities that we index by n, and with different skills that we index by s.
The value of a n national of skill s in country i at time t, vin,s,t, is given by
vin,s,t = log(C
i
s,t) + max{j}Nj=1
{βE[vjn,s,t+1]−mijn,s,t + νjn,s,t},
where Cis,t is the consumption aggregator that we describe below. The term m
ij
n,s,t
is the migration cost from country i to country j at time t for a household native
from country n and skill level s.
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The migration cost, mijn,s,t in our model is time varying, as it can be impacted
by changes to migration policy. Specifically, we allow mobility costs to have a
non-policy and a policy component, that is, mijn,s,t = m˜
ij
n,s,t + mpol
ij
n,s,t, where
m˜ijn,s,t is the non-policy component of the cost of migrating from country i to
country j for a household of nationality n and skill s, and mpolijn,s,t is the pol-
icy component that is impacted by migration restrictions. Moreover, we allow
non-policy migration to also be time-varying and include origin-specific compo-
nents, destination-specific components, and bilateral components, that is m˜ijn,s,t =
m¯in,s,t + m¯
j
n,s,t + m¯
ij
n,s,t.
We assume that idiosyncratic preference shocks jn,s,t are stochastic i.i.d. of a
Type-I extreme value distribution with zero mean, and with dispersion parameter
ν that later on we will relate it to the migration cost elasticity. Finally, β is the
discount factor. The presence of migration costs and idiosyncratic preferences
generates a gradual adjustment of flows in response to changes in the economy
since only the fraction of households with idiosyncratic preference for a location
that more than offset the migration cost will relocate each period.
Using the properties of the Type-I extreme value distribution, we can solve for
the expected (expectation over ) lifetime utility of a worker of nationality n and
skill s in country i, namely V in,s,t ≡ E[vin,s,t],
V in,s,t = log
(
Cis,t
)
+ νlog
(
∑Nj=1exp(βV
j
n,s,t+1 −mijn,s,t)1/ν
)
. (3.1)
The first term in equation (3.1) represents the current utility of that households
in country i and the second term captures the expected value of staying in that
country the next period and the option value of migrating to a different country.
Note that the option value of migration varies by skill and nationality, and cap-
tures the fact that households of different nationalities living in the same country
face different migration restrictions.
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Households supply a unit of labor inelastically, and receive a competitive
nominal wage wis,t that depends on the country of residency, and the skill level.
Given this, the indirect utility of a household with skill s in country i is given by
Cis,t =
wis,t
P it
, (3.2)
where P it is the local price index.
Using the properties of the extreme value distribution, we also solve for the
fraction of households of nationality n and skill s that migrates from country i to
country j at time t, which we denote by µijn,s,t
µijn,s,t =
exp(βV jn,s,t+1 −mijn,s,t)1/ν
∑Nk=1 exp(βV
k
n,s,t+1 −mikn,s,t)1/ν
. (3.3)
This equation describes gross flows of migrants by nationality and skill across
countries. Notice that 1/ν captures the response of migration flows to migration
costs, or in other words, the migration cost elasticity, which is a parameter that
we need to estimate.
With the initial distribution of labor by nationality and skill across countries,
and the migration flows at each period, we can solve for the evolution of labor by
nationality and skill at each moment in time. Specifically,
Lin,s,t+1 =∑
N
j=1µ
ji
n,s,tL
j
n,s,t, for all n, s. (3.4)
Finally, the total labor supply in each country is then given by the sum of high-
skill (h) and low-skill (l) workers of all nationalities,
Lit =∑Nn=1
(
Lin,h,t + L
i
n,l,t
)
.
We now turn to describe the production structure of each economy.
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3.3.2 Production
A continuum of goods is produced in each country with technology as in (Eaton
and Kortum, 2002). The technology to produce these goods requires both high-
skilled and low-skilled labor, and structures. High-skilled and low-skilled labor
are imperfect substitutes, and structures is a fixed factor. Total factor produc-
tivity (TFP) is composed of two terms: an aggregate component (Ait), which is
common to all varieties in a country, and a variety-specific component (zi) that is
a stochastic realization from a FrÈchet distribution. We allow technology levels
to be endogenous and proportional to the size of the economy, that is Ait = φ
i
tL
i
t
, as in (Ramondo et al., 2016).19 Note that, although the elasticity of TFP with
respect to population size is equal to one under this formulation, the elasticity of
real income with respect to population is less than one because of the congestion
effects in the presence of local fixed factors.20
Since each variety is identified by zi, we use it to index a variety. Therefore,
the production function of a given good in country i is given by
qit(z
i) = ziAit
((
δih
) 1
ρ
(
Lih,t
) ρ−1
ρ +
(
δil
) 1
ρ
(
Lil,t
) ρ−1
ρ
) ρ(1−γi)
ρ−1 (
Hi
)γi
,
where Lih,t and L
i
l,t are the amount of high and low-skilled labor used to pro-
duce a given good in country i, ρ is the elasticity of substitution between high and
low-skilled labor, (1− γi) is the share of labor payments in value added, δih is the
weight of high-skilled labor in production, and δil is the weight of low-skilled
labor, with δih + δ
i
l = 1. The stock of land and infrastructures is H
i, which, as
mentioned before, is a fixed factor.
19Note that an isomorphic relation arises from models with free entry of firms as in (Melitz,
2003).
20Given this, the production structure of our model can be mapped into existing static models
with scale effects that show existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium (e.g. (Kucheryavyy et al.,
2016)).
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We refer to rentiers as the owners of the fixed factorsHi. As in (Caliendo et al.,
2017b) we assume that there is a mass one of rentiers in each economy and that
rentiers consume local goods using (3.2), the same consumption aggregator as
households. Rentiers obtain rents ritH
i from the fixed factors they own and rent
to firms. We assume that these rents are sent to a global portfolio and that rentiers
obtain a share ιi of the global portfolio revenues χt = ∑Ni=1 r
i
tH
i, where rit is the
rental price of structures in country i. Differences between remittances to the
global portfolio and the income transfers from the global portfolio will generate
imbalances in each country, and therefore, this assumption on the behavior of
the rentiers will allow us, in our quantitative model, to match the observed trade
imbalances across nations. This ownership structure has only an indirect impact
on workers’ welfare through market clearing conditions since workers are not the
owners of the fixed factor. An alternative is to model workers as owners of assets
and the possibility of carrying these assets to different countries. This formulation
implies a much harder problem to solve since it would require to keep track of
each household and her assets, and therefore, we leave it for future research.
Goods can be traded across countries subject to trade costs. Specifically the
cost of shipping goods from country j to country i is given by κijt = (1+ τ
ij
t )d
ij
t ,
where dijt is an iceberg-type trade cost, which includes non-tariff trade barriers,
and τ ijt is an ad-valorem tariff.
As in (Eaton and Kortum, 2002), using the properties of the FrÈchet distribu-
tion we can solve for the bilateral trade shares piijt and the price index P
i
t as a
function of factor prices, productivities and trade costs. Specifically,
piijt =
Ajt (κ
ij
t x
j
t )
−θ
∑Nk=1 A
k
t (κ
ik
t x
k
t )
−θ , (3.5)
P it =
(
∑Nj=1A
j
t (κ
ij
t x
j
t )
−θ
)− 1θ , (3.6)
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where xit is the unit price of an input bundle, namely
xit ≡ ζi
(
δih(w
i
h,t)
1−ρ + δil (w
i
l,t)
1−ρ
) (1−γi)
1−ρ
(rit)
γi , (3.7)
where ζi is a constant. We now describe the market clearing conditions and the
equilibrium of the model.
3.3.3 Market Clearing
The total expenditure on goods by country i is given by labor income of workers
of all skill levels and nationalities residing in country i, by income of local rentiers,
and by tariff revenues. Namely, the goods market clearing is given by
Xit = ∑
N
n=1∑s=h,l w
i
s,tL
i
n,s,t + ι
iχt + T
i
t , for all i, (3.8)
where χt = ∑Ni=1 r
i
tH
i is the rent of the global portfolio, and where
T it = ∑
N
j=1 τ
ij
t
piijt
(1+τ ijt )
Xit are tariff revenues.
Finally, the labor markets clear, i.e
wis,tL
i
s,t = ξ
i
s,t(1− γi)∑Nj=1
pijit
(1+ τ jit )
Xjt , for all i, s, (3.9)
where ξis,t is the share of skill s in the labor payments, which is time varying
given the CES production structure.
3.3.4 Equilibrium
We denote byΘt ≡ ({dijt }, {m˜ijn,h,t}, {m˜ijn,l,t}, {φit}, {Hi})N ,Ni=1,j=1 the set of constant
and time-varying fundamentals, that is, bilateral non-tariff (iceberg) trade costs,
non-policy mobility costs by nationality and skills, the exogenous component of
productivity across countries, and the stock of fixed factors across countries. In
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addition, we denote by Υt ≡ ({τ ijt }, {mpolijn,h,t}, {mpolijn,l,t})N ,N ,Nn=1,i=1,j=1 the dif-
ferent economic policies of a country: tariffs and migration policies that impact
migration costs mijn,s,t. The state of the economy is given by the distribution of
labor across each market at a given moment in time Lt =
{
Lin,h,t,L
i
n,l,t
}N ,N
n=1,i=1
.
We now seek to define the equilibrium of the model given fundamentals, trade
policies, and migration policies. First, we formally define the static equilibrium,
which is given by the set of factor prices that solve the static trade equilibrium.
Definition 1. Given (Lt,Θt,Υt), the static equilibrium is a set {wih,t,wil,t, rit}Ni=1 of
factor prices that solves the static sub-problem given by the equilibrium conditions (3.5),
(3.6), (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9).
We denote by ωis,t ≡ wis,t/P it real income and by ωis,t(Lt,Θt,Υt) the solution of
the static equilibrium given (Lt,Θt,Υt). We now define the sequential competitive
equilibrium of the model given a sequence of fundamentals and policies:
Definition 2. Given an initial allocation of laborL0, a sequence of fundamentals {Θt}∞t=0,
and a sequence of policies {Υt}∞t=0, a sequential competitive equilibrium of the model
is a sequence {Ln,s,t,µn,s,t,Vn,s,t,ωis,t(Lt,Θt,Υt)}N ,∞n=1,t=0 for s = {h, l}, that solves the
households’ dynamic problem, equilibrium conditions (3.1), (3.3), (3.4), and the tempo-
rary equilibrium at each t.
Definition 2 illustrates the equilibrium of the model given an initial condition
on the state of the economy and for a given sequence of fundamentals and poli-
cies. Our goal now is to use the model to study the trade, migration and welfare
effects of changes to trade and migration policies. We do so in the multi-country
version of the model calibrated to the EU economies and a constructed rest of
the world. Taking a large scale model to the data requires estimating a large set
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of unknown parameters—technologies, iceberg trade costs, the non-policy com-
ponent of migration costs, and the endowments of fixed factors—that we refer
to as fundamentals. We use the method proposed by CDP, dynamic hat algebra
(henceforth DHA), to take the model to the data to study the effects of changes to
trade and migration policies. The key advantage of DHA is that we can conduct
our quantitative analysis without estimating the fundamentals of the economy.
We now express the equilibrium conditions of the model in relative time differ-
ences and show how we can use the model and data to study the effects of the
EU enlargement.
3.3.5 Solving for Policy Changes
Suppose we want to study the effects of changes in policy from {Υt}∞t=0 → {Υ ′t}∞t=0.
Let y˙t+1 ≡ yt+1/yt denote the relative time change of a variable, and let yˆt+1 ≡
y˙′t+1/y˙t+1 denote the relative time difference of the variable under a sequence of
policies {Υ ′t}∞t=0 relative to the sequence of policies {Υt}∞t=0.
For instance, if yt+1 are prices, yˆt+1 is the relative change in prices as a conse-
quence of the change in policy. Given this notation we can write the equilibrium
conditions of the model for a given change in the sequence of policies. Impor-
tantly, what the next proposition shows is that, given data on the allocations
of the economy, we can study the effects of a change in policy without infor-
mation on the sequence of fundamentals. To simplify notation let ˆmpolijn,s,t ≡
exp(mpol′ijn,s,t+1 −mpol′ijn,s,t)/ exp(mpolijn,s,t+1 −mpolijn,s,t), and
uˆin,s,t ≡ exp(V ′in,s,t+1 − V ′in,s,t)/ exp(V in,s,t+1 − V in,s,t).
Proposition 1. Given data {Lt,µt,pit,Xt}∞t=0, elasticities (ν, θ, β, ρ), and a sequence of
counterfactual changes in policy ˆ{Υt}∞t=0, solving the model does not require {Θt}∞t=0,
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and solves
uˆin,s,t = Cˆ
i
s,t
(
∑Nj=1µ′
ij
n,s,t−1µ˙
ij
n,s,t
(
ˆmpolijn,s,t
)−1/ν (
uˆjn,s,t+1
)β/ν)ν
,
µ′ijn,s,t =
µ′ijn,s,t−1µ˙
ij
n,s,t
(
ˆmpolijn,s,t
)−1/ν (
uˆjn,s,t+1
)β/ν
∑Nk=1 µ′ikn,s,t−1µ˙
ik
n,s,t
(
ˆmpolikn,s,t
)−1/ν (
uˆkn,s,t+1
)β/ν ,
L′in,s,t+1 =
N
∑
j=1
µ′jin,s,tL
′j
n,s,t ,
for all n, and s, where µ˙ijn,s,t is the observed (data) change in migration flows over
time, and Cˆis,t = ωˆ
i
s,t(L̂t, Υ̂t) is obtained from solving the static trade equilibrium con-
ditions.21
The result in Proposition 1 follows directly from CDP, and shows how we
can use data and estimated elasticities to study the effects of a change in policy
without needing to estimate fundamentals.
We apply the result of Proposition 1 as follows. Consider a sequence of ob-
served allocations (data) before and after the change in policy. This sequence of
data contains information of the actual fundamentals and the policies in place
at each time, including the policy changes due to the EU enlargement. To iso-
late the effect of the EU enlargement, we have to construct a counterfactual se-
quence of allocations that reflects the evolution of the economies in the absence
of the EU enlargement. Proposition 1 shows how to compute this counterfactual
economy under a new sequence of policies, Υˆt, relative to the data. For the case
of the EU enlargement, the counterfactual sequence of policies is to leave tariffs
and migration policy unchanged, that is, at the pre-enlargement level. Therefore,
21Appendix C.6 describes the equilibrium conditions of the temporary equilibrium in relative
time differences.
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the solution to the equilibrium conditions in relative time differences showed in
Proposition 1 answers the following question: “How would the economy look
like if everything would have happened as in the data (changes in fundamentals,
other policies, etc.) except for the EU enlargement?”
The methodology developed in CDP has two main attractive properties to
quantify the effects of the EU enlargement. First, we only need to identify the
change in policy and therefore, we do not need to identify the evolution of the
whole set of unobservable parameters (fundamentals) during the period of anal-
ysis. Second, we solve for the counterfactual economy relative to an economy
that is calibrated using time series, and therefore, when feeding into the model
the actual changes in policy, it will match exactly the observed gross migration
flows, trade flows, and all the rest of observed labor market allocations. We can
apply the result in Proposition 1 to study any other counterfactual change in pol-
icy and/or to study changes in fundamentals. Of course, this requires the use
of time series data on labor allocations, migration and trade flows, and expendi-
tures, as well as estimates of the elasticities.22 Implementing this methodology
requires a measure of the changes in policies that we want to study. While the
magnitude of changes in tariffs comes immediately from the data, measuring the
change in migration costs associated with the EU enlargement is challenging.
In the next section, we describe how we construct the data to compute the
model, we present the estimation strategy used to measure the changes in policy-
related migration costs, and we estimate all the relevant elasticities.
22In practice, there is no infinite sequence of data. To overcome this, we follow CDP and use
the maximum possible data available and then use the model to solve forward for the economy
under a constant set of fundamentals and policies. In our application this would mean to use data
from the years 2002 to 2007 and then solve forward with the level of fundamentals and policies
implied by the data of the year 2007.
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3.4 Estimation
To implement the DHA described in the previous section, we need data on bi-
lateral migration shares by nationality and skill µijn,s,t, bilateral trade shares pi
ij
t ,
total expenditure by country Xit , and the distribution of labor by nationality and
skill across countries Lin,s,t. In addition, we need to compute the share of labor
payments in value added (1 − γi) and the share of labor by skill ξis,t. We also
need estimates of the migration cost elasticity 1/ν, and an estimate of the elastic-
ity of substitution between low and high skill workers ρ. We also need to input a
value for the trade cost elasticity θ, and for the discount factor β. In our quanti-
tative analysis we use the value θ = 4.5 from (Caliendo and Parro, 2015), whose
methodology is consistent with the gravity-trade equation of our model.23 Fi-
nally, we impose a yearly discount factor β = 0.97. To evaluate the change in
trade and migration policy we also need bilateral ad-valorem tariffs τ ijt , and the
changes in migration costs associated to the policy for each country pair. In this
section we describe the data construction, and estimation strategies to obtain the
elasticities and changes in migration costs associated to the EU enlargement. Ap-
pendix C.2, C.3, and C.4 present a more extensive description of the data and the
estimation methodologies.
Section 3.2.3 described the construction of gross migration flows across Euro-
pean countries by nationality and skill µijn,s,t. We now briefly describe the produc-
tion and trade data needed to compute the model. We construct the bilateral trade
shares piijt for the 17 countries in our sample, and a constructed rest of the world,
using trade flows from the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), and we also
compute total expenditure by country Xit from WIOD. Employment Ln,s,t is com-
puted using the stocks of workers by country, nationality, skills and year from the
EU-LFS. The share of labor payments in value added (1− γi) is computed with
23The methodology in Caliendo and Parro (2015) is consistent with models that deliver a mul-
tiplicative gravity equation, like the model in this paper.
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information on labor compensation retrieved from the socio economic accounts
of the WIOD. The share of labor by skill ξis,t in total labor payment is obtained
using labor compensation data by skill from the socio economic account of the
WIOD data set.
3.4.1 Identifying Policy-Related Changes in Migration and Trade
Costs
In this section we present our strategy to measure the changes in migration costs
due to the EU enlargement for each pair of countries in our sample. As we
described in Section 3.2.1, the elimination of migration restrictions was imple-
mented at different points in time for different pairs of countries. The main
changes in migration policy over the period 2002-2007 were the United Kingdom
opening to NMS countries in 2004, followed by Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal
in 2006, and NMS countries opening their respective labor markets to each other
in 2004. Therefore this is the set of changes in migration costs that we are going
to estimate in what follows.
Our strategy employs a difference-in-difference-in-differences approach based
on the migration shares equilibrium equation (3.3). Define yijn,s,t ≡ logµijn,s,t, then
the log odds of the probability of migrating from country i to country j with re-
spect to the probability of staying in country i for workers of nationality n and
skill s is given by
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t = −
1
ν
(
mijn,s,t −miin,s,t
)
+
β
ν
V jn,s,t+1 −
β
ν
V in,s,t+1. (3.10)
Intuitively, the log odds are decreasing in the cost of migrating from i to j relative
to the cost of staying in i, and increasing in the value of living in j compared
to the value of living in country i. Equation (3.10) provides therefore a natural
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starting point to measure the change in relative migration costs from country i
to j between two time periods; a decrease in migration costs, controlling for the
change in the relative value of living in j, would result in an increase in the ratio
of migrants to stayers.
Our goal is to estimate the change in migration costs due to the EU enlarge-
ment (mpolijn,post−enlarg. -mpol
ij
n,pre−enlarg). In order to separate changes in pol-
icy from changes in the non-policy components of migration costs, we estimate
(3.10) in a difference in difference fashion and impose our identification restric-
tion that the change (before and after the enlargement) in the trend in migra-
tion costs between countries that changed migration policy and those that do
not is only due to the EU enlargement. We control for destination-nationality-
skill-time and origin-nationality-skill-time factors such as the value terms and
changes in the non-policy origin and destination specific migration costs with
origin-nationality-skill-time and destination-nationality-skill-time fixed effects.24
Therefore, our identification of changes in migration costs due to the change
in policy is internally consistent with both the model developed in Section 3.3 and
our migration cost structure discussed in the subsection 3.3.1. We next describe
in more detail how we proceed to identify the changes in migration costs due to
the enlargement for each of the policy changes in our period of analysis.
Example: U.K. Policy-Related Changes in Migration Costs Applied to NMS
To explain in more detail our identification strategy, we start by describing the
estimation of the policy-related change in the cost of migrating from NMS to the
U.K. We then follow with the rest of changes to migration policy. In the case of
24The decision to open could, in fact, be affected by the current stock or the recent inflows
of immigrants in the country, or by the political orientation of the government. As explained
in Footnote 12, this is unlikely in the case of 2004 EU enlargement. Still, we control for these,
and other, possibilities through the destination-skill-time fixed effects. Similarly, the economic
situation in the NMS countries, as well as other push migration factors, are accounted for by the
origin-skill-time fixed effects.
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the U.K. we consider three sets of gross migration flows: from NMS countries
to the U.K., our treated group in the difference-in-difference jargon; from NMS
countries to Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany (EU-5), our first
control group, that corresponds to a set of EU countries that did not open their la-
bor market to NMS countries before 2008; and from EU-5 to the U.K., the second
control group. Starting from equation (3.10) and using our migration cost struc-
ture discussed in the subsection 3.3.1, we can express equation (3.10) as a function
of origin-specific factors, destination-specific factors, non-policy bilateral mobil-
ity costs and the cost associated to migration policy:
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t = −
1
ν
mpolijn,s,t −
1
ν
(
m¯in,s,t −
1
ν
miin,s,t
)
− β
ν
V in,s,t+1 (3.11)
− 1
ν
m¯jn,s,t +
β
ν
V jn,s,t+1 −
1
ν
m¯ijn,s,t.
The left-hand side terms in equation (3.11) are the log migration flows to U.K.
and control groups minus stayers. The first term in the right-hand side of equa-
tion (3.11) captures the policy component of migration costs, the second and third
terms represent the origin-specific factors, the fourth and fifth terms represent the
destination-specific factors, and the last term represents the bilateral non-policy
component of migration costs. In our empirical model, we capture the origin spe-
cific factors with origin-skill-time fixed effects, and the destination specific factors
with destination-skill-time fixed effects. Notice that our first control group identi-
fies the origin fixed effects, and the second control group identifies the destination
fixed effects. The bilateral non-policy component will be captured with a bilat-
eral dummy, whose coefficient will measure the migration cost pre-enlargement
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from NMS countries to the U.K. relative to the migration costs from NMS coun-
tries to the EU-5 group and from the EU-5 group to the U.K. Finally, the change in
costs due to the policy will be captured with a bilateral and time-varying dummy,
whose coefficient will measure the change in these relative migration costs before
and after the enlargement, our object of interest. We pool the flows of low and
high-skilled workers for the bilateral dummies to capture the fact that changes in
migration policy were non-discriminatory across skills and nationalities. There-
fore, our empirical model resulting from our structural model is given by:
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t = δU .K.n,s,t In,s,t (j = U .K.) +∑o∈NMS αon,s,tIn,s,t (i = o) +
+βU .K.n ∑o∈NMS In,s,t (j = U .K., i = o) +
+βU .K.n,post∑o∈NMS In,s,t (j = U .K., i = o, t ∈ post) + εijn,s,t,
(3.12)
where I (.) is an indicator function, δU .K.n,s,t represents the coefficients of a set of
year-skill dummies for when the destination is the U.K., αon,s,t represents the co-
efficients of a set of year-skill dummies for each source NMS country, βU .K.n is the
coefficient of a dummy for when the origin is an NMS country and the destina-
tion is the U.K., and βU .K.n,post is the coefficient of a dummy for when the origin is an
NMS country, the destination is the U.K., and t belongs to the post 2003 period.25
Finally, εijn,s,t is a random disturbance of relative migration costs and it is assumed
to be orthogonal to changes in migration policy.
The coefficient βU .K.n,post is then our main coefficient of interest, representing the
change in migration costs between the pre- and post-enlargement periods, nor-
malized by −1/ν, i.e.
βU .K.n,post ≡ −
1
ν
(
mpolNMS,UKNMS,post−enlarg. −mpolNMS,UKNMS,pre−enlarg.
)
. (3.13)
In other words, given an estimate of the migration elasticity, βU .K.n,post provides an
25Note that the origin-nationality-skill-time fixed effects αon,s,t also control for changes in the
cost of staying in country o for a s-skilled n national.
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estimate of the average change in the cost of migrating from NMS countries to
the U.K. due to the enlargement process, after controlling for any destination-
skill-nationality-time and origin-skill-nationality-time confounding factors.26
Note the importance of using three sets of gross flows, from NMS to the U.K.,
from NMS to EU-5 countries, and from EU-5 countries to the U.K., in order to
identify destination-nationality-skill-time and origin-nationality-skill-time fixed
effects.27 The coefficient βU .K.n,post is then the sum of three components: the average
change in the cost of migrating from NMS countries to the U.K., our target, minus
both the change in the cost of migrating from NMS countries to EU-5 countries
and the change in the cost of migrating from EU-5 countries to the U.K. for NMS
nationals. We exploit the fact that (i) EU-5 countries did not open their labor
markets to NMS countries in the sample period (which justifies choosing EU-5 as
the control group), and (ii) those NMS nationals residing in EU-5 before the EU
enlargement did not experience changes in migration costs associated to the EU
enlargement.28 Appendix C.3.1 and C.3.2 provide support for the common trend
assumption underlying the difference-in-difference strategy.
EU Countries Policy-Related Change in Migration Costs Applied to NMS
The top panel of table 3.1 presents our estimates of the policy-related changes
in migration costs for the case of NMS nationals moving from NMS countries
to the U.K, Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. As we can see, all estimates are
26Note that one could have estimated a coefficient across NMS origin countries and skills. In-
stead, we constrained the point estimate to be equal across skill groups. This does not mean that
the migration costs are the same for different skill groups, it only means that the change in policy
was proportionally equal across different skill groups.
27Given that we are aggregating data at the origin-destination-year level for a given nationality
we account for possible random effects common to all individuals migrating from the same origin
country to the same destination country in the same year.
28One reason why this is the case is that NMS nationals already legally working in one of the old
member states at the date of accession for an uninterrupted period of at least 12 months continue
to have access to the labor market of that member state. NMS nationals who had in 2004 legally
worked in e.g. Germany for at least 12 months could keep working there even if the German
labor market was not generally open to NMS nationals.
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TABLE 3.1: Estimates of Changes in Migration Costs, NMS nationals
NMS nationals
Destination j → U.K. (2004) GR (2006) IT (2006) ES (2006) PT (2006)
βjn,post
3.52***
(1.11)
2.29**
(0.83)
1.01*
(0.55)
0.18
(0.54)
1.01***
(0.49)
R2 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.98
Obs. 564 564 564 564 564
Notes: The table reports difference-in-difference estimates, from separate regressions, of the
change in migration cost from NMS countries to either the United Kingdom (U.K.), Greece (GR),
Italy (IT), Spain (ES), or Portugal (PT) for NMS nationals. Recall, from equation (3.13), that a
positive estimate implies a reduction in migration costs. The treatment period (post) is 2004-2007
for the U.K., and 2006-2007 for the other destinations. Parentheses includes robust standard
errors, ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10. Similar significance is obtained if instead we use
two-way clustering at the origin-destination-country level.
positive and significant (except for Spain), pointing to a reduction in the cost of
migrating from NMS to Europe for NMS nationals both in 2004 and 2006.29 These
coefficients are hard to interpret since they reflect the change in the migration cost
scaled by the migration elasticity and measured in units of utility. To understand
the magnitude, in terms of consumption, real wages, etc., of these changes we
need to use these estimates as inputs in our quantitative model.
Placebo Experiments
To support our identification strategy we also run placebo experiments. The in-
tuition is that we expect the costs of migrating from NMS countries to the U.K.,
Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal not to have changed for EU-15 nationals as a
consequence of the EU enlargement. The bottom panel of table 3.2 reports these
estimates, and reassuringly shows no change in the migration costs due to the
enlargement from NMS to Europe for those that already were European citizens.
29Recall, from equation (3.13), that a positive estimate implies a reduction in migration costs.
144
TABLE 3.2: Placebo Estimates of Changes in Migration Costs, EU
nationals
EU nationals
Destination j → U.K. (2004) GR (2006) IT (2006) ES (2006) PT (2006)
βjn,post
0.74
(1.40)
−0.08
(1.52)
−0.02
(1.35)
0.46
(1.34)
−1.22
(1.45)
R2 0.88 0.90 0.89 0.90 0.90
Obs. 564 564 564 564 564
Notes: The table reports difference-in-difference estimates, from separate regressions, of the
change in migration cost from NMS countries to either the United Kingdom (U.K.), Greece (GR),
Italy (IT), Spain (ES), or Portugal (PT) for EU-15 nationals. The results correspond to a placebo
exercise since no migration policy changes occurred for EU-15 nationals. The treatment period
(post) is 2004-2007 for the U.K., and 2006-2007 for the other destinations. Parentheses includes
robust standard errors, ∗∗∗ p<0.01, ∗∗ p<0.05, ∗ p<0.10. Similar significance is obtained if instead
we use two-way clustering at the origin-destination-country level.
Change in the Migration Costs from NMS to NMS
We now consider the other main changes in migration policy: NMS countries
opening their respective labor markets to each other. In these cases we cannot
apply anymore the difference-in-difference methodology since, because of data
limitations, there is no control group we can exploit.30 Therefore, to estimate
this set of migration costs we proceed in an alternative way. Taking the product
between the ratio of migrants to stayers in one direction and in the opposite di-
rection, we can differentiate the value functions, and the resulting ratio will only
contain information on migration frictions.31 Taking logs, we get
(
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t
)
+
(
yjin,s,t − yjjn,s,t
)
= −1
ν
((
mijn,s,t −miin,s,t
)
+
(
mjin,s,t −mjjn,s,t
))
.
30Bulgaria and Romania, which could have potentially been an alternative control group, have
limited information on nationality.
31In the international trade literature this ratio is known as the Head and Ries index, and it is
used to identify trade frictions.
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TABLE 3.3: Changes in Migration Costs, NMS to NMS
NMS nationals
βpost 1.71∗∗∗
(0.49)
R2 0.99
Obs. 252
Notes: ∗∗∗p < 0.01, robust standard errors
With this measure we can only estimate a combination of migration costs in
one direction and in the opposite direction, and therefore we need to impose
more structure to separate them. In particular, we assume the change in migra-
tion costs to be symmetric, and to be the same for each pair of NMS countries.
Following the same logic as in equation (3.11), but noticing that all origin-specific
and destination-specific factors cancel out, we regress the measure of migration
frictions on a constant and a dummy variable for the post-enlargement period,
(
yijn,s,t − yiin,s,t
)
+
(
yjin,s,t − yjjn,s,t
)
= α+ βpostI
ij
n,s,t (t ∈ post) + εijn,s,t,
where I (.) is an indicator function and post represents the post 2003 period,
and the constant captures the non-policy bilateral migration costs. Then, βpost
captures the average change between the pre- and post-enlargement period of
the migration frictions, which measures the policy-related change in migration
costs.32
Table 3.3 reports the results, and shows a reduction in the cost of migrating
from NMS to NMS countries, for NMS nationals, in 2004.
32We also used the same strategy in order to identify the changes in costs of migrating to NMS
for EU nationals. For this case we used the flows of EU nationals from the EU to NMS before and
after the change in policy. Given that there where not many flows over our sample period and no
significant variation in the flows we ended up obtaining not economically significant estimates
for this case.
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Change in Trade Policy
Finally, we employ bilateral tariffs τ ijt between each pair of countries and the
rest of the world, using information from the World Integrated Trade Solution
(WITS) data set, to capture changes in trade costs due to the EU enlargement. We
use effectively applied rates and we combine information from two different data
sets, the TRAINS data set and the WTO data set, to have complete and consistent
information on tariffs over time.33
Armed with this set of estimates of the changes in trade and migration costs
associated with the EU enlargement , we now proceed to estimate the necessary
elasticities for our quantitative analysis.
3.4.2 International Migration Elasticity
The migration elasticity is needed to evaluate the welfare effects associated to
changes in the barriers to migrate; welfare effects depend on the magnitude of the
change in barriers, and on how sensitive the decision to migrate is to the barriers
themselves. (Artuç et al., 2010) and CDP, provide estimates of the elasticities for
internal migration flows, while here we deal with international migration. We
therefore adapt the methodology of (Artuç and McLaren, 2015) to the structure
of our model, and apply it to the flows of EU nationals within the EU, to provide
a value for the international migration elasticity.34
The first stage of the methodology is a fixed-effect estimation that uses the mi-
gration share equation (3.3) and bilateral gross migration flows data to estimate
value differences and the migration cost function normalized by ν. The second
stage of the methodology relies on the Bellman equation. We insert the estimated
33In Appendix C.2.3 we explain in detail how we construct the bilateral tariff data for each
country pair.
34We describe in detail the implementation of the methodology and report the results, both for
the baseline case and for the extension with public good described later, in Appendix C.4.
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value differences from the first stage into the Bellman equation, and construct a
linear regression to retrieve the international migration elasticity by exploiting
the variation in real wages. We estimate the second stage model as an IV regres-
sion, using two-period lagged values of real wages as instruments, and clustering
standard errors at the country level.35
In our preferred specification with β = 0.97 we obtain an elasticity of 0.44—
significant at 1 percent—which implies a value of ν of 2.3. This is the value that
we use when performing our quantitative analysis.
3.4.3 Elasticity of Substitution Between Low- and High-Skilled
Workers
In this section, we provide the estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
low and high-skilled workers that will be used to quantify the effects of the
EU enlargement.36 Following the literature, low-skilled workers include work-
ers with a high-school degree or less, and high-skilled workers are workers with
some college education and college graduates. We estimate the elasticity of sub-
stitution using detailed information on workers’ wages and hours, as well as
firms’ location and industry, from the Portuguese matched employer-employee
data (Quadros de Pessoal) for the period 1991-2008.37 Our estimation strategy
35We emphasize three merits of the (Artuç and McLaren, 2015) methodology: First, the estima-
tion strategy does not require taking logarithm of probabilities. Given that most of the migration
shares are very small this is an important feature that avoids causing large errors and imprecise
estimates, and allows us to work with 17 countries. Second, we can be agnostic about exactly what
information workers have when they form their expectations of future wages, and only assume
that forecast errors are mean zero conditional on contemporaneous information. Third, we im-
pose only a mild assumption on bilateral migration costs: we assume that migration costs for EU
nationals flowing across EU-15 member states did not vary over time and skills. Note, however,
that we can still let the cost of migrating out of country i, and into country j, be skill-dependent.
36We will also check the robustness of our results using estimates of the elasticity obtained via
alternative econometric approaches, as well as estimates from the literature.
37We resort to Quadros de Pessoal for a number of reasons. First, Quadros de Pessoal’s provides
an exhaustive coverage of firms and their workers over a long time-span. Currently, the data set
collects information on about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees per year. Second, we can
estimate an elasticity of substitution between low and high-skill workers that is consistent with
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builds on standard approaches (e.g. (Katz and Murphy, 1992)), but we instru-
ment the endogeneity of the relative supply of high to low-skilled workers. We
estimate the following econometric model based on the equilibrium conditions
of the theory laid out in Section 3.3,
ln
wvrh,t
wvrl,t
= −1
ρ
ln
Lvrh,t
Lvrl,t
+ αvr + εvrt , (3.14)
where
(
wvrh,t/w
vr
l,t
)
is the ratio of high- and low-skilled workers’ wages in indus-
try v and region r (in Portugal),
(
Lvrh,t/L
vr
l,t
)
is the corresponding relative sup-
ply, and ρ is the elasticity of substitution between low and high-skilled workers.
Finally, we have written the relative weight of high- and low-skilled workers
(1/ρ) ln (δvrh /δ
vr
l ) as the sum of an industry-region fixed effect and a residual
industry-region-time effect αvr + εvrt .
The main difficulty faced by researchers in this area is that the relative num-
ber of more educated workers and their relative wages are determined simul-
taneously by demand and supply. Because of that, the relative supply term(
Lvrh,t/L
vr
l,t
)
in equation (3.14) could be correlated with industry-region demand
shocks (εvrt ), making it difficult to identify the elasticity of substitution via OLS.
We tackle this issue by using instrumental variable estimation.38 Our instrument
for
(
Lvrh,t/L
vr
l,t
)
is constructed using information on the local availability of low-
the skills definitions from the EU-LFS. Third, we can estimate an elasticity of substitution using
data from an European country, and we can compare our findings to other estimates available
in the literature for other countries. Last but not least, we can exploit the richness of the data to
implement an instrumental variable strategy, described below, that facilitates the identification of
the elasticity of substitution.
38Many papers estimating the elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled workers
do not consider endogeneity issues. Two important exceptions are (Angrist, 1995) and (Ciccone
and Peri, 2005). (Angrist, 1995) estimate the relationship between the return to schooling and
the supply of more educated workers among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
during the 1980s, exploiting the fact that the increase in the supply of more educated workers
was mainly driven by the creation of new local institutions of higher education. (Ciccone and
Peri, 2005) estimate the long-run elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skilled workers
at the U.S. state level using data from five 1950-1990 decennial censuses. They exploit time- and
state-specific child labor and compulsory school attendance laws as instruments.
149
and high-skilled workers that change firm because of displacement, and in partic-
ular because of firm closure.39 A firm closure can be considered as an exogenous
shock to a worker’s career, since it results in a separation of all plant’s work-
ers and it is not related to the worker’s own job performance ((Dustmann and
Meghir, 2005)). Moreover, when instrumenting the relative labor supply of a
given industry, we consider only closures of firms that belong to other indus-
tries, so that their closure is hardly related to the market of the industry under
consideration. Finally, as workers tend to search and accept more easily new jobs
in the same local labor market of the past job, we consider closures of firms that
belong to the same region of the industry under consideration. Overall, the local
availability of displaced workers can then be considered as an exogenous labor
supply shock for local firms. Figure 3.5 shows the correlation between the instru-
mented variable and the instrument.
39Displacement is usually defined as the permanent and involuntary separation of workers
from their jobs without cause (i.e. for economic reasons). Displacement occurs when a firm shuts
down or substantially downsizes.
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FIGURE 3.5: Relative supply of high-skilled workers and displaced
high-skilled workers, by industry and region, 1992-2005
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Note: Own elaboration using the matched employer-employee data set Quadros de Pessoal
described in Section C.2.5 and Appendix C.5. Low-skill includes all workers with a high-school
degree or less, and high-skilled are workers with some college education and college graduates.
Each circle in the plot corresponds to an industry-region-year, where regions are approximately
NUTS II (5 regions), and industries are NACE 1-digit. The dashed line corresponds to the
predicted values of a linear OLS model, with slope of 0.53 (with standard error 0.050) and R2
equal to 0.39.
Employing the methodology and data outlined above (and described more
in detail in Appendix C.5), we obtain an elasticity of 4, which is the number
we use in our quantitative analysis. The estimate of the elasticity of substitu-
tion is pretty robust to alternative different specifications, methodologies, and
levels of data aggregation (Appendix C.5). Our estimate is slightly above those
commonly found for the U.S. ((Katz and Murphy, 1992),(Johnson, 1997), (Krusell
et al., 2000b), (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012a), (Ciccone and Peri, 2005)) which ranges
between 1.5 and 2.5, but below the elasticity of substitution of 5 between low-
and medium-skilled workers found for Germany ((Dustmann et al., 2009)). Since
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the set of European countries we consider in the quantitative analysis is pretty
diverse in terms of labor market institutions and workforce characteristics we
consider our benchmark estimate of 4 as a good compromise.
3.5 Economic Effects of the 2004 EU Enlargement
In this section, we use the estimated policy-related changes in migration costs,
and the observed changes in tariffs, to quantify the migration and welfare effects
of the EU enlargement. We first compute the migration effects from the actual
changes to migration and trade policies over the period 2002-2007, and we then
quantify the welfare effects. We also use our model to study the interaction be-
tween trade openness and migration policy, and to decompose the role of the
different mechanisms of the model in shaping the welfare effects.
3.5.1 Migration Effects
We start by quantifying the migration effects from the EU enlargement. In par-
ticular, with our structural model we want to answer questions such as: How
did the stock of new member states (NMS) migrants in EU-15 countries respond
to the EU enlargement? Was NMS migration gradual or a once for all process?
What was the change in the stock of NMS migrants in EU-15 countries across
skill groups, and in the short and long run? What would have been the migration
effects in the absence of changes to trade policy?
To compute the migration effects, we feed into our structural model the esti-
mated changes in migration costs and the observed changes in tariffs over 2002-
2007, and compute the change migration effects compared with an economy where
migration and trade policies stayed unchanged. Figure 3.6 displays the evolution
of the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries (for all workers and by skill).
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TABLE 3.4: Migration effects by skill group: Change in the stock of NMS nationals in
EU-15
High skill (%) High skill (thous.)
∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy ∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy
2002 0 0 0 0
2007 0.014 0.019 51.9 69.3
2015 0.058 0.066 215.8 246.2
Steady state 0.130 0.168 485.2 625.9
Low skill (%) Low skill (thous.)
∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy ∆ EU enlargement w/o trade policy
2002 0 0 0 0
2007 0.066 0.070 246.1 262.6
2015 0.301 0.312 1,124 1,162
Steady state 0.753 0.793 2,809 2,959
Notes:This table shows the percentage and absolute change in the stock of low skill and high skill
NMS nationals in EU-15 countries due to the 2004 EU enlargement. Columns 2 and 4 report the
counterfactual change in the absence of trade policy changes.
The darker line shows the evolution of the stock in the baseline economy with the
actual changes to migration and trade policy between 2002-2007. The dashed line
shows the evolution of the stock of NMS nationals in the counterfactual economy,
where we hold migration costs and tariffs constant at the levels before the EU en-
largement. Therefore, the difference between the two lines is the migration effects
from the EU enlargement. From the figure, panel a, we can see that the increase
in the stock of NMS migrants in EU-15 countries is realized very gradually over
time. For instance, three years after the EU enlargement (that is, in 2007) the stock
of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.03 percentage points, while
ten years after the implementation, the stock raises by 0.23 percentage points. We
find that in steady state, the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases
by 0.63 percentage points, or by about 3.3 million, which corresponds to about 5
percent of the population of the NMS countries in 2004. Across individual coun-
tries, we find that the United Kingdom is the country that experienced the largest
increase in the stock of NMS nationals.
We now turn to compute the change in the stock of migrants across different
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skills, and after doing so, we discuss the interaction between migration and trade
policies. Figure 3.6, panel b, presents the evolution of the stock of low and high
skill NMS migrants in EU15 countries. In Table 3.4, columns (1) and (3), we also
decompose the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries by skill. We find that
the EU enlargement primarily increases the migration of low-skilled NMS work-
ers to EU-15 countries, and to a much lesser extent the migration of high-skilled
workers. For instance, as we can see from the table, the stock of NMS high-
skilled workers in EU-15 countries increases by 0.014 percentage points, or 51.9
thousands by 2007, by 0.06 percentage points or 215.8 thousands by 2015, and by
0.13 percentage points or by about 485.2 thousands in the long run. We find that
the change in the stock of NMS low-skilled workers is much larger. Specifically,
for the case of low-skilled workers, the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries
increases by 0.066 percentage points or 246.1 thousands by 2007, by 0.3 percent-
age points or 1.1 million by 2015, and by 0.75 percentage points or by about 2.8
million in the steady state.
We can also use the model to compute what the migration effects would have
been in the absence of changes to trade policy. In columns (2) and (4) of Table
3.4, we compute the change in the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries
holding trade policy constant. We find that migration would have been larger
in the absence of changes to trade policy. For instance, the stock of low-skilled
workers would have been about 150 thousands larger in the long run, and the
stock of high-skilled workers would have been about 140 thousands larger. The
gains from trade associated with the entry of NMS countries into the European
Custom Union and the common commercial policy seemed to have moderated
the incentive to emigrate towards the EU-15 member states.
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3.5.2 Welfare Effects
We now turn to the welfare analysis. We start by describing the welfare ef-
fects of the EU enlargement, and we then study the interaction between trade
and changes to migration policy. We also study the importance of the timing to
changes in migration policy, and we quantify the welfare effects of the different
mechanisms that operate in our structural model.
Table 3.5, column (1) presents the welfare effect of the EU enlargement. Sim-
ilar to the previous section, to compute these welfare effects, we feed into our
structural model the estimated policy-related changes in migration costs and the
observed changes in tariffs over 2002-2007, and compute the change in welfare,
measured in terms of consumption equivalent, compared with an economy where
migration and trade policies stayed unchanged. We do so across skills, and na-
tionalities (NMS nationals and EU nationals), and to facilitate the analysis we ag-
gregate individual countries into NMS and EU-15 countries using employment
as weights. Before turning to the results, it is important to clarify the interpre-
tation of the welfare numbers from the table. In particular, the welfare effect for
a given country and skill group, say NMS low-skilled workers, corresponds to
the change in welfare, measured in consumption equivalent, of a representative
low-skilled worker living in NMS countries previous to the EU enlargement. In
other words, this welfare number takes into account both migrants and stayers.
Turning to the results in the table, we can see that the largest winners are the
NMS countries, and in particular the low-skilled workers. Welfare of NMS low-
skilled workers increases 1.46%, while welfare for high-skilled workers increases
0.97%. The larger welfare effect for low-skilled workers is explained by a higher
option value of migration for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers
due to the fact that, for instance, low-skilled workers are relatively more scarce
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in EU-15 countries. As a result, as we explained above, more low-skilled work-
ers than high-skilled workers migrate to EU-15 countries after the EU enlarge-
ment. On the other hand, we find relatively smaller welfare effects for workers
in EU-15 countries. Welfare increases 0.23% for high-skilled workers and 0.12%
for low-skilled workers. High-skilled workers in EU-15 countries benefit from
the increase in the relative supply of low-skilled labor after the reduction in mi-
gration restrictions, and the resulting expansion in total output. We find that
aggregate NMS welfare increases 1.41%, using employment to aggregate across
skills. Welfare in EU-15 countries increases 0.14%, and aggregate welfare for Eu-
rope increases 0.36%.
In column (2) of Table 3.5, we present the welfare effects of only changes to
trade policy. Specifically, we feed into our structural model the changes to tariffs
over 2002-2007, but we hold migration policy constant at the initial level. We
find positive welfare effects across all countries and skill groups. Welfare gains
are larger for NMS countries than for EU countries as they experience a larger
decline in tariffs. For the case of EU-15 countries, welfare gains for high-skilled
and low-skilled workers, are about 0.18%, and for the EU-15 as a whole as well.
In NMS countries, welfare gains for high and low-skilled workers are 0.83% and
81%, respectively, and 0.81% for the aggregate NMS.
The third column in Table 3.5 presents the welfare effects of only changes to
migration policy. To do so, we feed into the model the estimated changes in mi-
gration costs, but hold tariffs constant at the initial level. We find that welfare
for both EU-15 and NMS countries, and across both skill groups, are lower in
the absence of changes to trade policy. In particular, we find that in the absence
of changes to trade policy the EU-15 countries would have lost from the EU en-
largement. For the case of NMS countries, welfare would have increased 0.13%
for high-skilled workers, and 0.63% for low-skilled workers. Welfare for NMS
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TABLE 3.5: Welfare effects of trade and migration policies, percent
EU Only changes to Only changes to
enlargement trade policy migration policy
EU
-1
5 High skill 0.231 0.178 0.049
Low skill 0.123 0.183 -0.059
Aggregate 0.144 0.182 -0.037
N
M
S High skill 0.965 0.833 0.132
Low skill 1.464 0.812 0.629
Aggregate 1.405 0.815 0.570
Europe 0.359 0.290 0.066
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in welfare, measured as consumption equivalent,
from changes to migration and trade policy. Column 2 presents the welfare effects due to changes
in migration and trade policies, Column 3 presents the welfare effects from only changes to trade
policy, and Column 4 shows the welfare effects due to only changes to migration policy.
increases by 0.57% with only changes to migration policy, and welfare for Europe
would have been 0.07%.
In Table 3.6 we study further the interaction between trade and migration poli-
cies. In particular, we study the welfare effects of the changes to migration policy
under three different levels of goods market integration. Column (1) replicates
the third column in the previous table, and therefore it shows the welfare effects
of the actual changes to migration policy under the actual level of trade integra-
tion at the time of the EU-enlargement. In Column (2) we compute the welfare
effects of the actual changes to migration policy if Europe would have been un-
der trade autarky at the time of the enlargement. To do so, we first compute the
equilibrium allocations when trade costs are set to infinite, and we then feed into
the model the changes to migration policies. In Column (3), we study the welfare
effects of the actual changes to migration policy if Europe would have been a free
trade area at the time of the enlargement. To do so, we first compute the equilib-
rium allocations when tariffs are eliminated, and we then feed into the model the
changes to migration policies.
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TABLE 3.6: Trade openness and welfare effects of migration policy
(percent)
Only changes to Changes to migration policy Changes to migration policy
migration policy under trade autarky under free trade
EU
-1
5 High skill 0.049 0.061 0.048
Low skill -0.059 -0.052 -0.060
Aggregate -0.037 -0.030 -0.039
N
M
S High skill 0.132 0.078 0.141
Low skill 0.629 0.572 0.638
Aggregate 0.570 0.514 0.580
Europe 0.066 0.063 0.067
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in welfare, measured as consumption equivalent,
due to the actual changes to migration policy. Column 2 presents the welfare effects under the ac-
tual level of trade openness, Column 3 shows the welfare effects under trade autarky, and Column
4 shows the welfare effects under free trade.
We can see from the table how the level of trade openness impacts the welfare
effects of migration policy. In particular, for the case of NMS countries, welfare
effects would have been about 13% lower under trade autarky compared to free
trade.
The intuition is that the upward pressure on labor cost in NMS countries that
experience a net outflow of workers pass through less to local prices the more
open the economy is. The opposite happens in EU-15 countries that experience
a net inflow of workers. We can see from the table that EU-15 countries would
have had smaller welfare losses from the changes to migration policy under trade
autarky, although this effect is very small. The important take away of these exer-
cises is that trade has a quantitative impact on the welfare evaluation of migration
policy.
Finally, Figure 3.7 presents the welfare effects of the EU enlargement across
different countries. We can see from the figure that although NMS countries are
the largest winners, there is heterogeneity in the welfare effects across countries.
Overall, we find that Poland, and Hungary are the largest winners from the EU
enlargement. We find that the only country that experience welfare losses is the
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United Kingdom, and specifically low-skilled workers whose welfare declines
0.17% as a consequences of the enlargement. As mentioned above, we find that
low-skilled workers in EU-15 countries lose from only changes in migration pol-
icy because of the large increase in the supply of low-skilled workers. In the case
of the United Kingdom, these losses are larger than the gains from the reduction
in tariffs because of the larger inflow of NMS nationals. Furthermore, the large
inflow of NMS nationals after the enlargement is a consequence of a large change
in the option value of migration.
Distributional Effects of the Timing of Migration Policy
What would have been the welfare effects if countries had changed migration re-
strictions with a different timing? In this subsection we study the importance of
the timing of changes to migration policy. To do so, Figure 3.8 panel a, shows the
welfare effects for EU-15 and NMS countries, relative to the actual effects, assum-
ing that instead of changing policy as they did over 2002-2007, countries would
have changed policy in different years. That is, we study the effects from a bi-
lateral reduction in migration restrictions between the United Kingdom, Greece,
Italy, Spain, Portugal, and NMS all happening in the year 2004, or 2005, and so
on. The figure shows that delaying the opening in migration, NMS countries
would have lower welfare gains compared to the actual gains, and the same is
true for the case of EU-15 high-skilled workers. For instance, if all countries had
changed migration policy in 2012, welfare gains for NMS low-skilled workers
would have been about 8% lower than the actual gains. On the other hand, we
find that low-skilled workers in EU-15 countries would have been better of by
delaying changes to migration policy. The result is explained by the fact that EU-
15 low-skilled workers gained from changes to trade policy but lost from changes
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to migration policy, and therefore, delaying the changes to migration policy in-
creases the relative impact of trade policy in their welfare.
In part, the previous result is driven by the United Kingdom that is the only
country that experiences welfare losses for low-skilled workers. Given that, on
panel b we investigate the welfare effects on the United Kingdom of delaying
the change in migration policy. The figure plots the welfare effects under differ-
ent opening years, and we find that both welfare losses of low-skilled workers
and welfare gains of high-skilled workers would have been smaller by delaying
opening to migration.
Accounting for the Provision of Public Goods
In this section we extend our model to account for additional congestion effects
coming from the provision of public goods. In particular, this extension is mo-
tivated by evidence on the fact that migrants are net beneficiaries of the welfare
system across countries, and therefore are more likely to use social benefits and
consume public goods than natives.40 To capture the congestion of public goods
due to immigration, we assume that households derive some utility from the per
capita provision of public goods in the economy. Specifically, the indirect utility
of a household with skill s in country i is given by
Cis,t =
(
Gi
Lit
)αi (
(1− τ iL)
wis,t
P it
)1−αi
, (3.15)
where P it is the local price index, and αi is the fraction of public goods in total
consumption.41 The supply of public goods, Gi, is fixed over time. In order
to supply Gi the government purchases final goods and finances its spending
from three sources: tariff revenues, labor taxes (τ iL), and lump sum transfers from
40See (Kerr and Kerr, 2011) for a survey.
41Similar specifications for preferences of public goods have been used recently in other quan-
titative studies, see (Fajgelbaum et al., 2015).
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the owners of fixed factors in each country. As a result, the government budget
constraint is given by
P itG
i = T it +∑
N
n=1∑s=h,lτ
i
Lw
i
s,tL
i
n,s,t +R
i
t for all i, (3.16)
where the double summation term on the right-hand side represents labor tax
revenues, and Rit are lump-sum taxes.
The total expenditure on goods by country i is now given by government pur-
chases, by net labor income of workers of all skill levels and nationalities residing
in country i, and by local rentiers. Namely, the goods market clearing is given by
Xit = P
i
tG
i +∑Nn=1∑s=h,l(1− τ iL)wis,tLin,s,t + ιiχt −Rit, for all i, (3.17)
with χt = ∑Ni=1 r
i
tH
i. As we can see, the net income of rentiers is given by the
share of the global portfolio minus lump-sum taxes, (ιiχt −Rit).
The equilibrium of this economy is the same as that described in Section 3.3.4,
but with the indirect utility given by (3.15), and the market clearing conditions
given by (3.16) and (3.17). Given this, the CDP solution method described in
Section (3.3.5) also applies in this economy with public goods. To compute the
the model, we need to re-estimate the migration cost elasticity 1/ν consistent
with the utility function (3.15). In Appendix (C.4.1) we show how to adapt the
estimation methodology to the model with public goods. We estimate a value of
ν = 1.89 that we feed into the model to quantify the migration and welfare effects
of the EU enlargement. We also need to compute the fraction of public goods in
total consumption αi, which we construct as final government consumption over
total final consumption by country using consumption data from the WIOD.42
Finally, we resort to data on labor income taxes from the OECD Tax Database.
42The values of αi across countries range from 0.16 to 0.31, with a mean value of 0.21.
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We now turn to quantify the migration and welfare effects of the EU enlarge-
ment in the model with public goods. Starting with the migration effects, we still
find a very gradual increase in the stock of NMS nationals in EU-15 country as
a consequence of the enlargement. In terms of the magnitudes, we find some-
what lower migration effects in the model with public goods. Specifically, three
years after the EU enlargement (that is, in 2007) the stock of NMS nationals in
EU countries increases by 0.02 percentage points, while ten years after the imple-
mentation, the stock raises by 0.22 percentage points. In steady state, the stock
of NMS nationals in EU-15 countries increases by 0.52 percentage points as a re-
sult of the EU enlargement. In the presence of public goods, immigration strains
public goods which introduces an additional source of congestion. As a conse-
quence, the households’ utility and incentives to migrate reduce compared to the
economy without public goods. Across skills, we find that most of the migration,
as a consequence of the enlargement, is low-skilled, similarly to our finding in
Section 3.5.1. In the long run, the stock of NMS high-skilled workers in EU-15
countries increases by 0.10 percentage points or by about 361.8 thousands, while
the stock of NMS low-skilled workers increases by 0.63 percentage points or by
about 2.3 million.
We now turn to the analysis of the welfare effects of the EU enlargement in the
presence of public goods. Overall, in the presence of public goods we find larger
welfare gains for NMS countries, and smaller welfare gains for EU-15 countries,
compared with the results in Section 3.5.1. This result is explained by the fact
that EU-15 countries experience a net inflow of workers, which congests public
goods and has a negative impact on welfare compared with a model without
public goods. On the other hand, the net outflow of workers in NMS countries
contributes to decongesting public goods, which has a positive effect on welfare.
We still find that the largest winners are the NMS countries, and in particular the
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low-skilled workers. Welfare of NMS low-skilled workers increases 1.52%, while
welfare for high-skilled workers increases 1.07%. On the other hand, we find
smaller welfare effects for workers in EU countries. Welfare increases 0.09% for
high-skilled workers and 0.03% for low-skilled workers. We find that aggregate
NMS welfare increases 1.47%, while EU-15 welfare increases 0.05%. Aggregate
welfare for Europe increases 0.29% as a result of the EU enlargement in the model
with public goods.
Finally, Figure 3.9 presents the welfare effects from the EU enlargement in the
presence of public goods. Poland and Hungary are the largest winners in this
case, and the United Kingdom experiences welfare losses. Welfare losses for low-
skilled workers in the U.K. are 0.43%, and high-skilled workers are now slightly
worse off.
The Role of Scale Effects, Fixed Factors, and Trade Openness
In this section, we study the role of other mechanisms in shaping the welfare
effects of the EU enlargement, namely, scale effects, fixed factors, and trade open-
ness. Table 3.7 shows the results. Column (1) of the table reproduces the bench-
mark results, that is, the welfare effects from changes to migration and trade poli-
cies described in Section 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. In column (2), we shut down the scale
effects (that is, we set the agglomeration elasticity equal to zero) in the bench-
mark model, but we let the other mechanisms operate. In this case, we still find
that EU-15 and NMS countries gain from the enlargement, but welfare gains are
a bit lower in EU-15 countries and larger in NMS countries compared with the
model in which all mechanisms operate. In particular, the absence of scale effects
subtracts 0.06 percentage points of welfare in EU-15 countries and adds 0.3 per-
centage points of welfare in NMS countries. The reason is that the net inflow of
migrants in EU-15 results in an increase in productivity in the presence of scale
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TABLE 3.7: Welfare effects under different model assumptions
EU No scale Autarky, no congestion
enlargement effects and scale effects
EU
-1
5 High skill 0.231 0.141 0.083
Low skill 0.123 0.065 -0.041
Aggregate 0.144 0.080 -0.017
N
M
S High skill 0.965 1.274 -0.010
Low skill 1.464 1.782 0.453
Aggregate 1.405 1.723 0.399
Europe 0.359 0.360 0.054
Notes: This table shows the percentage change in welfare, measured as consumption
equivalent, under different model assumptions. Column 1 presents the welfare effects
due to the actual changes in migration and trade policies, Column 2 presents the welfare
effects in a model without scale effects, and Column 3 shows the welfare effects in a
model with trade autarky, without scale effects, and without congestion effects.
effects, and the NMS that have a net outflow of workers experience a productivity
decline in the presence of scale effects.
Finally, in column (3) we compute the welfare effects under autarky, and
where we also shut down all congestion effects (infrastructure and public goods)
as well as scale effects. To do so, we first compute the equilibrium allocations
when trade costs are set to infinite, and we then feed into the model the changes
to migration and trade policies. Compared with the third column in Table 3.6
welfare is substantially different in a model without trade, scale and congestion
effects; welfare losses for EU-15 are more than twice larger, and welfare gains
for NMS countries are reduced by 30%. With this final counterfactual exercise we
want to emphasize again the importance of accounting for trade, and other mech-
anisms of the model such as local fixed factors and scale effects when evaluating
the welfare impact of migration and trade policies.
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3.6 Conclusion
Migration and trade are two themes that, historically and nowadays, are central
in Europe as well as in other regions of the world. The freedom of movement of
workers and of goods are considered as two of the four fundamental freedoms
guaranteed by EU law. At the same time, immigration into Europe during the en-
largement process, as well as the influx of refugees from war-torn countries, are
recent major shocks whose economic effects are hard to evaluate, since they inter-
act with heterogeneous production structures, free intra-Community trade, and
the European Union Customs Union. In this context, the international economics
literature has made considerable advances on the quantification and understand-
ing of the gains from economic integration, but most of the focus has been on the
goods market, and less attention has been devoted to the factors market and to
migration policy. In this paper we aim at making progress in this area.
We quantify the general equilibrium effects of trade and labor market inte-
gration. We show that in order to evaluate the economic effects of labor mar-
ket integration it is crucial to take in to account the process of integration in the
goods market. We find that the EU enlargement primarily fostered the migra-
tion of low-skilled workers and that trade policy helped to moderate migration
flows and mitigate congestion effects. The largest winners were the new mem-
ber states, and in particular their low-skilled workers, although we find positive
welfare effects for high-skilled workers as well. Importantly, we find that in the
absence of changes to trade policy, the EU-15 would have been worse off after
the enlargement. This result is robust to the inclusion of other mechanisms in the
model, like the presence of public goods financed with labor taxes.
Our paper incorporates different but complementary elements in the analysis.
We use reduced-form analysis that exploits migration policy changes to identify
changes in migration costs and key elasticities. We build a rich dynamic general
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equilibrium model that includes important mechanisms considered in the litera-
ture to quantify the migration and welfare effects of actual changes to trade and
migration policies. Among other things, we show quantitatively how the effects
of labor market integration are affected by the extent to which countries are open
to trade. Future work might aim at studying the distributional effects across sec-
tors of the economy. Sectoral linkages are important for trade policy quantitative
analysis and they might well be also for migration policy evaluation.
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FIGURE 3.2: Migration flows and stocks of NMS nationals in the
EU-15, 2002-2007
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Note: Own elaboration using the data set on gross migration flows described in Section 3.4 and
Appendix C.2.2. Migration flows includes 10 EU-15 countries and 7 NMS countries. EU-15 and
NMS nationalities are defined in Section 3.4 and Appendix C.2.2 and cover all the EU-25 mem-
bers. High-skill includes all individuals with at least tertiary education, while low skills include
the residual workers with education up to post secondary non-tertiary education (see Appendix
C.2.2).
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FIGURE 3.3: Difference-in-difference estimates of the increase in the
flow of NMS nationals migrating to the U.K. due to the EU enlarge-
ment
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Note: The figure reports difference-in-difference point estimates, as well as the 99th, 95th, and
90th percentiles confidence intervals, of the year-by-year treatment effects of the EU enlargement
on the flow of NMS nationals to the U.K.
FIGURE 3.4: U.K. leapfrogging Germany as the top destination for
migrants from Poland
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Note: The figure reports, for each year, migrants from Poland to EU-25 by country of destination
as a share of total Polish migrants.
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FIGURE 3.6: Evolution of the stock of NMS migrants in EU15 coun-
tries (percent)
Notes: This figure presents the stock of NMS migrants in EU-15 countries. The green lines show
the evolution of this stock with actual changes to trade and migration policies. The dashed lines
show the evolution holding trade and migration policies unchanged. The panel, (left column)
presents the results for all workers, and panel b (right column) presents the results for high and
low-skilled workers.
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FIGURE 3.7: Welfare effects, percent
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Notes: These figures present the welfare effects of the EU enlargement across different countries
and skill groups.
FIGURE 3.8: Welfare effect of changes in the timing of migration
policy
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FIGURE 3.9: Welfare effects with public goods, percent
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Notes: These figures present the welfare effects of the EU enlargement across different
countries and skill groups with the presence of public goods.
171
Chapter 4
The Weather Effect: estimating the
effect of voter turnout on electoral
outcomes in Italy
This paper examines the effect of variation in voter turnout on electoral outcomes
in Italy. I use data on the spatial distribution of turnout for 2008 and 2013 to
examine how it can affect differences in electoral outcomes. Exploiting the ex-
ogenous variation in weather conditions across municipalities I use rainfalls to
instrument for turnout levels: if non-voters systematically differ from habitual
voters in terms of their characteristics or preferences, the effect of turnout on the
electoral outcome can generate "extreme" outcomes. I find that bad weather de-
creases turnout and that a higher turnout favours the Movimento 5 Stelle, while
both the Democrats and the Centre are negatively affected.
4.1 Introduction
The Italian political debate at the beginning of 2013 has been largely about the
surprising outcome of the national elections held in February: indeed for the first
time in history, a newly born movement - the "Movimento 5 Stelle" led by Beppe
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Grillo (an ex-comedian) - entered the parliament with the highest share as a single
party (25.5%).
The movement was born as a protest against the established political and bu-
reaucratic system "that costs millions of Euros and creates inefficiencies": within
only a few years it began a party with a longitudinal system of political recom-
mendations, ranging from the left (green energy, strong welfare policies against
unemployment) to the right/populist (no immigration, exit from the Euro zone),
thus capturing the favour of millions of voters from both sides.
Moreover, because of the political crisis and the anticipated breakdown of the
technician government led by Mario Monti, the Italian President Giorgio Napoli-
tano, had been obliged to convene to new elections in February. This is very
unusual because elections are usually held in summer to avoid inconvenience
related to bad weather and to ensure that everyone can exercise the right to vote.
Starting from this empirical observation and exploiting the peculiarities of this
specific case, I investigate the effect of voter turnout on electoral outcomes. This
is an important topic in political science because, besides the importance of high
political participation in "social" terms1 , if non-voters systematically differ from
habitual voters in terms of their characteristics, the effect of turnout on the elec-
toral outcome can generate interesting outcomes; for instance, a higher turnout
can either advantage the incumbent, the democrats, the "residual" parties or uni-
formly affect all the parties in the electoral arena.
Despite the attention that such an hypothesis received, few formal tests have
been carried on. Probably, the most complete is (Gomez et al., 2007) where the
authors find a negative effect of bad weather on voter turnout in US presidential
elections. After them, many scholars start looking for similar results in different
countries: (Eisinga et al., 2012) find a negative effect in Dutch national parliament
1A high level of voter turnout is not only preferable for expressive reasons, but also reduces
the bias in terms of the unobserved difference between voters and non-voters, thus increasing the
overall quality of political representation
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elections; (Persson et al., 2013) claim that no significant effect of weather can be
noticed in Swedish national elections and (Lind, 2013) states that in Norway rain
may actually increase turnout. Present literature has not yet proved which effect,
if any, the weather exerts on turnout.
Bad weather hypothesis is consistent both with rational choice ((Downs, 1957))
and socioeconomic status ((Verba and Nie, 1972)) model, providing another source
of cost that discourages individual from taking part in political life. The ma-
jor contribution is however on the technical side. Indeed, political economists
have long looked for an instrument for turnout in order to overcome the endo-
genity problem that arise when it is used to explain electoral outcomes. Such
instrument would help in understanding which party has the mostly committed
electoral basis, which party would benefit from high (or low) turnout and could
provide a possible explanation for recent electoral results. Once established that
weather conditions are a good instrument for turnout this work looks at the effect
of turnout on electoral outcomes. Compared to (Gomez et al., 2007) and the rest
of the literature it is the first time that such an analysis is done in a multi-party
environment.
Almost all the literature about the topic test a partisan hypothesis (or an in-
cumbent hypothesis2)meaning that parties will benefit differently from changes
in turnout level. DeNardo ((DeNardo, 1980) , (DeNardo, 1986)) argues that the
partisan composition of the electorate has a strong impact on the partisan ef-
fect, while Martinez and Gill ((Martinez and Gill., 2005)) use the "social class
differences" argument to explain the difference in outcomes3.The empirical ev-
idence provided to explain the effect of turnout on electoral outcomes is mixed
and unclear: some scholars use survey data on voters and non-voters to estimate
2An alternative hypothesis is that higher turnout disadvantages the incumbent: Grofman,
Owen and Collet (Grofman et al., 1999) use the argument of growing unpopularity to corrobo-
rate their thesis.
3Empirical evidence is provided by Radcliff ((Radcliff, 1994)) and Erikson ((Erikson, 1995)).
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the degree to which these two subgroups can influence the elections because of
the differences in their preferences (see Martinez and Gill (Martinez and Gill.,
2005), Citrin, Schikler and Sides (Citrin et al., 2003)), while other scholars directly
regress the level of turnout on the electoral outcomes (Radcliff (Radcliff, 1994),
Erikson (Erikson, 1995), Nagel and MacNulty (Nagel and McNulty, 1996)). How-
ever, neither approach provides a convincing methodological strategy to assess
the causal relationship between turnout and electoral outcomes.
In this work I try to shed some light on the causal link between turnout and
electoral outcomes using an instrumental variable approach that exploits the ran-
domness of weather conditions in the election days as an instrument for voter
turnout; I will then focus on the spatial autocorrelation of bad weather in certain
regions to rule out this potential source of bias.
In section 4.2 I present the data and describe the methodology while in section
4.3 I present the results. In section 4.4 I discuss the spatial autocorrelation issue
providing some tentative solutions and in section 4.5 I conclude.
4.2 Data and Methodology
4.2.1 Political data
In order to estimate the impact of turnout on electoral outcome, I use official elec-
toral data (by parties) at the municipality level for the national elections held in
2008 and 2013 for both Chamber and Senate. The level of detail allow to have a
sample of 7745 municipalities for which I observe vote share by parties in both
Chamber and Senate; since the Italian law restricts the vote for the Senate only to
the population with more than 25 years old, I can disentangle the amount of votes
coming from young voters by manually subtracting the vote to the Senate from
the ones to the Chamber. Moreover, I have data for voters and eligible voters in
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both Chamber and Senate at municipality level for both elections divided by gen-
der. With this enormous amount of information I can compute different turnout,
ranging from the total one - given by the percentage of eligible voters casting on
the election - to female and male turnout and young voters’ turnout. For the lat-
ter however, I make a non-trivial assumption; in fact, I need to assume that all
the voters that turnout and are eligible for Senate, will vote for both the Chamber
and the Senate. If this assumption holds, than I can compute the young voters’
turnout by using the difference in eligible voters and actual voters in Chamber
and Senate. Indeed, frequently in the data eligible voters express their preference
for both political bodies, but some residual concern on how to treat municipalities
with young voters’ turnout greater than one is left unsolved (this is the case when
eligible voters do not vote for the Senate hence the differences between voters for
Chamber and Senate is disproportionately big).
The parties that I include in the analysis are the major parties: Democrats
(PD) led by Pierluigi Bersani, People of Freedom (PDL) led by Silvio Berlusconi,
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) led by Beppe Grillo, Scelta Civica (SC) led by Mario
Monti, Centre (UDC) led by Pierferdinando Casini, Northern League (LN) led by
Umberto Bossi and Left (SEL) led by Nichi Vendola. Finally, I have a large set of
covariates ranging from measures of social capital at municipality level such as
blood donation or participation to the 1974 divorce referendum to measures of
economic performance such as GDP per capita, unemployment level and mean
earnings.
4.2.2 Geographical informations
In order to capture the effect of weather on turnout, I have different measures of
weather conditions (rain, visibility, temperature) gathered from the website ilme-
teo.it for the 4 elections days (2 days in 2008 and 2 days in 2013); the variable that
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I use in the estimation is rainfall, a dummy equal to one if in the election dyad in
a given municipality I observe precipitation (in both days). Moreover, I have geo-
graphical information (altitude, distance from the sea, area, kilometres of coasts)
at municipality level gathered from ISTAT (Italian statistical office) and munic-
ipality boundaries updated in 2011 (shape); these large amount of information
is useful to have an understanding of the diffusion of the weather phenomena
across the Italian Regional boundaries.
4.2.3 Methodology
The theoretical connection between turnout and electoral outcome is the follow-
ing: if voters and non-voters systematically differ in their set of preferences, then
different levels of turnout can generate very different electoral outcomes. It is
however diffucult assuming that the decision to turn out is completely exoge-
nous to the vote choices of the voter, i.e. there is selection into voting, thus the
endogeneity issue arises.
A potential solution to the endogeneity problem would be an experimental
design in which agents are "encouraged" or "forced" to vote according to a ran-
dom assignment to the treatment (voters) or to the control (non-voters). In this
case, since the assignment to treatment is random, the researcher can causally
claim the impact of higher turnout artificially generated on the electoral outcome.
This is because the random assignment would solve the problem of different pref-
erences between voters and non-voters because the treated agents are chosen ran-
domly among the whole population.
However, it is straightforward to notice that a similar experiment is hard to
implement for ethical reasons; on the one hand it is not possible to force people
to turnout while on the other hand, a Lab experiment that resemble the charac-
teristics of real elections would never capture the complexity of the phenomena.
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To find causal evidence of the effect of turnout on electoral outcomes, I use an
instrumental variable (IV) approach exploiting the randomness of weather con-
ditions (rainfalls) as an instrument for voters’ turnout. The theoretical framework
I refer to is a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) model with heterogeneous
potential outcomes (Angrist and Pischke, (Angrist and Pischke., 2009)). Within
this framework, rainfall will work as a suitable instrument for turnout if:
1. Is "as good as randomly assigned" (Angrist and Pischke (Angrist and Pis-
chke., 2009)) and exogenous to electoral outcomes (independence);
2. It explains the differences in electoral outcomes only through turnout (ex-
clusion restriction);
3. It is correlated with turnout-the endogenous variable-in the first stage (ex-
istence of first stage);
4. Has a monotonic relationship with turnout (monotonicity).
If these conditions hold, the IV will produce consistent estimates; however, whereas
assumptions (3) and (4) can be tested using the available data, respectively with
the first stage regression and a t-test of difference in means between the differ-
ence in turnout in treated places-where the dummy variable for rain is equal to
one- and non-treated locations (or equivalently an OLS regression)4, both the in-
dependence assumption and the exclusion restriction cannot be tested.
It seems legitimate to claim that a substantial part of the variation in elec-
toral outcomes due to different weather conditions works through differences in
turnout by changing the opportunity cost of peripheral voters. Substantially, as-
suming utility maximizing agents, an increase in the cost induced by bad weather
would reduce the utility of voting. However, one can also argue that bad weather
has a direct effect on voters’ mood: for instance, bad weather would advantage
4The difference in means is .0144099 and it is significant at one per cent. The t-test is 11.7490.
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conservative parties (people are in a bad mood because of the weather) while
good weather would encourage people to ask for reforms. This in turn is equiva-
lent of assuming that rainfalls have two different effects, a direct effect on voters’
mood and a mediated one on different turnout levels. The argument of risk aver-
sion is used in a work in progress paper by Bassi (Bassi, 2013) where she uses an
experimental approach to test if weather conditions directly affect electoral out-
comes in India; results show that after controlling for a wide set of individual
characteristics, bad weather favours less risky candidates. This idea is partially
ruled out by our IV estimations which point out that a worsening in weather con-
ditions do not favour conservative parties (perceived as less risky); nevertheless,
the existence of a direct channel cannot be completely tested using our data, but
the relative magnitude of the latter with respect to the important indirect impact
of rainfalls through turnout can justify the exclusion restriction.
Henceforth, no other factors like electoral law or politically driven alteration
of the electoral race (e.g. a change in identification requirements) took place from
2008 to 2013, hence I can be confident that the main channel trough which a
change in weather conditions will affect electoral outcome is turnout.
The IV Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation that I perform is the follow-
ing:
∆Yji = β0 + β1∆Xˆi + β2∆Mi + β3FE ++it (4.1)
and the First stage
∆Xji = β0 + β1∆Zi + β2∆Mi + β3FE ++it (4.2)
where:
• ∆ Y is the vote share variation for a single party (j) in a given municipality
(i) from 2008 to 2013;
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• ∆ Z is the variation in rainfalls (the instrument) equal to 1 if there is a wors-
ening in weather condition from 2008 to 2013 in a given municipality, zero
otherwise;
• M is a set of covariates (varying at municipality level and over time);
• FE is the geographical fixed effect;
• ∆ X is the variation in turnout (the endogenous variable);
• µ and  are the error terms;
The variable rainfall (Z) is equal to one if in the election dyad in a given mu-
nicipality I observe rainfall (in both days) while the difference in rainfall (∆Z)
between the two elections is equal to one if there is a worsening in weather con-
ditions, so that the dummy rainfall (Z) equals one in 2013 and zero in 20085. I
can employ less stringent measures of weather conditions (visibility, rainfalls in
only one of the two days), but they all fail to identify the model in the first stage.
Indeed, a marginal change in weather conditions would not change drastically
the opportunity cost to turnout while a rainstorm can have a serious impact on
turnout levels.
It is important to notice that I estimate a heterogeneous effect model with co-
variates implying that the independence assumption is conditional on covariates:
in fact, the rainfalls differential (∆Z) is random conditional on the geographical
location of the municipality. In our case, conditioning is not necessary for the
statistical identification of model - it holds both conditional and unconditional
on covariates - but it is necessary from a theoretical point of view. Effectively,
even though weather conditions are certainly exogenous to political decisions,
conditioning on the municipality’s altitude ensures that the volatility of electoral
5I do not distinguish among zero (equal) and minus one (better) because this would cause
interpretation problems and provide little additional insight.
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outcomes to weather conditions is smoothed across the Regions. In Figure 4.1 I
present the physical map of Italian municipalities while in Figure 4.2 and in Fig-
ure 4.3 I show the distribution of rainfalls during the two elections6: is evident
that the binary indicator for rainfall has some spatial patterns for the single elec-
tion dyad, but the difference in rainfalls (see Figure 4.4) in a single municipality
conditional on its altitude and given that the elections took place in very different
periods of the year - one at the end of April while the other in mid-February - is
as good as if randomly assigned.
4.3 Results
I begin by estimating the baseline OLS specification where I directly regress rain-
falls on parties’ shares. I estimate a first difference model with regional fixed
effect and a set of controls; table 4.1 reports the results for the baseline OLS speci-
fication. Democrats (PD - column 1) benefits the most from a bad weather with a
0.8% increase in the party share in case of rainfalls while the Movimento 5 Stelle
(M5S - column 3) is strongly and negatively affected from rainfalls with a de-
crease of 1.1%. The effect of rainfalls is also significant for the Centre (SC) led by
Mario Monti (+0.49%), while it is not significant for the People of Freedom (PDL).
It is important to notice that I do not have data for 2008 elections for Movi-
mento 5 Stelle (M5S) and Scelta Civica (SC), so I can only perform cross section es-
timation with regional fixed effects for these two parties. Nonetheless, this would
not change the exclusion restriction of the IV specification, but it will only change
the standard errors of the model.
In Table 4.2 I presents the results for the IV estimation7; I control for a set of
covariates capturing the level of social capital, the GDP and other characteristics
6All the maps are obtained with municipality data in ArcGIS.
7The uncentered R2 is reported because of different intercepts among groups.
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FIGURE 4.1: Altitude
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FIGURE 4.2: Rain 2008
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FIGURE 4.3: Rain 2013
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FIGURE 4.4: Rain Difference
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TABLE 4.1: Effect of rainfalls on electoral outcome (OLS)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES PD PDL M5S SC
Rainfalls 0.00888*** 0.000681 -0.0116*** 0.00495***
(0.00148) (0.00177) (0.00205) (0.00124)
Altitude YES YES YES YES
Social Capital YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,150 7,150 7,155 7,155
R-squared 0.415 0.381 0.432 0.359
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and for the altitude of the municipality (Figure 1). Moreover, the introduction
of the Regional fixed effects accounts for the potential bias generated by region
specific unobservable, the geography of the place and partially for the spatial
autocorrelation within Regions (discussed in Section 4.4).
In columns 1 and 4 I show the first stage regressions of rainfall on turnout;
both coefficients are strongly significant (1%) with the expected negative sign.
Indeed, the coefficients (columns 1 and 4) indicate that rainfall decrease turnout
respectively by 0.7 and 1.4 percentage points. Results are robust to the F-test of
excluded instruments with scores between 20 and 56.
The second stage regressions confirm the initial hypothesis showing that a
higher turnout disproportionately favours the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S - col-
umn 5): rainfall leads to a decrease in turnout of 1.47% which itself leads to a
decrease in the vote share of the party of 1.15% (−0.0147 ∗ 0.788 = −0.01158)
while it negatively affects the Democrats (PD - column 1) decreasing their share
by 0.88% (−0.00681 ∗ −1.295 = 0.0088). This in turn implies that in absence of
rainfall in the last political elections, the Movimento 5 Stelle would have gained
an additional 1.15 percentage point, moving from 25.55% to 26.7%. On the one
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TABLE 4.2: Effect of rainfalls on electoral outcome (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First IV IV First IV IV
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00681*** -0.0147***
(0.00150) (0.00197)
Turnout -1.295*** -0.105 0.788*** -0.345***
(0.334) (0.261) (0.170) (0.0970)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
F test . 20.72 . 55.30
R2 0.692 0.462 0.882 0.995 0.930 0.836
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,131 7,131 7,131
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
hand, the former finding captures the essence of the exploit of the party that inter-
cepted the preferences of non-habitual voters; hence the vote share for the Movi-
mento 5 Stelle is increasing in turnout. On the other hand, the result for the
Democrats is capturing a counter intuitive behaviour: non-habitual voter would
usually vote big parties8, but surprisingly the Democrats’ share drastically de-
creases with turnout. This result can be partly explained by both a weak electoral
campaign and the austerity measures proposed - and largely opposed by most
of the Italian population; the latter hypothesis is further confirmed by the nega-
tive coefficient (overall effect of 0.5%) for the Centre leaded by Mario Monti (SC -
column 6) who firstly proposed the austerity measures.
As a robustness check, I perform the estimation splitting the voters’ sample in
8To the best of my knowledge there is no literature about the difference in preferences between
voters and non-voters in Italy and most of the literature on the topic is about US elections where
only two parties compete in the race. In fact, with Democrats and Republicans only, the mostly
tested hypotheses are the "partisan effect", "anti-incumbent effect" or the "volatility effect" (See
Gomez et al(Gomez et al., 2007) and Hansford and Gomez (Hansford and Gomez, 2010)). I find
some evidence of the anti-incumbent effect shown by the negative coefficient for the Centre leaded
by Mario Monti.
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TABLE 4.3: Effect of rainfalls on electoral outcome: Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First IV IV First IV IV
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00671*** -0.0150***
(0.00168) (0.00223)
Turnout -1.313*** -0.107 0.771*** -0.338***
(0.371) (0.266) (0.173) (0.0972)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,131 7,131 7,131
F test . 15.98 15.98 . 45.26 45.26
R2 0.695 0.359 0.882 0.994 0.924 0.825
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
females and males; Table 3 and Table 4 present the results for the two samples.
Observing the coefficients for males and females, I cannot find any significant
difference in their behaviour: they do not differ in the sensitivity of turnout levels
to rainfall; hence they show similar behaviours in the second stage regression.
Finally, I test the model for young voters (table 4.5) aged from 18 to 24 that
voted for the first time, but the model has a small F-test. This can be because the
distribution of young voter turnout is biased by the fact that I replace turnout
levels greater than one with values of one, hence implying that in municipalities
in which eligible voters do not cast for the Senate young voters have a very high
turnout level.
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TABLE 4.4: Effect of rainfalls on electoral outcome: Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First IV IV First IV IV
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00685*** -0.0142***
(0.00152) (0.00190)
Turnout -1.286*** -0.104 0.814*** -0.356***
(0.336) (0.259) (0.176) (0.100)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,131 7,131 7,131
F test . 20.31 20.31 . 56.11 56.11
R2 0.622 0.442 0.883 0.996 0.928 0.837
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE 4.5: Effect of rainfalls on electoral outcome: Young voters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First IV IV First IV IV
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.0158** -0.0137***
(0.00674) (0.00338)
Turnout -0.572** -0.105 0.817*** -0.357***
(0.259) (0.125) (0.252) (0.136)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 6,583 6,583 6,583 6,588 6,588 6,588
F test . 5.502 5.502 . 16.34 16.34
R2 0.0208 -0.943 0.862 0.987 0.864 0.741
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
189
4.4 Spatial Autocorrelation
The instrument that I use for turnout in section 3 is rainfall, a dummy variable
(equal to 1 if there are precipitations) not necessary randomly distributed across
space9(see Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3); this potentially generates spatial autocorre-
lations of the residuals of the IV2SLS (two stage least squares model) regression
across municipality in the same area. A weather phenomenon that is locally clus-
tered can drive the results of our estimation; to smooth this source of bias I esti-
mate a first differences fixed effect (FE) IV model controlling for the altitude of
the municipality. The FE should control for any regional specific variable that is
constant over time, thus it should capture some of the variability that is left in the
residual term. Nonetheless, Region or Province-election specific variables could
escape from our controls: this can be ideally tackled with Province-elections fixed
effect, but the strategy is unfeasible in our case because I have only two elections
and the interaction term would capture all the variability.
For a deeper understanding of the potential bias generated by the spatial au-
tocorrelation, I perform the spatial analysis of the residuals of the IV model. The
residuals are capturing what is left in explaining electoral outcomes once I ac-
count for the variation in turnout instrumented with rainfalls net of a number of
controls at the municipality level (blood donation, altitude, participation to the
1974 divorce referendum). I compute the Moran’s I (Moran, 1948) for all the par-
ties (Figure 4.5 shows the results for the three main parties while the analysis of
other parties is presented in the appendix) with different sets of weights ranging
from the rook contiguity10 to the aggregation of 51 municipalities (the average
number of municipalities per Province) until 408 municipalities to resemble the
9It is exogenous to electoral outcome, but not randomly distributed across space.
10This is the most conservative specification because you consider as neighbours only the mu-
nicipality that share a boarder. I do not implement Queen Contiguity because the specifications
of interest pertains Provinces and Regions.
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FIGURE 4.5: Moran’s I
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average Region. I decide to artificially aggregate municipality to "mimic" the av-
erage Province or Region instead of using the official grouping of municipalities
in each Region or Province because residuals - and weather - should be autocor-
related in certain areas irrespective of the geographic boundaries that delimit the
area itself. Thus, given the relevant heterogeneity in the municipalities’ area, I fol-
low Anselin (2002) arguing that the weighting scheme with the k-nearest neigh-
bours avoids also the creation of "islands" (areas without neighbours) and forces
an even distribution of neighbours per data point.
Results show that the Moran’s I by Province range from a high 0.2341 for the
Movimento 5 Stelle to a low 0.0749 for the Democrats (PD) while if I consider the
Regions as the main aggregation area, I have value from 0.0131 (PD) to 0.0350
(M5S). Moreover, in order to highlight the clusters and their significance level I
perform the LISA (Anselin, (Anselin, 1995))11statistic using the Province level as
weighting scheme. Results (Figures from 5 to 7) underline the existence of some
clusters, though with low significance (often below 5%).
The Moran’s I and the LISA statistics suggest that spatial autocorrelation is a
residual concern in our model with respect to identification; therefore, I do not
use a Spatial Error (SE) model accounting for autocorrelation in the error term
because it would impose a structure to the former that could not be supported
with sounding economic theory. However, I prefer to estimate the baseline model
with robust standard errors that account for potential heteroskedasticity across
municipalities (for completeness a SE model is presented in the appendix).
4.5 Concluding Remarks
Understanding the effect of turnout on electoral outcomes has been a central topic
in the political debate for a long time and has captured the attention of political
11Local Indicator of Spatial Autocorrelation (LISA) is a local version of the Moran’s I.
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FIGURE 4.6: LISA Democrats (PD)
scientists in the recent past.
In this work I have tried to shed some light on the causal relationship be-
tween turnout and electoral outcomes using an IV fixed effects model where I
instrument voter turnout with rainfalls. Results show that there is a significant
effect of weather on turnout and that the latter generates differential outcomes
depending on the parties: the incumbent as well as the traditional parties lose
their vote share because of higher turnout (generated by good weather), while
the new protest party (Movimento 5 Stelle) benefits from good weather condi-
tions by capturing the preferences of non-habitual voters.
Being worried about the spatial autocorrelation of the residual terms in our
main specification, I performed a spatial analysis of the clusters (Provinces or Re-
gions). I computed Moran’s I and LISA statistics using several weighting schemes
for all the main parties; results suggest that spatial autocorrelation is a residual
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FIGURE 4.7: LISA People of Freedom (PDL)
concern with respect to the identification strategy, thus it is not essential to use a
spatial error model.
There are several possible future steps for this work. First, collecting data for
a consistent number of municipality elections, I can try to introduce municipality
fixed effects that should clean our estimates from any residual source of concern.
Indeed, a long panel helps in isolating the single causal effect of turnout on elec-
toral outcomes.
Second, I can collect post elections data surveying the Italian population on
the effect of weather on their voting decision. This information would help us in
understanding the magnitude of the direct channel of weather on parties’ shares,
hence disentangling the pure turnout effect.
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FIGURE 4.8: LISA Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S)
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 1
A.1 Construction of the dataset
One of the innovation of the paper is to bring together several data sources and
construct an harmonized dataset on banks, credit relationships, firms and work-
ers. In this appendix I describe in detail each dataset and the procedure followed
to select the sample and construct the variables used in the analysis.
A.1.1 Credit registry (CRC)
CRC is the credit registry of the Central bank of Portugal. The dataset has a
monthly frequency and records all the loans conceded to firms and individuals
with value greater than 50 Euros from each bank in the Portuguese territory. It
does not report credit given by foreign banks residing abroad to firms in the Por-
tuguese territory, while it does record credit conceded to foreign owned firms re-
siding in Portugal. The dataset includes several informations on each loan which
I use to select a my sample.
I select regular credit to firms, excluding credit not yet materialized (potential)
or any type of credit for which there is no expectation of being reimbursed or the
expectation of being reimbursed is low (Overdue in a legal dispute or written-off
in legal dispute for example).
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The distinction between long and short term loans is made using a combina-
tion of two different variables: from 2009 onwards (2009 included) the dataset
has precise information on loan maturity and allows me to select credit up to 1
year maturity. Before 2009, the dataset does not contain information on credit
maturity, but instead reports the credit categories. Indeed, credit is categorized
into commercial, discount funding, other funding and short term, medium and
long term funding and other residual categories. I define a loan to be short term
credit before 2009 if it is reported as a commercial, discount funding and other
funding and short term. The structural difference in the way short term credit is
defined does not create a mechanical drop in the supply of credit; in fact, looking
at figure 1.3 the total amount of short term credit supplied in the economy starts
decreasing between 2009 and 2010, while it still increases for the first year of the
new classification, namely 2009. 1 Long term credit is calculated as the resid-
ual category, subtracting the value for short term credit from the total amount of
credit received by the firm in a month.
The CRC dataset reports monetary values in current euros for each loan: I de-
flate all monetary values to 2013 euros using the monthly (aggregated to annual)
Consumer Price index (CPI - Base 2008) by Special Aggregates from Statistics
Portugal.
I select non financial corporations2 and aggregate values to yearly level by
taking the average of total short and long term firm credit across months.
1I double check that the categorization is meaningful by checking that the series of loans for
a randomly selected sample of firms across the years 2008 and 2009 does not mechanically drop
because of the structural change in the dataset.
2To select non financial corporations I use the first digit of the tax identifier and match the
dataset with the full list of non financial corporations identified using the sector of activity from
the matched employer-employee dataset (QP).
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A.1.2 Central do balancos (BBS)
The bank balance sheet dataset (Central do balancos) includes the monthly bal-
ance sheet of all the financial institutions based in Portugal. For each institution,
the dataset reports a detailed classification of assets and liabilities together with
their characteristics and monetary values (in millions of Euros). I deflate all mon-
etary values to 2013 euros using the monthly (aggregated to annual) Consumer
Price index (CPI - Base 2008) by Special Aggregates from Statistics Portugal.
To construct the measure of exposure to the interbank borrowing market I
proceed as follows: from the liability part of each bank balance sheet, I sum short
term deposits with maturity up to 1 year and repos contracts where the coun-
terpart is a foreign financial institution and divide the sum by the total assets
of the bank. I exclude intra-group funding by flagging the transaction in which
the counterpart is the the ultimate owner of the Portuguese affiliate.3 I construct
an alternative measure excluding the ECB as a counterpart and perform the es-
timation using this definition; results are qualitatively the same. The measure of
foreign interbank borrowing is the average of the monthly borrowing for each
bank across the 12 months.
Mergers & Acquisitions
Mergers and acquisitions have been very frequent in the Portuguese banking sys-
tem in the last 2 decades. Many institutions, both big and very small ones, were
involved in a process that led a consolidation of the banking system; the consol-
idation had its peak around 2000 with four of the top seven credit institutions in
Portugal involved in mergers or acquisition processes.
3This happens only in 3 cases and for small banks that account for less that 1% of the total
credit in a year. Details on the name of the bank or the business group are not included due to
confidentiality.
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The event per se does not alter the analysis of this paper, but the problem
arises when the M&A events are accounted differently in bank balance sheet
database and in the credit registry. To make the two dataset consistent, I have
checked all the M&A events happened between 1998 and 2013 that involved in-
stitutions with at least 1% of total credit in a given month.
A.1.3 Matched employer-employee (Quadros de Pessoal)
Quadros de Pessoal, is a longitudinal dataset matching virtually all firms and
workers based in Portugal.4 Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000
firms and 3 million employees from 1998 to 2013. The data are made available by
the Ministry of Employment, drawing on a compulsory annual census of all firms
in Portugal that employ at least one worker. Each year, every firm with wage
earners is legally obliged to fill in a standardized questionnaire. Reported data
cover the firm itself, each of its plants, and each of its workers. Variables avail-
able in the dataset include the firm’s location, industry, total employment, sales,
ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic private, public or for-
eign), and legal setting. The worker-level data cover information on all personnel
working for the reporting firms in a reference week. They include information on
gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings, hours worked (normal
and overtime), etc. The information on earnings includes the base wage (gross
4Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been
used by, amongst others, Cabral and Mata (2003) to study the evolution of the firm size distri-
bution; by (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labour markets in
terms of unemployment duration and worker flows; by (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005) to study the
determinants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual
and actual wages); by (Carneiro et al., 2012) who, in a related study, analyze how wages of newly
hired workers and of existing employees react differently to the business cycle; by (Martins, 2009)
to study the effect of employment protection on worker flows and firm performance. See these
papers also for a description of the peculiar features of the Portuguese labour market.
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pay for normal hours of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other regu-
larly paid components, overtime work, and irregularly paid components.5 It does
not include employers’ contributions to social security. Each firm entering the
database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number which we use
to follow it over time. The Ministry of Employment implements several checks to
ensure that a firm that has already reported to the database is not assigned a dif-
ferent identification number. Similarly, each worker also has a unique identifier,
based on a worker’s social security number, allowing us to follow individuals
over time. The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at
the workplace—as required by the law—imply a high degree of coverage and re-
liability. The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services of
the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compliance of firms with the law
(e.g., illegal work).
A.1.4 Combined dataset and data processing
Central do balancos (BBS) and the credit registry (CRC) are merged by means
of bank identifiers, while the matched employer-employee dataset is merged to
CRC using the firm identifier. As in (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005), I account for
sectoral and geographical specificities of Portugal by restricting the sample to
include only firms based in continental Portugal while excluding agriculture and
fishery (Nace rev.1, 2-digit industries 1, 2, and 5) as well as minor service activities
and extra-territorial activities (Nace rev.1, 2-digit industries 95, 96, 97, and 99).
Concerning workers, I consider only single-job, full-time workers between 16 and
65 years old, and working between 25 and 80 hours (base plus overtime) per
week. Each worker in Quadros de Pessoal (QP) has a unique identifier based
5It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to less measurement er-
ror than worker-reported data. Furthermore, the Quadros de Pessoal registry is routinely used by
the inspectors of the Ministry of Employment to monitor whether the firm wage policy complies
with the law
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on her social security number. We drop from the sample a minority of workers
with an invalid social security number and with multiple jobs. If a worker is
employed in a particular year, we observe the corresponding firm identifier for
that year. Since worker-level variables are missing in 2001, I follow (Mion and
Opromolla, 2014) and (Mion et al., 2016) and assign a firm to workers in 2001
in the following way: if a worker is employed by firm A in 2002 and the year
in which the worker had been hired (by firm A) is before 2001 or is 2001, then I
assign the worker to firm A in 2001 as well; for all other workers, we repeat the
procedure using 2003. In case neither 2002 nor 2003 allow us to assign a firm to
a worker in 2001, we leave the information as missing. All the information in QP
is collected during the month of November of each year. Worker-level variables
refer to October of the same year. To control for outliers, I apply a trimming
based on the hourly wage and eliminate 0.5 percent of the observations on both
extremes of the distribution. Firm-level variables refer to the current calendar
year (except firm total sales that refer to the previous calendar year). The location
of the firm is measured according to the NUTS 3 regional disaggregation.
A.1.5 Definitions
Layer number. In the matched employer-employee data set, each worker, in each
year, has to be assigned to a category following a (compulsory) classification of
workers defined by the Portuguese law (see (Mion and Opromolla, 2014) and
(Caliendo et al., 2015a)). Classification is based on the tasks performed and skill
requirements, and each category can be considered as a level in a hierarchy de-
fined in terms of increasing responsibility and task complexity. On the basis of the
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hierarchical classification and taking into consideration the actual wage distribu-
tion, we partition the available categories into occupations. We assign "Top execu-
tives (top management)" to occupation 3; "Intermediary executives (middle man-
agement)" and "Supervisors, team leaders" to occupation 2; "Higher-skilled pro-
fessionals" and some "Skilled professionals" to occupation 1; and the remaining
employees, including "Skilled professionals", "Semi-skilled professionals", "Non-
skilled professionals", and "Apprenticeship" to occupation 0. The position of the
workers in the hierarchy of the firm, starting from 0 (lowest layer, present in all
firms) to 3 (highest layer, only present in firms with 3 layers of management).
Number of layers of management. A firm reporting c occupational categories
will be said to have L = c − 1 layers of management: hence, in our data we will
have firms spanning from 0 to 3 layers of management (as in CMRH). In terms
of layers within a firm we do not keep track of the specific occupational cate-
gories but simply rank them. Hence a firm with occupational categories 2 and
0 will have 1 layer of management, and its organization will consist of a layer 0
corresponding to some skilled and non-skilled professionals, and a layer 1 corre-
sponding to intermediary executives and supervisors.
Reorganization. Firms can reorganize by changing the hierarchical structure
or not. In fact, in line with the hierarchy model described in (Caliendo and Rossi-
Hansberg, 2012), firms might decide to drop(add) a management layer if the
shock to the production scale is sufficiently large to make the fixed cost of an
additional management layer high(low) compared to the benefit of the reduction
in marginal cost due to the increase in productivity that the new manager brings
to the firm by making the production workers more productive. On the other
hand, if the shock to the production scale is not big enough, firms might chose to
change the internal organization without changing the hierarchical structure. In
the latter case, the firm might decide to decrease the number of employees in a
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specific layer or in any layers or decrease the wages of the workers to decrease
the total wage bill of the firm.
Contract types.
Wage bill. A worker annual wage is computed adding the monthly base and
overtime wages plus regular benefits and multiplying by 14. We apply a trim-
ming of the top and bottom 0.5 per cent within each year. A firm wage bill is the
sum of the annual wages of all its workers that satisfy the criteria listed above.
OLS TFP. Log total factor productivity computed from a standard three fac-
tors (labour, capital and materials) Cobb-Douglas production function model where
output is measured by firm sales and the model is estimated via OLS. Separate
estimations have been carried for each industry.
Wooldridge revenue-based productivity. Log total factor productivity com-
puted from a standard two factors (labour and capital) Cobb-Douglas production
function model where output is measured by firm value-added. 6
Short term credit. Short term credit computed summing all the bank credit
with maturity up to 1 year for a firm in a given calendar year.
A.2 Additional results
A.2.1 Productivity
To better understand the impact of credit supply shocks to the economy through
the lenses of the organization of the firm, this section presents a description of
the impact of credit shock on firm organization and productivity. The decision to
reorganize production by adding or dropping a layer of management has been
shown to be an important determinant of firm productivity (see (Caliendo et al.,
2015a)). Indeed, (Caliendo et al., 2015a) show that when firms reorganize by
6See (Wooldridge, 2009).
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adding a layer of management they are more productive, but they also increase
the quantity produced to an extent that lowers the price charged by the firm and
that in turns leads to a drop in revenue-based productivity. However, the deci-
sion to reorganize is endogenous as well as the amount of credit the firm uses; if
one wants to study the impact of credit supply on firm productivity needs two
different instrument, one for the credit supply and one for the reorganization it-
self. In absence of such an instrument, I report descriptive results of productivity
changes correlated with firm reorganizations and negative credit supply shocks.
Table A.1 presents results for the estimation of productivity for firms that drop
a management layer: a 10% drop in the supply of short term credit is correlated
with a 0.48% increase in revenue productivity (column 1) and a 2.24% increase
in sales per worker (column 3) while no effect is found on markup (column 2).
Results are consistent with the findings in (Caliendo et al., 2015a): when firms
are hit by a negative credit supply shock and reorganize by dropping a layer of
management their productivity increases compared to firms that do not reorga-
nize. It is crucial to notice that in this specification we are comparing two firms
hit by a shock with the same intensity but with different reorganizational reac-
tion: one of the two firms reorganizes by changing the hierarchical structure and
dropping one management layer, while the other firm keeps constant the hier-
archical structure while potentially reorganizing on the extensive and intensive
margin within each layer—by changing the number of workers within each layer
and its composition.
A formal test of the mechanism described by (Caliendo et al., 2015a) in this
set-up would require data on quantity and prices as well as an additional instru-
ment for change in the number of layers. Moreover, the general equilibrium effect
is non trivial and it is difficult to argue that more flexibility in the labour mar-
ket immediately translates into a more responsive reaction of firms to exogenous
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shocks that in turns leads to reorganizations and to an average increase in pro-
ductivity in the economy. More investigation to deal with the selection problem
in the estimation of the productivity effects and a framework that incorporates
the organization of the firm and the credit constraint into a general equilibrium
model are needed to understand the welfare implications of reorganizations.
A.2.2 Accounting for bank specialization
A major concern for the identification strategy presented in section A.2.2 is bank
specialization. The identifying assumption behind the approach described in sec-
tion A.2.2 is that—in expectation— changes in firms’ credit demand are equally
spread across all banks lending to the firm.7
If banks have advantages in specializing in a specific sector of activity and
supply disproportionately more in the specialized sector compared to all others,
a negative shock to that bank can have stronger effects for the firms in the sector
in which the bank is specialized. Moreover, if a demand shock hits a sector more
than other sectors at the same time as the credit shock, the assumption that the
changes in firms’ credit demand are equally spread across all banks lending to
the firm does not hold. Both effects would lead to an additional reduction in the
credit supply for the firms in the sector of the bank’s specialization and ultimately
bias the estimates of the elasticity of firm organization to credit supply.
I follow (Paravisini et al., 2015b) and construct an index of bank specialization
by exploiting information on the universe of loans granted by each bank and the
sector of activity of the firms receiving the loan. The index of banks specialization
for each bank is equal to 1 if a bank i has an above the average exposure of loans
in a two digit sector in the Pre period compared to all active banks in the Pre
7This approach is standard in the literature that empirically identifies bank credit supply
shocks by controlling for demand shocks by mean of firm-time fixed-effects (see for example
(Khwaja and Mian, 2008), (Paravisini, 2008), (Schnabl, 2012), (Paravisini et al., 2015b), (Chodorow-
Reich, 2014) and (Jiménez et al., 2014))
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period in Portugal. To test if bank specialization is a major concern in my set-up,
I augment specification 1.1 interacting the measure of credit supply Ci with the
measure of bank specialization and estimate equations 1.6 and 1.7 with the new
terms. The new equation that I estimate is the following:
List = η ∗ ln(Cit) ∗Bankspecializationi + δi + γst + ist (A.1)
Equation A.1 is estimated in first difference instrumenting the supply of credit
as in equation 1.7. Table A.2 shows that the results of the estimation of equation
A.1; in the first column 1 re-estimate the first stage regression for the augmented
specification. The coefficient and the size of the f-test confirm the existence of a
robust first stage even if one accounts for bank specializing in a specific sector
of activity. In columns 2, 3 and 4 I estimate second stage for the three main out-
comes, namely the wage bill of the firm and the wage bill de-trended and the
number if employees. The coefficients on the instrumented credit supply confirm
the results obtained in section 1.3.5 both in magnitudes and in significance, pre-
dicting an elasticity of 1.8% to a 10% reduction in short term credit for the wage
bill of the firm and of 1.7% for the total number of workers. However, the row be-
low shows the coefficients of the interaction between the supply of credit and the
measure of bank specialization; interestingly, none of the interaction is significant
and the signs are the opposite we would expect.8
8This is a test of bank specialization at 2 digit sectoral level which does not exclude the exis-
tence of bank specialization at a finer level of aggregation. More data would be needed to compute
further test in the spirit of the paper by (Paravisini et al., 2015a).
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TABLE A.1: Productivity
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln TFP Markup Sales/worker
∆ ln Ĉi -0.048** 0.017 -0.224**
(0.024) (0.016) (0.100)
Observations 1,533 1,533 1,533
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes
Sector-time FE Yes Yes Yes
Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation 1.7 in
first differences for the period 2004-2013 conditional on dropping a layer of management;
the table compares firms that drop a layer of management in response to the shock with
firms that either keep the same organizational structure or add a management layer. FDb
is the measure of foreign dependence of bank b to the interbank borrowing market as a
share of total assets of the bank in a pre-sample year, 2003. I estimate 1.7 using a linear
function of FD,FDb to construct the instrument. The dependent variables are log changes
of the averages before and after the shock. In column 1, TFP is estimated using a standard
procedure as defined by Levinson and Petrin. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
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TABLE A.2: Bank specialization
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln Ci Wage bill Wage bill det. # workers
∑bwib ∗ FDb -1.228***
(0.204)
∆ ln Ĉi 0.185*** 0.173*** 0.169***
(0.049) (0.053) (0.055)
∆ ln Ĉi * Bank specialization -0.005 -0.004 -0.004
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013)
Observations 12,657 13,266 13,266 13,266
First stage F-Stat 33.67 33.67 33.67 33.67
Sector FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Notes: This table reports the estimation of the second stage as defined in equation
1.7 in first differences for the period 2004-2013 interacting the instrument with the mea-
sure of intensity is measure of bank specialization equal to one if the bank is above the
median of specialization in a sector compared to the other banks in a pre-sample year,
namely 2003. FDb is the measure of foreign dependence of bank b to the interbank bor-
rowing market as a share of total assets of the bank in a pre-sample year, 2003. I estimate
1.7 with the interaction for bank specialization using a linear function of FD, FDb to con-
struct the instrument. The dependent variables are log changes of the averages before
and after the shock. The number of workers employed in the firm is the total amount
of workers employed by the firm in the calendar year, the wage bill is the total amount
of wages (base plus overtime) payed by the firm in each calendar year, the wage bill
de-trended is the total amount of workers employed by the firm in the calendar year de-
trended using a standard linear de-trending methodology to take out normal business
cycle variation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
208
Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 2
B.1 Trade data
Statistics Portugal collects data on export and import transactions by firms that
are located in Portugal on a monthly basis. These data include the value and
quantity of internationally traded goods (i) between Portugal and other Mem-
ber States of the EU (intra-EU trade) and (ii) by Portugal with non-EU countries
(extra-EU trade). Data on extra-EU trade are collected from customs declarations,
while data on intra-EU trade are collected through the Intrastat system, which, in
1993, replaced customs declarations as the source of trade statistics within the
EU. The same information is used for official statistics and, besides small adjust-
ments, the merchandise trade transactions in our dataset aggregate to the official
total exports and imports of Portugal. Each transaction record includes, among
other information, the firm’s tax identifier, an eight-digit Combined Nomencla-
ture product code, the destination/origin country, the value of the transaction in
euros, the quantity (in kilos and, in some case, additional product-specific mea-
suring units) of transacted goods, and the relevant international commercial term
(FOB, CIF, FAS, etc.).1 We were able to gain access to data from 1995 to 2005 for
1In the case of intra-EU trade, firms have the option of “adding up” multiple transactions
only when they refer to the same month, product, destination/origin country, Portuguese re-
gion and port/airport where the transaction originates/starts, international commercial term,
type of transaction (sale, re-sale,...etc.), and transportation mode. In the case of intra-EU
209
the purpose of this research. We use data on export transactions only, aggregated
at the firm-destination-year level.
B.2 Matched employer-employee data
The second main data source, Quadros de Pessoal, is a longitudinal dataset match-
ing virtually all firms and workers based in Portugal.2 Currently, the data set
collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million employees. As for the trade
data, we were able to gain access to information from 1995 to 2005. The data are
made available by the Ministry of Employment, drawing on a compulsory an-
nual census of all firms in Portugal that employ at least one worker. Each year,
every firm with wage earners is legally obliged to fill in a standardized question-
naire. Reported data cover the firm itself, each of its plants, and each of its work-
ers. Variables available in the dataset include the firm’s location, industry, total
employment, sales, ownership structure (equity breakdown among domestic pri-
vate, public or foreign), and legal setting. The worker-level data cover informa-
tion on all personnel working for the reporting firms in a reference week. They
include information on gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings,
hours worked (normal and overtime), etc. The information on earnings includes
the base wage (gross pay for normal hours of work), seniority-indexed compo-
nents of pay, other regularly paid components, overtime work, and irregularly
trade, firms are required to provide information on their trade transactions if the volume
of exports or imports in the current year or in the previous year or two years before was
higher than 60,000 euros and 85,000 euros respectively. More information can be found at:
"http://webinq.ine.pt/public/files/inqueritos/pubintrastat.aspx?Id=168"
2Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been used
by, amongst others, (Cabral and Mata, 2003) to study the evolution of the firm size distribution;
by (Blanchard and Portugal, 2001) to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in terms
of unemployment duration and worker flows; by (Cardoso and Portugal, 2005) to study the de-
terminants of both the contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual
and actual wages); by (Carneiro et al., 2012) who, in a related study, analyze how wages of newly
hired workers and of existing employees react differently to the business cycle; by (Martins, 2009)
to study the effect of employment protection on worker flows and firm performance. See these
papers also for a description of the peculiar features of the Portuguese labor market.
210
paid components.3 It does not include employers’ contributions to social secu-
rity.
Each firm entering the database is assigned a unique, time-invariant identify-
ing number which we use to follow it over time. The Ministry of Employment
implements several checks to ensure that a firm that has already reported to the
database is not assigned a different identification number. Similarly, each worker
also has a unique identifier, based on a worker’s social security number, allow-
ing us to follow individuals over time. The administrative nature of the data and
their public availability at the workplace—as required by the law—imply a high
degree of coverage and reliability. The public availability requirement facilitates
the work of the services of the Ministry of Employment that monitor the compli-
ance of firms with the law (e.g., illegal work).
B.3 Combined dataset and data processing
The two datasets are merged by means of the firm identifier. As in (Cardoso and
Portugal, 2005), we account for sectoral and geographical specificities of Portu-
gal by restricting the sample to include only firms based in continental Portugal
while excluding agriculture and fishery (Nace rev.1, 2-digit industries 1, 2, and
5) as well as minor service activities and extra-territorial activities (Nace rev.1, 2-
digit industries 95, 96, 97, and 99). Concerning workers, we consider only single-
job, full-time workers between 16 and 65 years old, and working between 25
and 80 hours (base plus overtime) per week. Our analysis focuses on manufac-
turing firms only (Nace rev.1 codes 15 to 37) because of the closer relationship
between the export of goods and the industrial activity of the firm. Even though
3It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to less measurement er-
ror than worker-reported data. Furthermore, the Quadros de Pessoal registry is routinely used by
the inspectors of the Ministry of Employment to monitor whether the firm wage policy complies
with the law.
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we focus on manufacturing firms we use data both on manufacturing and non-
manufacturing firms to build some of our variables, including export experience
as well as the Nace rev.1 2-digit code, size, and productivity of the previous em-
ploying firm.
Each worker in Quadros de Pessoal (QP) has a unique identifier based on her
social security number. We drop from the sample a minority of workers with an
invalid social security number and with multiple jobs. If a worker is employed in
a particular year, we observe the corresponding firm identifier for that year. Since
worker-level variables are missing in 2001, we assign a firm to workers in 2001
in the following way: if a worker is employed by firm A in 2002 and the year in
which the worker had been hired (by firm A) is before 2001 or is 2001, then we
assign the worker to firm A in 2001 as well; for all other workers, we repeat the
procedure using 2003. In case neither 2002 nor 2003 allow us to assign a firm to a
worker in 2001, we leave the information as missing.
All the information in QP is collected during the month of November of each
year. Worker-level variables refer to October of the same year. To control for out-
liers, we apply a trimming based on the hourly wage and eliminate 0.5 percent of
the observations on both extremes of the distribution. We thank Anabela Carneiro
for providing us with the conversion table between education categories (as de-
fined in QP) and number of years of schooling. Firm-level variables refer to the
current calendar year (except firm total sales that refer to the previous calendar
year). The location of the firm is measured according to the NUTS 3 regional dis-
aggregation. In the trade dataset, we restrict the sample to transactions registered
as sales as opposed to returns, transfers of goods without transfer of ownership,
and work done.
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B.4 Definitions
Some concepts are recurring in the explanation of a majority of the tables and
figures. We define them here.
Firm-level variables
Firm Age Firm age at time t is equal to the (log) difference between t and the year
(minus one) the firm was created. The year the firm was created is replaced to
missing whenever it is earlier than 1600.
Firm Export Status We divide firms into new, never, continuing, exiting and other
exporters. Firm f at time t is a new exporter if the firm exports in t but not in t− 1.
If the opposite happens, the firm is an exiting exporter at time t. If the firm ex-
ports both in t− 1 and in t it is a continuing exporter in t. If the firm does not
export neither in t− 1 nor in t then it is a never exporter in t. If the firm is not
observed in t− 1 then we classify it as other exporter in t. Never exporter is the
reference category in the wage analysis.
Firm Productivity Firm (apparent labor) productivity at time t is equal to the
(log) ratio between total sales (sales in the domestic market plus exports) and the
number of all workers employed by the firm as resulting from the firm record.
Firm Size Firm size at time t is equal to the (log) number of all workers employed
by the firm as resulting from the firm record.
Foreign Ownership A firm is defined as foreign-owned if 50 percent or more of
its equity is owned by a non-resident.
Industry-level Exports They are obtained aggregating HS6 codes export data
from the BACI dataset provided by CEPII and represent (log) aggregate exports
of Portugal of products belonging to Nace rev.1 2-digit industries.
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Share of Skilled Workers Share of firm’s workers with 12 or more years of edu-
cation.
Worker-level variables
Hourly Wage (Log) hourly wage is computed adding base and overtime wages
plus regular benefits (at the month-level) and dividing by the number of regular
and overtime hours worked in the reference week multiplied by 4.3¯. We apply a
trimming of the top and bottom 0.5 per cent. Regular and overtime hours worked
are set to (i) missing if (individually) greater than 480 per month, (ii) to zero if
negative.
Hiring Date The year the worker was hired in the firm is a variable that is directly
registered in QP. Since there are few instances when the hiring date changes from
year to year for the same worker-firm spell, we create a robust version of the hir-
ing date computed using the mode for each firm-worker spell. If there is a tie, we
take the minimum year in the spell.
Tenure This variable is measured as the difference between the current year and
the hiring date.
Country-groups
We partition export destinations into seven groups: Spain, other top 5 export des-
tination countries (Italy, UK, France, and Germany), other EU countries (Austria,
Belgium or Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Swe-
den), OECD countries not belonging to the EU (USA, Australia, Canada, Switzer-
land, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Norway,
New Zealand, Poland, Slovakia, Turkey), countries belonging to the Community
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of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP in Portuguese—Angola, Brazil, Cape
Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, and Timor-Leste),
China, and the rest of the World. We adopted this partition because of the fol-
lowing reasons. First, Portugal is an economy deeply rooted into the European
market. EU countries are special and we further divide them into top 5 des-
tinations (based on the number of Portuguese exporting firms, as well as total
exports, in 2005) and other EU countries. The strong cultural ties and proximity
to Spain also require attention which is why we separately consider Spain. Ex-
ports to OECD as compared to non-OECD countries are likely to be different in
terms of both exported products and quality range. At the same time, China and
countries sharing language ties with Portugal are also likely to be characterized
by different exports patterns.
Product-groups
We use the Isic rev2 3-digit classification to divide export products into 29 cate-
gories ranging from “Food manufacturing” (code 311) to “Other Manufacturing
Industries” (code 390). The Isic rev2 is a widely used classification allowing to
bridge products to industries and for which both information on the degree of
product differentiation - borrowed from (Rauch, 1999) - and financial vulnera-
bility - borrowed from (Manova et al., 2015) - is readily available. At the same
time data on both trade and production across countries over 1995-2005 is easily
accessible at this level of disaggregation from the CEPII (Centre d’Etude Prospec-
tives et d’Informations Internationales) trade and production dataset. This data
is needed to compute our measure of Chinese import penetration in country d for
product p à la (Autor et al., 2014b). The 29 product categories we end up work-
ing with also represent a balance between a sufficient level of detail on the one
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side and the need to economise on the dimensionality of the dataset involved in
estimations on the other side.
B.5 Wage analysis
The first step towards establishing a relationship between the export experience
brought by managers into a firm and the firm’s trade performance consists in
assessing whether export experience corresponds to a wage premium. In this
Section, we estimate a Mincerian wage equation to show that managers with ex-
port experience (as defined in Section 2.1.1) enjoy a sizeable wage premium. The
premium is robust to controlling for worker and firm fixed effects, previous firm
observables, job-change patterns, as well as a large set of worker and current
firm time-varying observables. Moreover, managers with experience in one (or
more) of the current destinations reached or products exported by their firm—
i.e. matched destination- or product-specific export experience—enjoy an even
higher wage premium.4 These results confirm previous evidence in (Mion and
Opromolla, 2014) for destination-specific experience and paint a new but similar
portrait for product-specific experience.
We further enrich the analysis by looking at the experience premia accrued by
different types of managers (general, production, financial and sales) and find
results in line with a knowledge diffusion story. More specifically, we show
that financial managers enjoy a basic export experience premium but no robust
product- or destination-specific experience premium. General and production
managers receive both a product- and a destination-specific experience premium
but little or no basic experience premium. Sales managers benefit from a destination-
specific experience premium while general managers get the largest premia in
most cases. Crucially, we find little evidence of a wage premium for non-managers,
4See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of specific export experience.
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which is the reason why in the trade performance analysis of Section 2.3 we focus
on managers only. These results add the evidence coming from raw wage data
shown in the previous Section.
There are caveats in our analysis as well as alternative explanations for the
existence of a premium that do not involve the diffusion of valuable export-
specific knowledge by managers. Though, such alternative explanations are at
odds with the existence of an additional wage premium for specific export expe-
rience and, as we will show later on, potentially imply our premia are actually
under-estimated. We discuss these issues in more detail in Section B.5.3.
B.5.1 Econometric model
Workers are indexed by i, current employing firms by f , previous employing firms
by p, and time by t. Each worker i is associated at time t to a unique current
employing firm f and a unique previous employing firm p. The baseline wage
equation we estimate is:
wit = β0 + β1Managerit + Mobility′itΓM + (Mobilityit ×Managerit)′ ΓMm+
+β2Experienceit + β3 (Experienceit ×Managerit) +
+β4Matched_Experienceit + β5 (Matched_Experienceit ×Managerit) +
+I′itΓI + P
′
ptΓP + C
′
ftΓC + ηi + ηf + ηt + εit,
(B.1)
where wit is the (log) hourly wage of worker i in year t, Managerit is a dummy
indicating whether worker i is a manager at time t, the vector Mobilityit contains
a set of dummies taking value one from the year t a worker changes employer for
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the 1st, 2nd,..time, Experienceit and Matched_Experienceit are dummies indicat-
ing whether worker i has, respectively, export experience and matched (destina-
tion or product; we estimate two separate regressions) export experience at time
t, the vector Iit stands for worker i time-varying observables,5 the vectors Ppt and
Cft refer to, respectively, the previous and current employing firm observables,6
ηi (ηf ) are individual (firm) fixed effects and ηt are time dummies.
The key parameters in our analysis are β2 + β3, i.e., the wage premium corre-
sponding to export experience for a manager, and β4 + β5, i.e., the extra premium
corresponding to matched export experience for a manager. β2 and β4 indicate,
respectively, the premium related to export experience and matched export expe-
rience for a non-manager. Mobility of workers across firms is needed, according
to our definition, to acquire export experience: Experienceit=1 if worker i has,
among his/her previous employers, an exporting firm while
Matched_Experienceit=1 further requires the current employing firm to be ex-
porting: (i) one or more of the products previous employers were exporting (ex-
perience in a product regressions); (ii) in at least one of the markets to which
previous employers were exporting (experience in a destination regressions). In
5A worker’s age, age squared, education, and tenure. See Section 2.1 and the Appendix for
further details.
6Previous firm observables are size, productivity, and a dummy indicating whether the cur-
rent and previous firms belong to the same industry or not. Current firm observables are size,
productivity, share of skilled workers, export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and standard
deviation of both age and education of managers, and industry-level exports. For previous firm
variables, as well as for current firm variables requiring knowledge of managers’ age and educa-
tion, we add a set of dummies equal to one whenever the data are missing, while recoding missing
values to zero. Previous employing firm information is not available for workers who enter the
labor market in our time frame or workers who always stay in the same firm. We do this to max-
imize exploitable information. When we then turn to the trade performance analysis which is,
as detailed above, representative of larger and more organizationally structured firms we simply
discard missing observations. We consider both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms in
constructing previous employing firm variables. In specifications without fixed effects we add
NUTS3 location and Nace rev.1 2-digit dummies as further controls. See Section 2.1 and the Ap-
pendix for further details.
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other words, identification of export experience premia comes from workers mov-
ing across firms. To disentangle wage variations due to mobility from those re-
lated to export experience we consider the set of dummies Mobilityit. We further
interact Mobilityit with manager status Managerit to allow mobility to have a
differential impact on managers and non-managers.
Mobilityit, Experienceit, and Matched_Experienceit, as well as their interac-
tion with manager status, thus define a difference-in-difference setting with two
treatments (acquiring export experience and eventually also matched export ex-
perience) and a control group of workers (managers and non-managers) chang-
ing employer without acquiring export experience.7
Equation (B.1) is first estimated without worker and firm fixed effects, then
with firm fixed effects and finally with both sets of fixed effects. In all three cases
we consider two specifications: with export experience only and with both ex-
port experience and matched export experience. As already indicated we present
separate regressions Tables for experience in a destination and experience in a
product. Last but least when focusing on the different types of managers we
break down the Managerit dummy (and its interactions with experience) into 5
categories (general, production, financial, sales and other). All our specifications
are estimated with OLS and we deal high-dimensional fixed effects building on
the full Gauss-Seidel algorithm proposed by (Guimarães and Portugal, 2010). See
the Appendix for further details.
7Our regression design is likely to actually underestimate the value of export experience. For
example, mobility dummies would absorb some of the effect of the export-related learning to
the extent greater knowledge leads managers to receive more job offers and hence move around
more.
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B.5.2 Results
Table B.1 and B.2 report the estimated export experience premia obtained from
the different variants of (B.1) both for manager and non-managers. More specif-
ically in Table B.1 we consider wage regressions with basic experience and ex-
perience in a destination while in Table B.2 we consider wage regressions with
basic experience and experience in a product. The two Tables also show the sig-
nificance levels of the premia, along with values of the F-statistics for managers’
premia and T-statistics for non-managers’ premia.8 Tables B.4 to B.9 in the Ta-
bles Appendix provide information on all the other covariates. Such Tables show
that coefficient signs and magnitudes are in line with previous research based
on Mincerian wage regressions, i.e., wages are: higher for managers, increasing
and concave in age, increasing in education and tenure, higher in larger, more
productive, foreign-owned and older firms, higher in firms with a larger share of
skilled workers.
The overall picture coming out from Tables B.1 and B.2 can be summarized as
follows:
Export experience does pay for a manager. Columns (1) to (3) in the two Tables9
point to a premium in between 11.5% (no fixed effects) and 2.7% (worker and
firm fixed effects). The latter figure should be considered as extremely conser-
vative because, due to the presence of worker fixed effects, we are identifying
that coefficient from workers who are currently managers but were not managers
in the past. Yet the 2.7% is economically big representing about half of the pre-
mium (5.8%) for being a manager in the estimation corresponding to column 3.
At the same time the difference in the premium across specifications do suggest
8Managers’ premia are obtained from sums of covariates’ coefficients in equation (B.1). There-
fore, their significance is tested with an F-statistic. Non-managers’ premia correspond instead to
individual coefficients in equation (B.1) and so the T-statistic is used.
9Note results are identical between the two Tables and rightly so.
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TABLE B.1: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a destination
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export Experience Premia for Managers
Export Experience 0.115a 0.110a 0.027a 0.064a 0.042a 0.013c
(870.8) (859.3) (27.4) (103.4) (50.3) (3.5)
Destination-Specific Exp. Experience 0.061a 0.089a 0.017a
(100.3) (230.1) (9.7)
Export Experience Premia for non-Managers
Export Experience 0.006a 0.014a -0.003c 0.022a 0.010a -0.003
(7.6) (17.0) (-1.7) (21.8) (10.6) (-1.1)
Destination-Specific Exp. Experience -0.028a 0.007a -0.003
(-25.4) (6.5) (-1.0)
Observations 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Worker controls X X X X X X
Firm (current and past) controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Worker FE X X
Notes: This Table reports export experience premia from the OLS estimation of several variants of the mincerian
wage equation (B.1). The dependent variable is a worker’s (log) hourly wage in euros. Export experience and
matched (destination) export experience are dummies. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the
export experience (and its refinements). Estimations include a number of covariates whose coefficients and standard
errors are reported in the Tables Appendix. Worker-year covariates include a worker’s age, age square, education,
and tenure. Current firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers, export status, age,
foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and education of managers, and industry-level exports.
Previous firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, and a dummy indicating whether current and previous
employing firms industry affiliations coincide or not. See the Appendix for details on covariates. All specifications
include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE
2-digits) dummies. Robust F-statistics (t-statistics) for managers (non-managers) premia in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
that managers with export experience are “better managers” and work for better
paying firms. However, a premium remains when controlling for both firm and
worker time-invariant heterogeneity indicating that export experience is not sim-
ply a proxy for managers’ unobserved ability and/or selection into higher paying
firms. Export experience is neither a trivial proxy for, as an example, a stronger
bargaining position of a manager moving out of a successful/productive firm.
We do control, in all specifications, for the size, productivity, and industry affil-
iation of the manager’s previous firm. As shown in Tables B.4 to B.9 in the Ta-
bles Appendix managers that come from more productive firms do earn a higher
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TABLE B.2: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a product
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export Experience Premia for Managers
Export Experience 0.115a 0.110a 0.027a 0.072a 0.046a 0.022a
(870.8) (859.3) (27.4) (182.9) (79.0) (12.4)
Product-Specific Exp. Experience 0.061a 0.100a 0.007
(127.1) (360.9) (1.7)
Export Experience Premia for non-Managers
Export Experience 0.006a 0.014a -0.003c 0.013a 0.003a -0.008a
(7.6) (17.0) (-1.7) (13.0) (2.9) (-3.5)
Product-Specific Exp. Experience -0.012a 0.025a 0.006a
(-11.4) (22.7) (4.8)
Observations 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Worker controls X X X X X X
Firm (current and past) controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Worker FE X X
Notes: This Table reports export experience premia from the OLS estimation of several variants of the mincerian
wage equation (B.1). The dependent variable is a worker’s (log) hourly wage in euros. Export experience and
matched (product) export experience are dummies. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager and the
export experience (and its refinements). Estimations include a number of covariates whose coefficients and
standard errors are reported in the Tables Appendix. Worker-year covariates include a worker’s age, age square,
education, and tenure. Current firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers,
export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and standard deviation of both age and education of managers, and
industry-level exports. Previous firm-time covariates include firm size, productivity, and a dummy indicating
whether current and previous employing firms industry affiliations coincide or not. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. Robust F-statistics (t-statistics) for managers (non-managers)
premia in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
wage, but export experience continues to be positively and significantly associ-
ated to a wage premium for managers.
There is an additional premium for matched export experience for managers.
Columns (4) to (6) in Table B.1 point to an additional premium accrued upon hav-
ing destination-specific experience, with respect to just having basic experience,
in between 8.9% (firm fixed effects) and 1.7% (worker and firm fixed effects). The
corresponding figures for the product-specific experience premium are 10% and
0.7% even though the latter fails to be significant. Overall our findings suggest
specific experience is an important feature of a manager’s wage and are consistent
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with the hypothesis that managers diffuse valuable export-related knowledge.
While the existence of a premium for export experience is also consistent with
the diffusion of knowledge not uniquely related to exporting (e.g. R&D skills, or-
ganizational practices, etc.) the additional premium for matched experience does
reinforce the view that export-specific knowledge is an important component of
the knowledge diffusion. Furthermore, our results suggest that such knowledge
proves to be very valuable when it is market-specific (product or destination).
There is limited evidence that export experience pays for non-managers.
Non-managers premia across Tables B.1 and B.2 are substantially smaller than
those corresponding to managers and less often significant. Given the key role
of managers for export-specific activities, the weaker evidence for premia among
non-managers is consistent with export experience entailing some valuable export-
specific knowledge. Managers are “special” because exporting requires success-
fully performing a number of complex tasks and managers are the employees
that are responsible for the most sophisticated tasks within a firm (see for ex-
ample (Antras et al., 2006), (Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg, 2012). Furthermore,
managers are also different because they are in charge of marketing and commer-
cialization activities. As suggested by (Arkolakis, 2010) and (Eaton et al., 2012),
searching for customers and suppliers and learning about their needs play a key
role in determining the success of a firm on the international market.
Table B.3 provides additional insights into the nature of export experience pre-
mia. More specifically, we now split managers into several categories depending
on their specific role within a firm and compute manager-type specific premia. In
the left panel of TableB.3 we jointly consider experience and destination-specific
experience and run estimations with no fixed effects, firm fixed effects and both
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worker and firm fixed effects. In the right panel of Table B.3 we do the same for
experience and product-specific experience. It is important to note that the use
of worker fixed effects is particularly conservative within this context because,
for example, premia referring to financial managers are identified across workers
who are currently financial managers but were either not a manager or a different
manager-type in the past.
Focusing on the most restrictive specifications – columns (3) and (6) – we
find that financial managers enjoy a basic export experience premium but no
robust product- or destination-specific experience premium. General and pro-
duction managers receive both a product- and a destination-specific experience
premium but little or no basic experience premium. Sales managers benefit from
a destination-specific experience premium while general managers get the largest
premia in most cases. We believe these results aligns with a knowledge diffusion
story. More specifically, we believe that knowledge acquired in ares like sales and
production is more prone to be destination- or product-specific while experience
in financing activities should instead be of a more generic nature. As for general
managers they need to have expertise in all such areas and so they are likely to
hold overall more valuable knowledge to be diffused.
B.5.3 Endogeneity
Selection. For the estimated premia to have a causal interpretation we need, as
is typically the case for Mincerian analyses, matching between firms and workers
to be random conditional on covariates in (B.1). If we consider wages wift for all
the possible firm-worker pairs this means we impose
E [εift|Xift, dift = 1]=E [εift|Xift] where Xift is our set of covariates and fixed ef-
fects and dift is a dummy taking value one if worker i is employed by firm f at
time t. Though admittedly restrictive, this hypothesis is made less strong by the
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fact that we use a large battery of controls for worker, past employer, and current
employer characteristics while accounting for unobserved time-invariant hetero-
geneity by means of both firm and worker fixed effects. Furthermore, it is actually
quite plausible that selection induces a downward bias of our premia which are
thus to be considered as conservative. For example, suppose wages wift reflect
workers’ productivity and that firm f hires the most productive worker from a
set I . We would then have dift=1
(
X
′
iftβ + εift ≥ maxi∗∈I X
′
i∗ftβ + εi∗ft
)
, where
1(.) is an indicator function. Under this assumption dift depends on both X
′
ift
and εift while E [εift|Xift, dift = 1] decreases in those components of the covari-
ates vector X
′
ift corresponding to a positive coefficient (like export experience) so
inducing a downward bias.10
Omitted Variables. One caveat potentially applying to our analysis is that ex-
port experience might be a proxy for some omitted variables. For example, hav-
ing being employed by an exporter could signal the unobserved ability of a man-
ager if exporters screen workers more effectively (see for example (Helpman
et al., 2010), (Helpman et al., 2012)). Another possibility is that workers (pre-
viously) employed by exporters could be expected to enjoy stronger wage rises
over the course of their career—as would occur, given the (widely documented)
productivity advantage of exporters, in the context of strategic wage bargaining
and on-the-job search (see for example (Cahuc et al., 2006)).11 We account for
these issues in three ways. First, we use worker fixed effects to capture any time-
invariant unobserved characteristic of the worker (including ability); second, we
use key previous firm characteristics (size, productivity, and industry) suggested
10Intuitively, given that the firm f has chosen worker i (dift = 1), an increase in X
′
iftβ (think
of this as the firm considering a manager with export experience with respect to one that has no
experience) means that the unobserved component εift needs not to be that large for worker i to
be chosen: negative correlation between εift and X
′
iftβ conditional on dift = 1.
11In these models workers employed by more productive/larger firms will, on average, receive
better on-the-job offers from other firms.
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by the strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search literature as well as by the
literature on inter-industry wage differentials (Gibbons and Katz, 1992) to control
for the fact that features of previous jobs are expected to have an impact on the
current salary; third, we use a refined definition of export experience that is more
directly linked to the actual exporting activities undertaken by the worker’s pre-
vious firms as well as being a feature that, unlike general ability, is more valuable
to some firms than others —i.e. matched destination or product export experi-
ence. We find it considerably more difficult to argue that matched export expe-
rience does not correspond to valuable trade-specific knowledge acquired when
working for an exporting firm.
Censoring. Export experience and matched export experience depend on the
whole professional history of a worker. For some observations, this history is not
entirely observed in our data, which exclusively covers the years 1995 to 2005.
For those workers that we consider not having experience based on the observed
data, it is possible that they acquired export experience before 1995. This is a
problem of missing data due to censoring. To deal with this issue we use a differ-
ent definition of export experience and matched export experience and explore its
quantitative implications. More specifically, we impose experience to be acquired
either in t− 1 or t− 2 and get rid of both 1995 and 1996 data. Results (available
upon request) are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to our core findings.
B.6 High-dimensional fixed effects
All specifications in the paper are estimated with OLS. With large data sets, es-
timation of a linear regression model with two high-dimensional fixed effects
poses some computational challenges (Abowd et al., 1999). However, the exact
least-square solution to this problem can be found using an algorithm, based on
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the “zigzag” or full Gauss-Seidel algorithm, proposed by (Guimarães and Portu-
gal, 2010). We use, for our estimations, the Stata user-written routine reg2hdfe
implementing (Guimarães and Portugal, 2010)’s algorithm; this routine has also
been used in (Carneiro et al., 2012), and (Martins and Opromolla, 2012). The main
advantage of this routine is the ability to fit linear regression models with two
or more high-dimensional fixed effects under minimal memory requirements.
Moreover, the routine provides standard errors correctly adjusted for the pres-
ence of the fixed effects. We apply the reg2hdfe routine setting the convergence
criterion for the iteration method to 0.001. As we are not interested in worker
and/or firm fixed effects per se, we keep all observations for which covariates
are available and not the largest connected group.
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TABLE B.3: Wage regression with different types of managers and export experience
Controls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Export Experience Export Experience
General manager 0.078a 0.072a -0.001 0.116a 0.110a 0.020
(13.1) (12.9) (0.0) (29.1) (30.5) (1.2)
Production manager 0.053a 0.049a 0.018 0.041a 0.047a 0.025b
(11.2) (10.9) (1.5) (8.3) (12.1) (4.1)
Financial manager 0.056a 0.033c 0.092a 0.101a 0.090a 0.084a
(7.5) (3.0) (10.6) (28.4) (23.0) (13.4)
Sales manager -0.030 -0.024a 0.012 0.021 0.031 0.042c
(1.4) (1.1) (0.2) (1.0) (2.4) (3.3)
Destination-Specific Exp. Experience Product-Specific Exp. Experience
General manager 0.482a 0.428a 0.091a 0.432a 0.385a 0.058a
(298.1) (262.8) (15.4) (231.7) (208.7) (6.8)
Production manager 0.132a 0.158a 0.036b 0.169a 0.184a 0.026c
(56.1) (86.4) (5.4) (105.1) (132.7) (3.5)
Financial manager 0.156a 0.190a -0.015 0.110a 0.134a -0.006
(45.2) (73.7) (0.2) (24.8) (37.5) (0.8)
Sales manager 0.212a 0.221a 0.039c 0.164a 0.173a 0.000
(59.6) (76.6) (3.0) (44.0) (55.7) (0.0)
Observations 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826 4,006,826
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Worker controls X X X X X X
Firm (current and past) controls X X X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Worker FE X X
Notes: This Table reports export experience premia from the OLS estimation of several variants of the mincerian
wage equation (B.1). The dependent variable is a worker’s (log) hourly wage in euros. In specifications (1) to (3)
both export experience and destination-specific export experience are considered along with their interactions with
dummies corresponding to different types of managers. In specifications (4) to (6) both export experience and product-
specific export experience are considered along with their interactions with dummies corresponding to different types
of managers. See Section 2.1.1 for the definition of a manager, manager types and for export experience (and its
refinements). Estimations include a number of covariates whose coefficients and standard errors are reported in the
Tables Appendix. Worker-year covariates include a worker’s age, age square, education, and tenure. Current firm-time
covariates include firm size, productivity, share of skilled workers, export status, age, foreign ownership, mean and
standard deviation of both age and education of managers, and industry-level exports. Previous firm-time covariates
include firm size, productivity, and a dummy indicating whether current and previous employing firms industry
affiliations coincide or not. See the Appendix for details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies,
and those not including fixed effects also contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. Robust
F-statistics in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.4: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a destina-
tion, controls (1st set, for Table B.1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (Years) 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager (0/1) 0.559a 0.553a 0.058a 0.559a 0.553a 0.058a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
2nd Firm (or later) -0.016a -0.004a 0.014a -0.016a -0.004a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.015a 0.013a 0.008a 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4th Firm (or later) 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
5th Firm (or later) 0.029a 0.014c 0.016c 0.027a 0.014c 0.015c
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
6th Firm (or later) 0.030 0.051b 0.020 0.029 0.051b 0.020
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
7th Firm (or later) 0.174 0.063 0.122 0.169 0.064 0.122
(0.117) (0.091) (0.088) (0.116) (0.091) (0.088)
2nd Firm (or later) and manag. -0.065a -0.047a 0.058a -0.065a -0.047a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
3rd Firm (or later) and manag. 0.037a 0.027a 0.054a 0.040a 0.029a 0.055a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
4th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.029b 0.018 0.040a 0.032b 0.020 0.040a
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
5th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.023 -0.022 -0.056b -0.020 -0.019 -0.056b
(0.039) (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.034) (0.028)
6th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.059 0.068 -0.024 0.065 0.074 -0.021
(0.110) (0.106) (0.060) (0.107) (0.102) (0.060)
7th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.709b -0.322c -0.252b -0.685a -0.306c -0.256b
(0.281) (0.192) (0.123) (0.266) (0.176) (0.122)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the first set of controls for the regressions of Table B.1. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.5: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a destination,
controls (2nd set, for Table B.1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.012a 0.054a 0.030a 0.012a 0.054a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a 0.076a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.160a -0.080a 0.035a 0.160a -0.080a 0.035a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.005a 0.053a -0.550a -0.007a 0.053a 0.090
(0.001) (0.001) (0.206) (0.001) (0.001) (0.209)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.273a -0.235a -0.097a -0.276a -0.235a -0.097a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Size of Previous Firm -0.007a -0.004a 0.002a -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Equal 0.076a -1.367a 0.077a -1.051a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
d_age_mg 0.008c -0.003 0.030a 0.008c -0.002 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
d_educ_mg -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Exp. (0/1) 0.006a 0.014a -0.004c 0.022a 0.010a -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the second set of controls for the regressions of Table B.1. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.6: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a desti-
nation, controls (3rd set, for Table B.1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Exporter (0/1) -0.006a 0.000 0.001 -0.005a -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.017a 0.006a 0.006a -0.015a 0.005a 0.006a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.009a 0.003a 0.003a 0.009a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Exporter (0/1) -0.004a 0.003a 0.003a -0.003a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Diff -0.056a -1.384a -0.056a -1.069a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
Sector of Prev. Firm (0/1) -1.918a -0.963a
(0.250) (0.251)
Matched Export Exp. (0/1) -0.028a 0.007a -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.131 0.129
(.) (.)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the third set of controls for the regressions of Table B.1. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.7: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a product,
controls (1st set, for Table B.2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (Years) 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a 0.025a 0.025a 0.023a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Manager (0/1) 0.559a 0.553a 0.058a 0.560a 0.553a 0.058a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
2nd Firm (or later) -0.016a -0.004a 0.014a -0.016a -0.005a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.015a 0.013a 0.008a 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4th Firm (or later) 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
5th Firm (or later) 0.029a 0.014c 0.016c 0.028a 0.014c 0.016c
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
6th Firm (or later) 0.030 0.051b 0.020 0.030 0.050b 0.020
(0.027) (0.024) (0.025) (0.027) (0.024) (0.025)
7th Firm (or later) 0.174 0.063 0.122 0.173 0.065 0.123
(0.117) (0.091) (0.088) (0.116) (0.091) (0.088)
2nd Firm (or later) and manag. -0.065a -0.047a 0.058a -0.067a -0.050a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
3rd Firm (or later) and manag. 0.037a 0.027a 0.054a 0.038a 0.027a 0.054a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
4th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.029b 0.018 0.040a 0.031b 0.019 0.040a
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013)
5th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.023 -0.022 -0.056b -0.020 -0.018 -0.056b
(0.039) (0.035) (0.027) (0.039) (0.035) (0.028)
6th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.059 0.068 -0.024 0.060 0.067 -0.024
(0.110) (0.106) (0.060) (0.107) (0.102) (0.061)
7th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.709b -0.322c -0.252b -0.690a -0.306c -0.253b
(0.281) (0.192) (0.123) (0.266) (0.174) (0.122)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the first set of controls for the regressions of Table B.2. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.8: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a product,
controls (2nd set, for Table B.2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.012a 0.054a 0.030a 0.011a 0.054a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a 0.026a 0.014a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.160a -0.080a 0.035a 0.160a -0.081a 0.035a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.005a -0.550a -0.006a 0.087
(0.001) (0.206) (0.001) (0.209)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.273a -0.235a -0.097a -0.275a -0.233a -0.097a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Size of Previous Firm -0.007a -0.004a 0.002a -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a 0.030a 0.024a 0.010a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Equal 0.076a -1.367a 0.077a -1.058a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
d_age_mg 0.008c -0.003 0.030a 0.008c -0.002 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
d_educ_mg -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b -0.080a -0.025a -0.008b
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Exp. (0/1) 0.006a 0.014a -0.004c 0.013a 0.003a -0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the second set of controls for the regressions of Table B.2. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.9: Wage regression with basic experience and experience in a prod-
uct, controls (3rd set, for Table B.2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Exporter (0/1) -0.006a 0.000 0.001 -0.006a -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.017a 0.006a 0.006a -0.017a 0.004a 0.006a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.009a 0.003a 0.003a 0.009a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Exporter (0/1) -0.004a 0.003a 0.003a -0.003a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.053a -1.918a -0.052a -0.972a
(0.001) (0.250) (0.001) (0.251)
Sector of Previous Firm Diff -0.056a -1.384a -0.053a -1.074a
(0.001) (0.280) (0.001) (0.281)
Matched Export Exp. (0/1) -0.012a 0.025a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.131 0.130
(.) (6.429)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.598 0.697 0.925 0.598 0.697 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the third set of controls for the regressions of Table B.2. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.10: Wage regression with different types of managers and export expe-
rience, controls (1st set, for Table B.3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age (Years) 0.026a 0.025a 0.023a 0.026a 0.025a 0.023a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age Squared (Years) -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Education (Years) 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a 0.041a 0.040a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tenure (Years) 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a 0.005a 0.005a 0.003a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Other manager (0/1) 0.500a 0.478a 0.049a 0.501a 0.478a 0.049a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
General manager (0/1) 0.432a 0.520a 0.098a 0.432a 0.520a 0.098a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Production manager (0/1) 0.713a 0.713a 0.090a 0.713a 0.713a 0.090a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Financial manager (0/1) 0.728a 0.730a 0.079a 0.729a 0.731a 0.079a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sales manager (0/1) 0.801a 0.812a 0.136a 0.802a 0.812a 0.136a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
2nd Firm (or later) -0.017a -0.005a 0.014a -0.017a -0.005a 0.014a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
3rd Firm (or later) 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a 0.015a 0.012a 0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
4th Firm (or later) 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a 0.031a 0.015a 0.008a
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
5th Firm (or later) 0.027a 0.014c 0.016c 0.028a 0.014c 0.016c
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
6th Firm (or later) 0.029 0.050b 0.019 0.029 0.050b 0.020
(0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025)
7th Firm (or later) 0.170 0.062 0.123 0.173 0.064 0.124
(0.116) (0.091) (0.088) (0.116) (0.092) (0.088)
2nd Firm (or later) and manag. -0.045a -0.029a 0.057a -0.046a -0.031a 0.058a
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
3rd Firm (or later) and manag. 0.038a 0.027a 0.054a 0.035a 0.025a 0.053a
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
4th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.030b 0.019 0.040a 0.028b 0.018 0.040a
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
5th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.012 -0.014 -0.053c -0.012 -0.014 -0.054b
(0.038) (0.033) (0.027) (0.038) (0.032) (0.027)
6th Firm (or later) and manag. 0.051 0.066 -0.019 0.046 0.061 -0.022
(0.094) (0.091) (0.061) (0.094) (0.091) (0.061)
7th Firm (or later) and manag. -0.623b -0.233 -0.261b -0.625b -0.232 -0.258b
(0.266) (0.171) (0.124) (0.266) (0.169) (0.124)
Constant 0.114 0.115
(15.504) (10.468)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the first set of controls for the regressions of Table B.3. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.11: Wage regression with different types of managers and export experi-
ence, controls (2nd set, for Table B.3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.011a 0.054a 0.029a 0.011a 0.054a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Apparent Labor Productivity (log) 0.075a 0.007a 0.005a 0.075a 0.006a 0.005a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Exports PT -0.058a 0.047a 0.067a -0.057a 0.047a 0.067a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Firm Age (log) 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a 0.002a -0.003a 0.001a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.027a 0.015a 0.006a 0.027a 0.015a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.164a -0.079a 0.035a 0.164a -0.079a 0.035a
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Size of Prev. Firm (0/1) 0.054a -0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Prev. Firm (0/1) -0.273a -0.229a -0.096a -0.272a -0.228a -0.095a
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008)
Size of Previous Firm -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a -0.006a -0.005a 0.002a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
App. Prod. of Previous Firm 0.030a 0.023a 0.010a 0.030a 0.023a 0.010a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Equal 0.077a -2.617a 0.077a -2.621a
(0.001) (0.245) (0.001) (0.245)
d_age_mg 0.010b 0.001 0.030a 0.010b 0.001 0.030a
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
d_educ_mg -0.079a -0.026a -0.008b -0.079a -0.026a -0.008b
(0.004) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a 0.001a 0.000a -0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a 0.001a 0.000a 0.000a
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b 0.004a 0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b 0.002a -0.001a -0.000b
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Export Exp. (0/1) 0.023a 0.011a -0.003 0.013a 0.003a -0.008a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the second set of controls for the regressions of Table B.3. See the Appendix for details
on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also contain region
(NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.12: Wage regression with different types of managers and export
experience, controls (3rd set, for Table B.3)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
New Exporter (0/1) -0.005a -0.000 0.001 -0.006a -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Continuing Exporter (0/1) -0.015a 0.004a 0.006a -0.017a 0.004a 0.006a
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exiting Exporter (0/1) 0.008a 0.003a 0.003a 0.008a 0.004a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Other Exporter (0/1) -0.003a 0.003a 0.003a -0.004a 0.003a 0.003a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sector of Previous Firm Diff -0.056a -2.635a -0.053a -2.638a
(0.001) (0.245) (0.001) (0.245)
Sector of Prev. Firm (0/1) -2.619a -0.053a -2.623a
(0.245) (0.001) (0.245)
Matched Export Exp. (0/1) -0.029a 0.005a -0.002 -0.013a 0.024a 0.006a
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Constant 0.114 0.115
(15.504) (10.468)
Observations 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284 4,006,826 4,004,447 3,609,284
R2 0.599 0.698 0.925 0.599 0.698 0.925
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table includes the third set of controls for the regressions of Table B.3. See the Appendix for
details on covariates. All specifications include year dummies, and those not including fixed effects also
contain region (NUTS-3) and industry (NACE 2-digits) dummies. ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.13: Probability to Start and Continue Export-
ing to a Specific Destination, controls (for Table 2.5)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.030a 0.027a 0.126a 0.124a
(0.006) (0.006) (0.014) (0.014)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.005b 0.005b 0.010b 0.010b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age (log) 0.003 0.004 0.008 0.008
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.010)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Exports PT 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.002 -0.003 0.012c 0.012c
(0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.002 -0.001 -0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Avg. FE Managers 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
Std. Dev. FE Managers -0.002 -0.003c 0.015a 0.014a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 166,860 166,860 52,124 52,124
R2 0.175 0.176 0.256 0.257
Firm FE X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard er-
rors for the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry and continuation
into a foreign destination (2.2). Estimation results for the main covariates, as
well as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation tech-
niques, are provided in the Table 2.5. All specifications include destination-
year dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dummies, have been
divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a com-
parable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses:
ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.14: Probability to Start and Continue Export-
ing a Specific Product, controls (for Table 2.6)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.011a 0.009a 0.076a 0.061a
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.016)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.002a 0.002a 0.009 0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Firm Age (log) -0.001 0.000 -0.011 -0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.015) (0.015)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.005) (0.005)
Exports PT 0.002 0.001 0.013 0.012
(0.001) (0.001) (0.014) (0.014)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.002b 0.001 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.009) (0.009)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.001b -0.001 0.002 0.009
(0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.005)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.001b -0.001b -0.001 -0.004
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. FE Managers 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.012) (0.013)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.015c
(0.001) (0.001) (0.007) (0.008)
Observations 775,675 775,675 40,125 40,125
R2 0.070 0.073 0.205 0.214
Firm FE X X X X
Product-Year FE X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the core covariates of our model of firm’s starting and continuing
exporting a specific product (2.2). Estimation results for the main covariates,
as well as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation tech-
niques, are provided in the Table 2.6. All specifications include product-year
dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dummies, have been di-
vided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable
metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01,
bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.15: (Log) Value of Exports to a Specific Desti-
nation Conditional on Entry or Continuation, controls
(for Table 2.7)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) 0.148 0.141 0.892a 0.875a
(0.184) (0.184) (0.069) (0.069)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.044 0.045 0.109a 0.107a
(0.055) (0.055) (0.026) (0.026)
Firm Age (log) -0.201 -0.198 -0.073c -0.069c
(0.171) (0.171) (0.042) (0.042)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) -0.006 -0.006 0.012 0.010
(0.073) (0.073) (0.024) (0.024)
Exports PT 0.128 0.128 0.043 0.041
(0.159) (0.159) (0.051) (0.051)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.009 -0.013 0.060c 0.055
(0.108) (0.108) (0.035) (0.035)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.012 0.012 -0.009 -0.004
(0.070) (0.070) (0.020) (0.020)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age -0.014 -0.015 0.000 -0.004
(0.056) (0.056) (0.013) (0.013)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.066 -0.067 -0.004 -0.008
(0.084) (0.083) (0.024) (0.024)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.075 -0.075 -0.008 -0.012
(0.051) (0.051) (0.013) (0.013)
Avg. FE Managers 0.017 0.016 -0.026 -0.024
(0.150) (0.150) (0.037) (0.037)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.016 0.015 0.033 0.026
(0.084) (0.083) (0.021) (0.022)
Observations 6,732 6,732 45,023 45,023
R2 0.478 0.478 0.506 0.507
Firm FE X X X X
Destination-Year Dummies X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry and continua-
tion into a foreign destination (2.2). Estimation results for the main covari-
ates, as well as more details regarding the econometric model and estima-
tion techniques, are provided in the Table 2.7. All specifications include
destination-year dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dum-
mies, have been divided by their respective standard deviation in order to
deliver a comparable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in
parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.16: (Log) Value of Exports of a Specific Prod-
uct Conditional on Entry or Continuation, controls (for
Table 2.8)
(1) (2) (5) (6)
Firm Size (log) -0.136 -0.159 0.352a 0.262b
(0.154) (0.153) (0.103) (0.103)
App. Labor Productivity (log) -0.120b -0.121b 0.122a 0.111a
(0.060) (0.060) (0.031) (0.030)
Firm Age (log) -0.153 -0.140 -0.109 -0.063
(0.128) (0.131) (0.127) (0.126)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) -0.000 -0.003 -0.050 -0.061c
(0.048) (0.048) (0.034) (0.034)
Exports PT 0.022 0.001 -0.043 -0.044
(0.149) (0.150) (0.095) (0.101)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.136 -0.140 -0.047 -0.072
(0.101) (0.102) (0.062) (0.065)
Avg. Managers’ Age -0.099 -0.091 -0.027 0.008
(0.068) (0.067) (0.033) (0.035)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age -0.081 -0.085c 0.029 0.015
(0.050) (0.050) (0.023) (0.024)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.004 0.018 -0.041 -0.054
(0.083) (0.083) (0.038) (0.039)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.054 0.058 -0.029 -0.044c
(0.048) (0.047) (0.022) (0.023)
Avg. FE Managers 0.126 0.116 0.036 0.059
(0.139) (0.139) (0.068) (0.068)
Std. Dev. FE Managers -0.007 0.003 0.016 -0.028
(0.077) (0.077) (0.046) (0.051)
Observations 11,853 11,853 29,033 29,033
R2 0.419 0.421 0.440 0.445
Firm FE X X X X
Product-Year Dummies X X X X
Robust standard errors in parentheses
a p<0.01, b p<0.05, c p<0.1
Notes: This Table reports OLS and IV estimator coefficients and standard
errors for the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry and continua-
tion into a foreign destination (2.2). Estimation results for the main covari-
ates, as well as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation
techniques, are provided in the Table 2.8. All specifications include product-
year dummies. All covariates, except destination-year dummies, have been
divided by their respective standard deviation in order to deliver a com-
parable metric. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses:
ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05, cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.17: Probability to Start Exporting in Angola;
controls (for Table 2.4)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 1 pse 2 pse 3 pse 4 pse
Firm Size (log) 0.019a 0.023a 0.023a 0.022b
(0.002) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.011a 0.007c 0.007c 0.007c
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm Age (log) 0.012a 0.013b 0.012c 0.013c
(0.002) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) -0.002c 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Exports PT -0.005a 0.029a 0.028a 0.028a
(0.001) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Share of Skilled Workers -0.001 0.005 0.004 0.005
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.000 -0.004c -0.004b -0.004b
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Avg. Managers’ Education 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 28,420 28,420 28,420 28,420
R2 0.024 0.383 0.384 0.384
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimator coefficients and standard errors for
the control covariates of our model of firm’s entry into a foreign destination
(2.2) focused on Angola. Estimation results for the main covariates, as well
as more details regarding the econometric model and estimation techniques,
are provided in the Table 2.4. All covariates, have been divided by their
respective standard deviation in order to deliver a comparable metric. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05,
cp < 0.1.
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TABLE B.18: Probability to Con-
tinue Exporting a Specific Product
to a Specific Destination; Interac-
tion with Chinese Import Penetra-
tion; controls (for Table 2.11)
(1)
Firm Size (log) 0.121a
(0.014)
App. Labor Productivity (log) 0.011a
(0.004)
Firm Age (log) 0.006
(0.010)
Foreign Ownership (0/1) 0.004
(0.004)
Exports PT 0.002
(0.008)
Share of Skilled Workers 0.012c
(0.006)
Avg. Managers’ Age 0.001
(0.004)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Age 0.002
(0.003)
Avg. Managers’ Education -0.001
(0.005)
Std. Dev. Managers’ Education -0.002
(0.003)
Avg. FE Managers 0.000
(0.008)
Std. Dev. FE Managers 0.014a
(0.005)
Observations 1,514,409
R2 0.302
Firm FE X
Notes: This Table reports OLS estimator coef-
ficients and standard errors for the control co-
variates of an enriched version of our model
of firm’s continuation into a foreign destina-
tion (2.2). Estimation results for the main co-
variates, as well as more details regarding the
econometric model and estimation techniques,
are provided in the Table 2.11. All covariates,
except destination-year and product-year dum-
mies, have been divided by their respective
standard deviation in order to deliver a com-
parable metric. Standard errors clustered at the
firm-level in parentheses: ap < 0.01, bp < 0.05,
cp < 0.1.
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Appendix C
Appendix to chapter 3
C.1 EU Accession and the Freedom of Movement of
Workers
In this Appendix we describe in detail the process that resulted in the entry of ten
new countries into the European Union in 2004, i.e. the EU membership process.
The process of joining the EU broadly consists of 4 stages. It is in essence based
on the prospective member’s ability of satisfying the accession criteria—also called
the “Copenhagen criteria” after the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993
which defined them. The accession criteria have a political (stability of institu-
tions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and
protection of minorities), economic (a functioning market economy and the ca-
pacity to cope with competition and market forces) and administrative/institutional
(capacity to effectively implement EU law, and ability to take on the obligations
of membership) component. The four stages that characterize the membership
process are the following.
1. Official candidate for membership. A country wishing to join the EU submits
a membership application to the Council of the European Union, which
asks the European Commission to assess the applicant’s ability to meet the
Copenhagen criteria. If the Commission’s opinion is positive, membership
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negotiations cannot start until all EU governments agree, in the form of
a unanimous decision by the EU Council. Negotiations take place between
ministers and ambassadors of the EU governments and the candidate coun-
try in what is called an intergovernmental conference.
2. Negotiations. The negotiation process includes three stages: screening, def-
inition of counterparties’ negotiation positions, and closing of the negoti-
ations. In the screening phase, the European Commission, together with
the candidate country, prepares a detailed report of how well the candidate
country is prepared in each of the 36 Chapters of the EU Law, spanning all
major economic, social, and institutional aspects (e.g the free movement of
goods, justice, and defense policy). If the results of the screening are sat-
isfactory the Commission makes a recommendation to open negotiations.
The candidate country then has to submit its position on every chapter of
EU Law, and the EU must adopt a common position. Negotiations then con-
tinue until the candidate’s progress is considered satisfactory in any field.
3. Accession Treaty. Once negotiations are successfully concluded, the Acces-
sion Treaty (containing the detailed terms and conditions of membership,
all transitional arrangements and deadlines, as well as details of financial
arrangements and any safeguard clauses) is prepared.
4. Support and Ratification. The Accession Treaty becomes binding once (i) it
wins the support of the EU Council, the Commission, and the European
Parliament; (ii) it is signed by the candidate country and representatives of
all existing EU countries; and (iii) it is ratified by the candidate country and
every individual EU country, according to their constitutional rules.
Table C.1 shows the date of application, the accession date, as well as population
for each NMS country.
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TABLE C.1: NMS Countries Characteristics
Date of Application Accession Date 2004 Population
Cyprus July 3rd, 1990 May 1st, 2004 1.01
Estonia November 24th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 1.36
Hungary March 31st, 1994 May 1st, 2004 10.11
Latvia October 13th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 2.26
Lithuania December 8th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 3.34
Malta July 3rd, 1990 May 1st, 2004 0.40
Poland April 5th, 1994 May 1st, 2004 38.18
Czech Republic January 17th, 1996 May 1st, 2004 10.20
Slovakia June 27th, 1995 May 1st, 2004 5.37
Slovenia June 10th, 1996 May 1st, 2004 2.00
Notes: 2004 population (in millions) from the World Bank World Development Indicators.
Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents
regardless of legal status or citizenship.
C.1.1 Migration Policies
The new members states had to comply with the fundamental principles of the
European Union. Article 6 of the Treaty on the European Union states that “The
Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to
the member states.” The freedom of movement of workers is considered as one
of the four fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law (acquis communautaire),
along with the free movement of goods, services, and capital.1 EU law effec-
tively establishes the right of EU nationals to freely move to another member
state, to take up employment, and reside there with their family members, as
well as protects against any possible discrimination, on the basis of nationality, in
employment-related matters.
1As effectively and concisely defined by Article 45 (ex Article 39 of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the freedom of
movement of workers entails “the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between
workers of the member states as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work
and employment”, (Council of the European Union, 2012).
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The Accession Treaty of 2003 ((European Union, 2003)) allowed the “old”
member states to temporarily restrict—for a maximum of 7 years—the access to
their labor markets to citizens from the accessing countries, with the exception of
Malta and Cyprus.2 These temporary restrictions were organized in three phases
according to a 2+3+2 formula: During an initial period of 2 years (May 1st, 2004 to
April 30th, 2006), member states, through national laws, could regulate the access
of workers from all new member states, except Malta and Cyprus; member states
could then extend their national measures for an additional 3 years (until April
30th, 2009), upon notification to the European Commission; an additional exten-
sion for other 2 years was possible in case the member state notified the European
Commission of a serious disturbance in its labor market or threat thereof.3 The
transitional arrangements were scheduled to end irrevocably seven years after
accession—i.e. on April 30th, 2011.
Figure C.1 shows the set of bilateral arrangements before the 2004 enlarge-
ment (Panel a), and during each of the three phases (Panels b, c, and d). A blue
cell means that there are no restrictions in place in flowing from the origin to the
destination country, i.e. EU law on free movement of workers apply. A yellow
(mixed blue-yellow) cell means that some restrictions are in place during (part of)
the phase.
Before 2004. Panel (a) shows that, before the 2004 enlargement, workers could
flow freely within the EU-15 member states but not between EU-15 and NMS as
2These restrictions could only be applied to workers but not to the self-employed. They only
applied to obtaining access to the labor market in a particular member state, not to the freedom
of movement across member states. Once a worker has been admitted to the labor market of
a particular member state, Community law on equal treatment as regards remuneration, social
security, other employment-related measures, and access to social and tax advantages is valid.
3The EU-25 member states that decide to lift restrictions can, throughout the remainder of
the transitional period, be able to reintroduce them, using the safe-guard procedure set out in
the 2003 Accession Treaty, should they undergo or foresee disturbances on their labor markets.
Notwithstanding the restrictions, a member state must always give preference to EU-2 (Malta
and Cyprus) and EU-8 workers over those who are nationals of a non-EU country with regard to
access to the labor market.
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well as between NMS countries.
Phase 1. On May 1st, 2004, the U.K. (together with Ireland and Sweden)
opens its borders to NMS countries, which reciprocate by opening their borders to
British citizens. All the other EU-15 countries keep applying restrictions to NMS
countries, except to Cyprus and Malta. All NMS countries decide to open their
border to EU-15 member states, except for Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia which
apply reciprocal measures. Finally, NMS countries lift all restrictions among each
others.
Phase 2. On May 1st, 2006, Greece, Portugal, and Spain, followed by Italy on
July 27th, lift restrictions on workers from EU-8 countries. As a consequence,
Hungary and Poland drop their reciprocal measures towards these four member
states. Slovenia lifts its reciprocal measures on May 25th, 2006, Poland on January
17th, 2007, while Hungary simplifies its reciprocal measures on January 1st, 2008.
During phase 2, The Netherlands (on May 1st, 2007), Luxembourg (on November
1st, 2007), and France (on July 1st, 2008) also lift restrictions on workers from EU-
8 countries.
Phase 3. Belgium, Denmark, Germany and Austria keep restricting access to
their labor markets under national law. Hungary applies (simplified) reciprocal
measures, limiting access to its labor market for workers from EU-15 member
states that restrict the access of Hungarian workers.
Belgium and Denmark opened their labor market to NMS countries on May
2009, while Austria and Germany opened their labor markets at the end of the
transitional period, on May 2011.
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FIGURE C.1: Migration restrictions: transitional arrangements be-
tween EU-15 and NMS
Note: Origin countries on the rows, destination countries on the columns. EU-15 member states
(AT, BE, DE, DK, GR, FR, IT, PT, U.K.) followed by NMS countries (CY, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, PL)) in
bold. A blue cell means that there are no migration restrictions in place in flowing from the origin
to the destination country, i.e. EU law on free movement of workers apply. A yellow (mixed
blue-yellow) cell means that some migration restrictions are in place during (part of) the phase.
C.1.2 Trade Policies
New member states became part of the European Union Customs Union, and
of the European common commercial policy.4 The customs union implies that
members apply the same tariffs to goods imported from the rest of the world,
4The customs union initiated with the Treaty of Rome in 1957, kick-started on July 1st 1968, and
it is regulated by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The common commercial
policy is also set down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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and apply no tariffs internally among members.5 The common commercial policy
covers trade in goods and services, intellectual property rights, and foreign direct
investment. As a consequence of the EU enlargement process, the new member
states automatically entered into international trade agreements to which the EU
is a party, and forwent their own existing agreements.6
C.2 Data
C.2.1 List of Countries
The sample includes 17 European countries and a constructed rest of the world
(RoW). Of our 17 countries, 10 are pre-2004 EU members and 7 countries joined
the EU in 2004. The list of pre-2004 EU members includes Austria, Belgium, Ger-
many, Denmark, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and the United Kingdom
while the new members are Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Poland. Overall, these 17 countries cover about 91 percent of the
population of the 25 members of the European Union in 2004.
We assign Ireland, The Netherlands, Malta, Sweden and Slovenia to the RoW
aggregate because their EU-LFS country surveys do not contain sufficient infor-
mation regarding the country of residence 12 months before the worker was in-
terviewed. Specifically, Ireland does not provide information on the country of
5Once the goods have cleared customs, they can circulate freely or be sold anywhere within
the EU customs territory. Import duties collected by customs remain an important source of in-
come for the EU. In 2013, they represented nearly 11 percent of the EU budget, which amounts
to §15.3 billion. Besides common tariffs, an important aspect of the customs union is the imple-
mentation of common and streamlined procedures across the union regardless of where in the
EU the goods are declared. Reduced time, homogeneity of rules, and lower uncertainty can be
significant factors in boosting trade relationships ((Hummels et al., 2007), (Hummels and Schaur,
2013), (Martincus et al., 2015), (Handley and Limao, 2015)).
6The entry of the new member states into the EU common commercial policy also had an
impact in terms of bargaining power. While all the ten new EU member states were already
part of the WTO before 2004, from 2004 on they participate to the WTO’s activities through the
European Commission. EU trade policy is in fact carried on by the European Commission, on
behalf of the European Union, working closely with the member states and keeping informed the
European Parliament.
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origin for any year in the survey, making it impossible to construct migration
flows from any country in the sample to Ireland. The country surveys for the
Netherlands and Malta are available from 2006 and 2009 onward respectively,
hence after the enlargement of the European Union. The case of Sweden presents
two different problems: first, data before 2005 contain information on the coun-
try of residence 12 months before only if this is Sweden itself. Moreover, in 2005
and 2006 there is no information on the country of origin in the Swedish survey.
Finally, in the Slovenian survey information on the country of origin is available
from 2008 on only.
We also assign Bulgaria, Slovakia, Luxembourg, Romania and Finland to the
RoW due to missing information on the nationality of the workers. More specif-
ically, Romania has information on nationality only from 2004 onward, Bulgaria
has no information on nationality before 2008, Slovakia has no information before
2003 while Finland does not distinguish the nationality of the countries involved
in the 2004 enlargement from the nationality of Bulgaria and Romania, which
entered the European Union in 2007.
C.2.2 Construction of the Data-set on Gross Migration Flows
Data on gross migration flows by country of origin, destination, nationality, skill,
and year are constructed from the micro data of the European Labour Force Sur-
vey (EU-LFS). For each individual surveyed, the questionnaire reports the coun-
try in which the individual resided 12 months before—besides reporting the cur-
rent country of residence, the year and week in which the individual was in-
terviewed, and a sampling weight that makes the survey representative at the
national level. We refer to the country in which the survey was carried out as
“destination”, and to the country in which the interviewed individual was living
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12 months before as “origin”. The questionnaire also reports information regard-
ing the age, education, and nationality of the worker. We focus on individuals
between 15 and 65 years old, and use the information reported to infer if the indi-
vidual is a migrant—in case the country where she resides today is different from
the one she was residing one year before—as well as the origin country, and the
year of migration.
Frequency, Completeness, and Date of Migration
From 1983 to 1997, the European Labour Force Survey was conducted only in
spring (quarter 1 or 2 depending on the country). Since 1998, the transition to a
quarterly continuous survey (with reference weeks spread uniformly throughout
the year) has been gradually conducted by member states. Some countries first
introduced a continuous annual survey (meaning the reference weeks were uni-
formly distributed throughout the spring quarter) and then switched to a quar-
terly collection, whereas others moved directly to a quarterly continuous survey.
For simplicity, we make every survey continuous quarterly. We emphasize that
the reason for doing this is just practical. The procedure outlined below does not
affect our results in any way since our analysis is carried on at the destination-
origin-nationality-skill-year level and the procedure operates instead at the intra-
annual level.
1. For each survey we count the number of weeks in which interviews were
carried on.
2. We multiply the sampling weight associated to each interview by the num-
ber of weeks covered in the survey and divide by 52.
3. We compute a representative week by averaging out the sampling weight
associated to each interview, by destination, origin, and year.
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4. We assign the representative week to any week not originally covered by
the survey, thereby ending up with 52 weeks for each country of destination
and year.
We make three further corrections to the EU-LFS survey. First, in a minority of
instances in some surveys—about 1.8 percent of the individuals, once account-
ing for sampling weights—interviewed individuals could, instead of indicating
the specific country of origin, refer to a broad group.7 When the broad group
is “European Union (EU-15)” we re-assign individuals to each individual EU-15
country proportionally, by destination and year, on the basis of all the other obser-
vations in which information on the specific country of origin is available. When
the broad group is either “Other European Economic Area", "Other Central and
Eastern Europe", or "Other Europe" we re-assign individuals to each individual
NMS country proportionally, by destination and year, on the basis of all the other
observations in which information on the specific country of origin is available.
When the broad group is “Other or stateless” we re-assign, by destination and
year, individuals to the RoW. When the country of origin is missing we re-assign
individuals to all other countries proportionally, by destination and year, on the
basis of all the other observations in which information on the specific country of
origin is available.
Second, for a few destination-origin-year-months the information is not com-
plete. In those cases, we use a standard interpolation procedure when the missing
information is between two years in which we have data, or backward projection
if the missing year is at the beginning of the series.8 Since the analysis carried
7This can also happen because of confidentiality concerns, which may differ on a country-by-
country basis due to national legislation, especially before the country joins the European Union.
8Interpolation is performed for the U.K. in 2008, and France in 2003, 2004 and 2005. Backward
projection is used for Latvia in 2001, 2002 and 2003, Czech Republic in 2001, Italy in 2001, 2002,
2003, and 2004, Slovakia in 2001 and 2002.
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TABLE C.2: Nationality mapping - before 2004
Before 2004
Code Label EU-15 survey NMS8 survey
0 Nationals EU-15 NMS8
111 EU-15 EU-15 EU-15
911 Non EU-15 NMS8 or other ** NMS8 or other **
800 Non-National/Non-Native * EU-15, NMS8 or other ** EU-15, NMS8 or other **
After 2004
0 Nationals EU-15 NMS8
1 EU-15 EU-15 EU-15
2 NMS10 NMS8 NMS8
Multiple codes Other categories Other Other
Notes: * Non-National/Non-Native in case the distinction EU/Non-EU is not possible
** NMS8 using levels of "other" flows based on 2004-8 data, residual belongs to "other"
on in the paper refers to the 2002-2007 period and some of the destination-origin-
year-months with incomplete observations refer to countries that we drop from
the analysis, the potential impact of the interpolations and projections on the re-
sults is even smaller.
Third, the survey does not report the exact date of migration but only the
country in which the interviewed individual was living 12 months before. In
other words, an individual that is interviewed in April of 2006 in the United
Kingdom and declares that 12 months before she was living in Poland could have
migrated out of Poland any time in the previous 12 months. Therefore, we spread
the sampling weight associated to this individual to the previous 12 months.
Nationality
The EU-LFS contains information on the nationality of the interviewed individ-
uals. However, mainly because of country-specific privacy regulations, the vari-
able “nationality” has different categories before and after 2004. Specifically, be-
fore 2004 the variable “nationality” takes only four values: "Nationals" (code 0),
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"EU-15" (code 111), "Non EU-15" (code 911), and "Non-National/Non-Native”
(code 800) in case the distinction EU-15/Non-EU-15 is not available. After 2004,
the category "Non EU-15" has been expanded to distinguish between “New mem-
ber states NMS10” (code 2) and other countries or groups of countries we will
refer to as “other categories”. Our goal is to create the following three nationality
categories: “EU-15”, “NMS10” and “Other”. In order to do so we have to redis-
tribute individuals from the "Non EU-15" category before 2004 into “NMS10” and
"Other", as well as redistribute individuals from the "Non-National/Non-Native”
category before 2004 into “EU-15”, “NMS10” and "Other". We now describe the
procedure to construct the nationality dimension of our migration data.9
In order to construct the nationality we need to deal with the number of people
with nationality "Other" (different from EU-15 and NMS nationals). We assume
that the accession of NMS countries does not affect the flow of "other" nationals
within the EU28. For every destination and origin country pair, and for every
year, we compute the number of "other" nationals for the period 2004 onward. We
then take the simple average—at the destination-origin level— over the period
2004-2008 and we subtract it to the codes 800 and 911 before 2004.10 In practice,
we do the following:
1. For the 800 group, we do a preliminary step: we split the 800 group in EU-15
and non EU-15 nationals using the average 2004-2008 shares of nonEU-15
within non-natives. In practice, we do the following: consider an 800 obser-
vation—for a given destination-origin-year-week—with weight x: the num-
ber of successes, n, from a Binomial with probability equal to the average
share described above and number of experiments equal to x is the number
9After 2004, the surveys for Latvia report the category NMS13 instead of distinguishing be-
tween NMS10 and NMS3. When creating nationalities described below, we use NMS13 in place
of NMS10 for Latvia.
10For destination-origin pairs that appear before 2004 but not after, we assign, for each desti-
nation, the average share across all origins. Note that in more than 99 percent of the cases this
happens when country of origin is missing.
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of "nonEU-15" associated to the observation. Then, x− n is the number of
EU-15 associated to the observation. In other words, we assume that each
person summarized by the observation has an equal and independent prob-
ability of being "nonEU-15". Note that it is important to apply a Binomial
to each observation because we want to preserve the information regarding
the reference week. We will use this information later on when we compute
the emigration shares.
2. Then, for every 911 and 800-turned-nonEU-15 observation, we apply a sim-
ilar procedure to split between NMS8 and "other" nationals. In practice, we
do the following:
(a) We compute the average number of “Other” post 2004 divided by the
sum of the weights of the 911 and 800-turned-nonEU-15 observations.
(b) We consider one of the 911 or 800-turned-nonEU-15 observations—for
a given destination-origin-year-week—with weight x: the number of
successes, n, from a Binomial with probability equal to the average
share described in (a) and number of experiments equal to x is the
number of “other” associated to the observation. Then, x − n is the
number of NMS8 nationals associated to the observation. In other
words, we assume that each person summarized by the observation
has an equal and independent probability of being “other”. Note that,
here as well, it is important to apply a Binomial to each observation
because we want to preserve the information regarding the reference
week. We will use this information later on when we compute the em-
igration shares.
We define 3 nationalities, “EU-15”, “NMS10” and “Other” based on table C.2.
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The Case of Poland The variable nationality for Poland is available only since
2004 and it only includes three codes: 0 “National / Native of own Country”, 5
“EU28”, and 8 “Europe outside EU28”. In order to separate EU-15 from NMS10
nationals, we construct an alternative nationality variable for Poland applying
the origin-year-specific shares of EU-15, NMS10, and Other nationals computed
for Hungary to the survey for Poland. We choose Hungary as a reference because,
just like Poland and unlike other NMS countries, it applies reciprocal measures
to EU-15 nationals. Poland lifted the reciprocal measures on January 1st, 2007,
while Hungary simplified the reciprocal measures on January 1st, 2008.
Education
The EU-LFS contains information on the education level of the interviewed indi-
viduals. Each individual is assigned an education level according to the Interna-
tional Standard Classification of Education (ISCED 1997). We use the ISCED clas-
sification to split individuals into two education levels, defining as high-skilled
all the individuals with at least tertiary education. We assign to the low-skilled
group the residual workers with education up to post secondary non-tertiary ed-
ucation. When information on education is missing, we proceed as follows: if in
a destination-origin-year-week we only observe individuals with either high skill
(low skill) or missing education, we assume all the individuals with missing ed-
ucation to be low-skilled (high-skilled). If in a destination-origin-year-week we
observe individuals with high skill, low skill and missing education, we propor-
tionally split the missings to high and low skill. Finally, if for a destination-origin-
year-week we do not have any information on education, we proportionally as-
sign education using the average annual shares of high and low skill migrants for
that same destination-origin-year or destination-origin.
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Stocks and Flows
Our goal is to construct a data set of migration flows that is internally consistent.
Let’s consider a given nationality-skill pair. For each country-sector-year pair
(i, v, t) we potentially have two separate measures of the stock of individuals: the
first measure comes directly from the EU-LFS (i, t) survey; the second measure
can be constructed from the set of EU-LFS {(i, t+ 1)}i surveys for the following
year. For example, the Polish survey of 2006 provides a measure of the number of
low-skill NMS nationals working in sector v in Poland in 2006. However, another
measure can be constructed using the surveys for all countries in 2007—includ-
ing the survey for Poland—reporting immigrants that were working in sector v
in Poland the year before. Let’s define the first measure as SPL,v06 and the sec-
ond measure as S˜PL,v06 . If S
PL,v
06 > S˜
PL,v
06 we can conjecture that the difference(
SPL,v06 − S˜PL,v06
)
captures migrants from Poland to the RoW. To the contrary, if
SPL,v06 < S˜
PL,v
06 we can replace S
PL,v
06 with S˜
PL,v
06 , and adjust the migration flows
between t− 1 and t accordingly. The following algorithm captures this idea.
1. Consider a given nationality, skill level, time interval t ∈ [0, ...,T ], and set
of countries i ∈ {EU ,NMS,ROW} where EU is the set of our 10 EU coun-
tries, NMS is the set of our 7 NMS countries, and ROW is a residual set of
countries (that must be commonly defined in each survey).
2. Let Si,vt be the stock of people in country i-sector v-year t according to coun-
try i survey in year t. Let F ijuvt−1,t be the flow of migrants from sector u in
country i to sector v in country j between t− 1 and t according to country j
survey in year t.
3. Consider t = T .
(a) For each country and sector iu in t = T − 1, it must be the case that
either
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i. SiuT−1 > ∑j ∑v F
ijuv
T−1,T (the stock is higher than the sum of the out-
flows) or
ii. SiuT−1 < ∑j ∑v F
ijuv
T−1,T (the stock is lower than the sum of the out-
flows).
(b) In the first case, we assume that the difference between the stock and
the flows represents migration from i to ROW. In order to determine
the sector of destination we use the average matrix for all other desti-
nations, i.e.
F˜ iROWuvT−1,T =
(
SiuT−1 −∑
j
∑
v
F ijuvT−1,T
)
∑
j 6=ROW
[(
F ijuvT−1,T/∑
v
F ijuvT−1,T
)]
/17
for all v. Housekeeping: We also set F˜ ijuvT−1,T = F
ijuv
T−1,T for all j 6= ROW ,
and S˜iuT−1 = S
iu
T−1.
(c) In the second case:
i. We trust the flows and update the stock in T − 1, i.e. we set S˜iuT−1 =
SiuT−1 +
[(
∑j ∑v F
ijuv
T−1,T
)
− SiuT−1
]
;
ii. We also update the inflows, between T − 2 and T − 1 to be consis-
tent with the new stock S˜jvT−1. We do so by assigning the difference
between S˜jvT−1 and S
jv
T−1 to inflows from ROW. In order to deter-
mine the sector of origin we use the average matrix for all other
countries of origin, i.e.
F˜ROWjuvT−1,T =
(
S˜jvT−1 − SivT−1
)
∑
i 6=ROW
[(
F ijuvT−1,T/∑
u
F ijuvT−1,T
)]
/17
for all u. Housekeeping: We also set F˜ ijuvT−1,T = F
ijuv
T−1,T for all j 6=
ROW , and F˜ iROWuvT−1,T = 0 for all uv.
(d) Housekeeping: we set S˜ivT = S
iv
T for all i 6= ROW .
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4. Consider now t = T − 1 and loop back to point 3.
After having performed the algorithm described above, we have the flows of mi-
grants for each pair of countries-sectors as well as the stock of people in each
country, sector, and year, but we do not have information on the stock of peo-
ple in the RoW, as well as their distribution across sectors. We use information
on population levels and on the share of population between 15 and 64 years
old from the World Bank World Development Indicators database to construct
the stock of people in the rest of world in 2002.11 We further use the average
year-nationality-skill-sector share from our 17 countries (EU members plus NMS
countries) and apply them to the RoW population to split people in the relevant
groups for our analysis.
Some destination-origin-nationality-skill-year sequences of migration flows
consists in sequences of zeros followed by positive values. While sequences of
tiny values followed by larger flows do not represent an issue, sequences of zeros
followed by positive values cannot be handled by the model. We perform the
following procedure to, essentially, replace zeros with small positive values. We
start from the stock of individuals in 2002, which includes three zeros: high skill
EU nationals in Estonia and Latvia, and low skill EU nationals in Lithuania. We
compute the average ratio of low to high skill EU nationals across NMS countries
and apply the (inverse) ratio to the stock of high (low) skill to turn the zeros into
positive values. Then we consider the migration shares and set them to be equal
to the average migration share by year, nationality and skill group across coun-
tries if the migration share is equal to zero. In case the average migration share is
missing, we compute the average across years. At the end of this procedure, we
use the new migration shares and the new stock for 2002 to recompute the stocks
11Total population is based on the de facto definition of population, which counts all residents
regardless of legal status or citizenship. The values used are midyear estimates.
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and flows by skill, nationality, origin, destination and year. At the end of the pro-
cedure described above, we have a set of flows of workers by country of origin,
destination, nationality and skill in each year and a consistent set of stocks. We
perform a number of checks that confirm that the share of population by desti-
nation, as well as the change in the share of population between 2002 and 2007,
again by destination, is not significantly affected.
Migration Data Checks
In this appendix, we provide some external validation for our constructed gross
migration data. First, we compare the final migration data set with the raw data
in terms of (i) the share of each country population relative to the aggregate pop-
ulation, and (ii) the ratio between low and high skill workers. In terms of the
share of each country population relative to the aggregate population we find
that the correlation between the raw and final data is 0.998 in 2002, the first year
in the sample. The correlation between the 2002-2007 changes of the same shares
is 0.542. In terms of the ratio of low to high skill workers, the cross-country cor-
relation between the raw and final data is 0.996, while the correlation between
the 2002-2007 changes is 0.865. Overall, we conclude that the data comparison in
terms of population shares and skill ratio is quite satisfactory.
Second, we compare the migration data set with migration information com-
ing from alternative data sources: Statistics Denmark and the UK Office for Na-
tional Statistics. As mentioned above, it is not easy to find accessible and com-
parable migration data. The UK is of particular interest given the role it played
in the 2004 EU enlargement, while Denmark is particularly well known for col-
lecting precise statistical information. We find that the correlation between the
immigration shares into Denmark, by year and country of origin, based on Statis-
tics Denmark information and based on our data is 0.79 for the 2003-2007 period.
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FIGURE C.2: Top migration destinations from Poland, share of NMS
nationals by skill, 2002-2007
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Note: These figures show the migration share out of Poland for low-skill and high skill
NMS nationals for the top 3 migration destinations in 2002 or 2007, plus the aggregate
share for all other EU countries.
The correlation between the UK Office for National Statistics aggregate inflow of
migrants from NMS and the inflow based on our data is 0.93 for the 2003-2007
period.12
12Denmark: Statistics Denmark series on immigration by sex, age, citizenship, country of last
residence and time are published in the StatBank, INDVAN time series. These data include per-
sons who took up residence in Denmark and who had resided abroad before. The data come from
the CPR, the central population register. We select people between 15 and 64 years, aggregate the
data by year and country of origin, and build immigration shares by dividing by the correspond-
ing Denmark population from the World Bank World Development Indicators database. UK:
We use the UK Office for National Statistics “Revised Net Long-Term International Migration”
time series. These data include long-term migrants, i.e. those that change their usual country of
residence. The primary data source is the International Passanger Survey (IPS), a continuous vol-
untary survey conducted at all principal air and sea routes and the channel tunnel. Slovenia and
Slovakia are included in the UK Office for National Statistics sample but not in our data, while
Cyprus is included in our data but not in the UK Office for National Statistics sample.
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Finally, we use our migration data set to investigate a number of specific
migration patterns that have either been documented in the literature, or that
have been prominently featured in the press and are part of the public aware-
ness. We focus on three migration routes: (i) from Poland to Germany/UK, (ii)
Portugal to France, and (iii) Italy to Germany/France/UK. The 2011 German
Census reports that about 2.7 million people whose country of birth is Poland
live in Germany.13 While Germany has been, for several reasons throughout
history, the main European destination for Polish emigrants, (Dustmann et al.,
2015) notes that ”Whereas Germany was the main destination in 1997, absorb-
ing about 27 percent of the Polish emigrant population, the largest destination
country in 2007 was the UK (with 31 percent of all emigrants).”14 Figure C.2,
using our data on migration flows, clearly shows the leapfrogging of Germany
by the UK in terms of main European destination for emigration, both for low-
skilled and high-skilled NMS nationals. Just like for Poland, a large fraction of the
Portuguese population lives abroad, and France has traditionally been the main
European destination for Portuguese migrants.15 The 2011 French Census reports
that about 6 percent of the Portuguese population lives in France. After France,
the other top four countries in terms of Portuguese-born people in 2011 are Spain,
Luxembourg, Germany, and Belgium. Our data set on gross flows of migrants
for the 2002-2007 period confirms this ranking. The third case we consider fea-
tures another country which has experienced throughout history large outflows
of population: Italy. According to the 2011 Italian Census, the top four countries
in terms of stock of Italian-born population are France, Germany, Switzerland,
13The 2011 Population and Housing Census marks a milestone in census exercises in Europe.
For the first time, European legislation defined in detail a set of harmonized high-quality data
from the population and housing censuses conducted in the EU Member States.
14The figures mentioned in (Dustmann et al., 2015)’s quote come from the Polish Labour Force
Survey, a rotating quarterly panel conducted in Poland by the Polish Central Statistical Office. The
survey registers the country of present residence for individuals who are part of the household
but who have been residing abroad for more than 3 months.
15The New York Times article “Pictures Tell the Story of Portuguese in France” captures the
importance of the Portuguese presence in France in the 1960s.
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and the United Kingdom. Once again, with the exclusion of Switzerland our
data is entirely consistent with the information coming from the census.
C.2.3 Bilateral Trade
The bilateral trade flows between each state in the sample are computed using
information from the WIOD database ((Timmer et al., 2015a)). We keep the set
of countries consistent with the migration data and we pool all the remaining
countries in the rest of the world. Values are in US dollars at current prices.
Table C.3 shows the share of NMS, EU-15, and Rest of the World, into ei-
ther NMS or EU-15 imports or exports. The table points to three patterns. First,
the larger trade integration among NMS countries, whose average weight into
imports or exports increases by 60 and 50 percent, respectively within 5 years.
Second, the larger weight of NMS in EU-15’s trade, which increases by about
30 percent, within 5 years. Third, both EU-15 and NMS countries tend to trade
more with the Rest of the World, and less with EU-15 countries themselves. All
patterns are consistent with the reductions in tariffs, between EU-15 and NMS,
among NMS countries, and between EU and the Rest of the World discussed in
Section 3.2.2.
Tariffs
The bilateral tariff data are constructed using the information in the WITS database.
We use effectively applied rates and we combine information from two different
datasets, the TRAINS data set and the WTO data set; the two datasets are compat-
ible because TRAINS combines information from different sources, among which
WTO data. We start from the TRAINS data set, which is the most complete of the
two and we proceed as follows to make the series complete:
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TABLE C.3: Imports and exports shares, EU-15 and NMS, 2002 and
2007
Imports shares
NMS importing from: EU-15 importing from:
Other NMS EU-15 RoW NMS Other EU-15 RoW
2002 5.7 52.6 41.7 3.9 46.9 49.2
2007 9.1 48.0 43.0 5.2 42.3 52.5
Change +3.4 -4.6 +1.3 +1.3 -4.6 +3.3
Exports shares
NMS exporting to: EU-15 exporting to:
Other NMS EU-15 RoW NMS Other EU-15 RoW
2002 6.2 54.6 39.2 3.8 43.8 52.4
2007 9.3 50.1 40.6 4.9 40.8 54.3
Change +3.1 -4.5 +1.4 +1.1 -3.0 +1.9
Notes: This table shows the weighted average imports and exports shares for NMS
and EU-15 countries. Averages have been constructed using the WTO and TRAINS
tariff data, as described in Section 3.4 and Appendix C.2.3, using the same set of ten
EU-15 countries and seven NMS countries as in our data set on gross migration
flows. The remaining countries are aggregated into the Rest of the World (RoW).
1. Use average EU-25 tariff applied to NMS8 to replace missing tariff when the
destination country of the exported good is a EU-15 country and the origin
belongs to the NMS8 group.
2. Use average EU27 tariff applied to NMS2 to replace missing tariff when the
destination country of the exported good is a EU-15 country and the origin
country belongs to the NMS2 group.
3. If the two criteria above do not fill the missing cells:
(a) Use WTO values to impute Trains values if WTO is not missing
(b) Missing values for 2003 are replaced with values from 2002. This could
happen because some NMS lowered their tariff before the formal ac-
cess to the European Union. We do not replace the missing values with
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FIGURE C.3: Tariffs data
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zeros, but we impute the non-zero value of the previous year.
(c) If we have missings in one year, we interpolate using the values of the
year before. This is the case for Lithuania in 2000.
(d) If all the values for a country are missing, we construct an average tariff
of similar countries and impute that value. This is the case for Latvia
for which we do not observe tariffs when exporters goods abroad; we
thus use the average tariffs applied to the exports of Lithuania and
Estonia.
We follow the same procedure using simple tariffs and weighted tariffs—where
weights are given by the amount of exports—and we obtain two complete sets of
tariffs for each country in our sample over time.
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Figure C.3 reports the comparison among the simple and weighted average
TRAIN tariff, the WTO tariff, and the tariff we construct using the methodology
described above.
C.2.4 Real Wages Share of Labor Compensation in Value Added
We compute the share of labor compensation in value added at the national level
using information from the socio economic accounts in the WIOD database. To
construct the series of real wages we use the information on the price levels of the
countries in our sample from the Penn World Tables. We use the variable "Price
level of CCON, equal to the PPP (ratio of nominal CON to CCON) divided by the
nominal exchange rate (National currency per USD)" which in other words is just
the ratio of expenditure at local prices to that at reference prices measured in the
currency of the base country—in our case the US.
Because the PPP is in units of the currency of country j per unit of the currency
of the base country, it is common to divide it by the nominal exchange rate to
obtain what is called the “price level” of country j (see (Feenstra et al., 2015)).
Moreover, we the WIOD database provides also information on the employment
level of each country over time, which constitutes the denominator of the formula
for real wages.
C.2.5 Portuguese Matched Employer-Employee Data
Employer-employee data come from Quadros de Pessoal, a longitudinal data set
matching virtually all firms and workers based in Portugal.16 Reported data
16Public administration and non-market services are excluded. Quadros de Pessoal has been
used by, among others, \cite{Cabral03} to study the evolution of the firm size distribution; by
\cite{Blanchard01} to compare the U.S. and Portuguese labor markets in terms of unemploy-
ment duration and worker flows; by \cite{Cardoso05} to study the determinants of both the
contractual wage and the wage cushion (difference between contractual and actual wages); by
\cite{Carneiro12} who, in a related study, analyze how wages of newly hired workers and of ex-
isting employees react differently to the business cycle; by \cite{Martins09c} to study the effect
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cover the firm itself, as well as each of its workers. Each firm and each worker
entering the database are assigned a unique, time-invariant identifying number
which can be used to follow firms and workers over time.
Currently, the data set collects data on about 350,000 firms and 3 million em-
ployees. Each year, every firm with wage earners is legally obliged to fill in a
standardized questionnaire. Reported data cover the firm itself, each of its plants,
and each of its workers. The worker-level data cover information on all personnel
working for the reporting firms in a reference week. They include information on
gender, age, occupation, schooling, hiring date, earnings, hours worked (normal
and overtime), etc. The information on earnings includes the base wage (gross
pay for normal hours of work), seniority-indexed components of pay, other reg-
ularly paid components, overtime work, and irregularly paid components.17 It
does not include employer’s contributions to social security.
The administrative nature of the data and their public availability at the work-
place—as required by the law—imply a high degree of coverage and reliability.
The public availability requirement facilitates the work of the services of the Min-
istry of Employment that monitor the compliance of firms with the law (e.g., ille-
gal work).
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FIGURE C.1: Log odds of migrating to the U.K. vs. staying in a NMS
country for NMS nationals, treatment and control flows, 2002-2007
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Note: Treatment flows in solid red, control flows in dashed blue. The pink vertical
dashed line marks the beginning of the treatment period.
C.3 Change in Migration Costs: Placebo Plots and
Residual Cases
In Section 3.4.1, we described the methodology used to identify changes in migra-
tion costs for the main events in our sample period: the United Kingdom open-
ing to NMS countries in 2004, followed by Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal in
2006, and NMS countries opening their respective labor markets to each other
and (mostly) to EU-15 countries in 2004. We also ran a number of placebo ex-
periments to support our identification strategy. In this appendix we provide
additional support for the identification strategy by showing, in sub-appendix
of employment protection on worker flows and firm performance. See these papers also for a
description of the peculiar features of the Portuguese labor market.
17It is well known that employer-reported wage information is subject to less measurement er-
ror than worker-reported data. Furthermore, the Quadros de Pessoal registry is routinely used by
the inspectors of the Ministry of Employment to monitor whether the firm wage policy complies
with the law.
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FIGURE C.2: Log odds of migrating to
Greece/Italy/Spain/Portugal vs. staying in a NMS country
for NMS nationals, treatment and control flows, 2002-2007
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C.3.1, a series of plots that allow to evaluate the common trend assumption. Sub-
appendix C.3.2 reports similar plots for the placebo experiments.
C.3.1 Common Trend Assumption
Figure C.1 shows the evolution over time of the (log) odds of migrating vs. stay-
ing (equation 3.10) for the treated and control groups of NMS nationals. The
treated group is represented by the NMS to U.K. flow of NMS nationals, with the
treatment period being after 2003. The control group is represented by the NMS
to EU-5 and EU-5 to U.K. flows of NMS nationals. The figure clearly conveys two
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messages: First the odds for both the treated and control groups were increas-
ing before the 2004 enlargement; second, when comparing the pre-treatment and
treatment periods, the change in the odds of migrating is clearly positive for the
treated group and close to zero for the control group. These patterns are con-
sistent with a substantial reduction in migration costs from NMS to the United
Kingdom.
Turning to the southern European destinations, Figure C.2 reports the evolu-
tion of the (log) odds for Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal—with the treatment
period being after 2005. Overall, the comparison between the log odds of the
treatment and the control groups before the policy changes confirms that the con-
trol groups represent a good measure of counterfactual log odds in the absence of
a policy change. Except for the case of Greece, the odds of migrating vs. staying
decreases, from the pre-treatment to the treatment period, both for the control
and the treated groups but significantly less for the latter, pointing to a positive
contribution associated to a reduction in migration costs.
C.3.2 Placebo Experiment
As shown in Section 3.2.1, a placebo experiment confirms the prior that EU na-
tionals did not experience any significant change in the cost of migrating back to
Europe from NMS countries. Figure C.3 reports the evolution of the (log) odds
for the treated and control groups.
C.4 International Migration Elasticity
In this appendix we describe in detail the estimation method used to find the in-
ternational migration elasticity in Section 3.4.2. We estimate the international mi-
gration elasticity, 1/ν, by adapting the method presented in (Artuç and McLaren,
271
FIGURE C.3: Log odds of migrating vs. staying for EU nation-
als (Placebo), from NMS countries to Greece/Italy/Spain/Portugal,
treatment and control, 2002-2007
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2015) to our theory and data. The method has two stages: first the Poisson regres-
sion stage where we estimate value differences and the migration cost function,
normalized by ν, for every time period. Second, the Bellman equation stage,
where we insert the estimated value differences into a Bellman equation and con-
struct a linear regression to retrieve the international migration elasticity, 1/ν.18
18Since we estimate the elasticity using only flows of EU nationals within EU-15 we drop the n
subscript.
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The estimation method relies on the following two equilibrium conditions
from the model: the migration share equation
µijt,s =
[
exp
(
βV jt+1,s −mijt,s
)]1/ν
∑Nk=1
[
exp
(
βV kt+1,s −mikt,s
)]1/ν , (C.1)
and the Bellman equation
V it,s = log
(
Cit,s
)
+ ν log
[
∑Nk=1
[
exp
(
βV kt+1,s −mikt,s
)]1/ν]
=
= log
(
wit,s/P
i
t
)
+ βEtV it+1,s +Ω
i
t,s,
(C.2)
where
Cit,s =
wit,s
P it
is the consumption aggregator, and
Ωit,s = ν log∑Nk=1
[
exp
(
β
(
V kt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mikt,s
)]1/ν
is the option value of migration.
First stage: Poisson regression The first stage is a fixed-effect estimation—based
on the migration share equation and bilateral gross migration flows data—to es-
timate value differences and the migration cost function normalized by ν.
The estimating equation can be derived as follows. In the migration share
equation (C.1), multiply both numerator and denominator on the right hand side
by
[
exp
(
−βV it+1,s
)]1/ν
,
µijt,s =
[
exp
(
β
(
V jt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mijt,s
)]1/ν
∑Nk=1
[
exp
(
β
(
V kt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mikt,s
)]1/ν .
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Then multiply both sides by the mass of agents Lit,s,
Lit,sµ
ij
t,s =
[
exp
(
β
(
V jt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mijt,s
)]1/ν
∑Nk=1
[
exp
(
β
(
V kt+1,s − V it+1,s
)
−mikt,s
)]1/νLit,s,
and rewrite as
Lit,sµ
ij
t,s = exp
(
β
ν
V jt+1,s −
β
ν
V it+1,s −
1
ν
mijt,s + logL
i
t,s −
1
ν
Ωit,s
)
. (C.3)
We interpret the equation above as Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood. The
first stage regression is then
Zijt,s = exp
(
λjt,s + α
i
t,s −
1
ν
mijt,s
)
+ εijt,s, (C.4)
where Zijt,s = L
i
t,sµ
ij
t,s asymptotically is the mass of agents with skill s moving
from i to j in t, λjt,s is a destination-skill-time fixed effect, α
i
t,s is an origin-skill-
time fixed effect.
The estimation of (C.4) can be done pooling the observations associated to all
years and skills in the data. Since we estimate the migration elasticity using only
flows of EU nationals within EU-15 we assume that bilateral migration costs do
not vary over time and skills, that is mijt,s = m
ij for all {t, s} pairs. Note, however,
that the cost of migrating out of country i, and into country j, is still potentially
skill-dependent because of αit,s, and λ
j
t,s, respectively. Finally, ε
ij
t,s is a random
disturbance of relative migration costs.
The λjt,s and α
i
t,s terms are not separately identified, so without loss of gener-
ality we set λ1t,s = 0 (or equivalently choose cell λ
1
t,s as the omitted category for
the fixed effects). Similarly, not all mij are separately identified, so without loss
of generality we set allmi,1 andm1j to zero. Overall, this is equivalent to defining
the destination-skill-time fixed effects as
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λjt,s =
β
ν
(
EtV
j
t+1,s −EtV 1t+1,s
)
− 1
ν
m1j , (C.5)
and the origin-skill-time fixed effects as
αit,s = −
β
ν
(
EtV
i
t+1,s −EtV 1t+1,s
)
+ logLit,s −
1
ν
Ωit,s −
1
ν
mi,1.
Note that the migration option value for an agent with skill s living in country
i in year t can be written as
1
ν
Ωit,s = −λit,s − αit,s + logLit,s −
1
ν
(
mi,1 −m1j
)
. (C.6)
Analogously to (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006), we use Poisson Pseudo Maximum
Likelihood (PPML) to estimate equation (C.4). This implies that, if we write the
estimating equation (C.4) in the form W ijt,s = exp
(
xijt,sγt,s
)
+ εijt,s, where x
ij
t,s is a
vector of dummy variables and γt,s is the vector of parameters to be estimated,
then we choose the parameters to solve the first-order condition
∑
t
∑
ij
[
W ijt,s − exp
(
xijt,sγt,s
)]
xijt,s = 0.
Second stage: Bellman equation In stage 1 we have estimated the destination-
skill-time and origin-skill-time fixed effects λjt,s and α
i
t,s. The second stage rewrites
the Bellman equation (C.2) as an estimating equation using the estimated values
from the first stage.
Using (C.2), we can write
β
ν
EtV
i
t+1,s =
β
ν
[
log
(
wit+1,s
P it+1
)
+ βEtV it+2,s +Ω
i
t+1,s
]
.
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Using (C.6) to substitute out the continuation value Ωit+1,s, and using the expres-
sion for the destination-skill-time fixed effects (C.5), we get
λit,s +
β
νEtV
1
t+1,s +
1
νm
1,i = βν log
(
wit+1,s
P it+1
)
+β
2
ν EtV
1
t+2,s − βαit+1,s + β logLit+1,s − βν
(
mi,1 −m1,i) . (C.7)
Define
φit,s = λ
i
t,s + βα
i
t+1,s − β logLit+1,s, (C.8)
and
ξt,s =
β2
ν
EtV
1
t+2,s −
β
ν
EtV
1
t+1,s,
and rewrite (C.7) as
φit,s = ξt,s + κ
i +
β
ν
log
(
wit+1,s
P it+1
)
+ it,s, (C.9)
where φit,s is the dependent variable constructed from Stage 1 estimates using
(C.8), ξt,s is a time-skill dummy, κi = − (β/ν)
(
mi,1 −m1,i) is a country fixed
effect, and it,s is the regression residual. The remaining right hand-side variables
are all taken from the data: log
(
wit+1,s/P
i
t+1
)
is the (log) real wage; log
(
Lit+1
)
is
the lead of the (log) population in country i. We estimate (C.9) as an IV regression,
using two-period lagged values of real wages as instruments similar to (Artuç
et al., 2010), and clustering standard errors at the country level.
We build wages, for each country i and year t ∈ [2002− 2009], as the ratio of
the economy-wide “Labour compensation” (in millions of national currency) and
“Number of persons engaged” (in thousands) from the WIOD Socio-Economic
Accounts (SEA) data set ((Timmer et al., 2015b)). Then, we use the purchasing-
power-parity adjusted real exchange rate from version 9.0 of the Penn World
Tables to compare wages across countries and time ((Feenstra et al., 2015)). To
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TABLE D.1: International Migration Elasticity, Second Stage Esti-
mates
Baseline With public good
1/ν 0.44
***
(0.13)
0.53***
(0.14)
Obs. 100 100
Notes: Standard errors clustered at the
country-level in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p<0.01
compute wages by skill level we resort once again to the WIOD Socio-Economic
Accounts: The high-skilled wage is computed by applying the high-skilled share
of labor compensation and the high-skilled share of total hours; we convert hours
into persons by assuming that the number of hours per person does not vary with
skills.
Table (D.1) reports the second stage IV estimates for 1/ν for β = 0.97 for
the baseline case and for the extension with public good described below. The
estimates for alternative values of β = {0.90, 0.95} are the same up to the second
decimal digit.
C.4.1 Estimation with Public Goods
In section 3.5.2 of the main text we extended our model to account for additional
congestion effects coming from the provision of public goods. It turns out that
this extension only slightly modifies the methodology for the estimation of the
international migration elasticity outlined above. The first stage, based on the mi-
gration share equation, is unchanged. The second stage relies on a modified Bell-
man equation that includes the per capita provision of public goods
(
Gi/Lit+1
)
,
weighted by the fraction of public goods in total consumption (αi ), as well as
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wages net of labor income taxes,
β
ν
EtV
i
t+1,s =
β
ν

αi log
(
Gi/Lit+1
)
+ (1− αi) log
[(
1− τ it+1
) wit+1,s
P it+1
]
+βEtV it+2,s +Ω
i
t+1,s
 .
Following the same steps outlined above for the case without public good, it is
easy to obtain the estimating equation
φit,s = ξt,s + κ
i +
β
ν
{
−αi logLit+1 + (1− αi) log
[(
1− τ it+1
) wit+1,s
P it+1
]}
+ it,s,
(C.10)
where the country fixed effect is now defined as
κi = (β/ν)αi logGi − (β/ν)
(
mi,1 −m1,i). In terms of data, we need to compute
the fraction of public goods in total consumption αi, which we construct using the
WIOD World Input-Output Database, and we need information on labor income
taxes. In order to compute net real wages we resort to the OECD Tax Database,
which provides data on combined central and sub-central government income
tax plus employee social security contribution, as a percentage of gross wage
earnings, for people whose income is 100 percent of the average wage ((OECD,
2016)). In the OECD Tax Database the average wage is defined as the average an-
nual gross wage earnings of adult, full-time, manual and non-manual workers.
Data are available for each year for 14 countries in our sample, all except Lithua-
nia, Latvia and Cyprus. For these three countries we compute the tax rate as the
average of the tax rate for all the other NMS countries, by year.
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C.5 Elasticity of Substitution Between Low- and High-
Skilled Workers
In Section 3.4.3 we provided an estimate of the elasticity of substitution between
low and high-skilled workers. To construct the data, we consider all industries
in the economy except for agriculture and fishing, international organizations,
and government and justice. We consider all single-job workers between 18 and
65 years old, working no more than 480 hours per month, earning at least the
minimum wage, excluding apprentices and workers for which no information
on education is available. We trim the top and bottom 1 percent of workers ac-
cording to the distribution of hourly wages in each year. We end up with 25.7
millions observations that we aggregate into skill-year groups to construct hours.
To construct the average wage in each cell we use a more selective sample that
includes only employees with a permanent contract, working at least 35 hours
per week. The average weekly wage in a skill-year cell is constructed by using
only the base wage, and then taking the weighted average over workers where
the weights are the regular hours worked by the individual. Wages are deflated
to 2005 using Statistics Portugal monthly consumer price index by special aggre-
gates that we convert to annual. In order to classify workers as “displaced” we
partly follow (Carneiro and Portugal, 2006) and define a firm as shutting down
after year t when the firm is observed in the Quadros de Pessoal data in year t but
is not observed in the dataset in any of the three subsequent years. If a firm is last
active in t we record the total regular hours worked by its low- and high-skilled
workers in t and use these hours to construct the instrument for t+ 1.19
Table E.1 reports the estimates, which are all significant at 1 percent. Employ-
ing the IV methodology and data outlined above, we obtain an elasticity of 4,
19We construct the lead because the information reported in Quadros de Pessoal is collected in
October of every year from 1994 on (before that it was collected in March).
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which is the number we use in our quantitative analysis. Our estimate is slightly
above those commonly found for the U.S. ((Katz and Murphy, 1992), (Johnson,
1997), (Krusell et al., 2000b), (Ottaviano and Peri, 2012a), (Ciccone and Peri, 2005))
which range between 1.5 and 2.5, but below the elasticity of substitution of 5 be-
tween low- and medium-skilled workers found for Germany ((Dustmann et al.,
2009)). Since the set of European countries we consider in the quantitative anal-
ysis is pretty diverse in terms of labor market institutions and workforce charac-
teristics we consider our benchmark estimate of 4 as a good compromise.
The estimate of the elasticity of substitution turns out to be pretty robust to al-
ternative different specifications, methodologies, and levels of data aggregation.
Table E.1 reports an alternative set of estimates using OLS with linear or spline
(with break in 1993) trends, at the industry-region and country-level. It also re-
ports a set of estimates based on an alternative way to construct the data series
for hours and wages based on (Autor et al., 2008). In this case we construct a fix-
weighted ratio of high-skill to low-skill wages for a composition-constant set of
sex-education-experience groups. To do that, we regress monthly deflated wages,
for each sex and year, on five education categories (3 years or less, between 4 and
6 years, between 7 and 9 years, between 10 and 12 years, and 13 years and above),
a quartic in experience (defined as age minus 6 minus the number of education
years), and all the interactions between the education dummies and the quartic in
experience. The predicted wages for each sex-education-experience-year group
are then aggregated at the skill-year level with a constant set of weights based
on the aggregate hours shares of each group. The series for hours is constructed
by aggregating at the skill-year level the series for total regular hours worked by
sex, five education groups and experience. The aggregation employs a series of
weights to turn hours into efficiency units. Weights are constructed by normaliz-
ing the predicted wages described above by the top wage across cells. Estimates
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TABLE E.1: Elasticity of substitution between low- and high-skill workers, Portuguese
matched employer-employee data
Ind.-region-level Country-level Country-level(compos.-adjusted)
Elasticity R2 Obs. Elasticity R2 Obs. Elasticity R2 Obs.
IV 4.0 0.84 180
Linear trend 5.2 0.94 210 4.2 0.97 14 3.6 0.97 14
Spline 3.7 0.92 210 3.1 0.98 14 3.0 0.99 14
Notes:All estimates are significant at 1 percent. All industry-region-level estimates include
industry-region fixed effects. Industry-region-level OLS estimates include industry-region-specific
trends.
for the elasticity of substitution, using different types of trends turn out to be
slightly smaller, but overall pretty similar to all the others.
C.6 Equilibrium Conditions of the Temporary Equi-
librium in Changes
In this appendix, we describe the equilibrium conditions of the production struc-
ture in relative time differences. As in the main text, let y˙t+1 ≡ yt+1/yt denote the
relative time change of a variable and by yˆt+1 ≡ y˙′t+1/y˙t+1 the relative time differ-
ence of the variable under a sequence of policies {Υ ′t}∞t=0 relative to the sequence
of policies {Υt}∞t=0. Also, let’s define ωs,t = ws,t (rt)γ
i/(1−γi).
The cost of the bundle of inputs and the price index in relative time differences
are
xˆit =
ξ ′ih,t−1
(
ω˙
′i
h,t
)1−ρ
+ ξ
′i
l,t−1
(
ω˙
′i
l,t
)1−ρ
ξih,t−1
(
ω˙ih,t
)1−ρ
+ ξil,t−1
(
ω˙il,t
)1−ρ

(1−γi)
1−ρ
,
Pˆ it =
(
∑Nj=1pi
′ij
t−1p˙i
ij
t Aˆ
j
t (κˆ
ij
t xˆ
j
t )
−θ
)− 1θ ,
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while the bilateral expenditure shares in relative time differences are
pˆiijt =
(
κˆijt xˆ
j
t
Pˆ it
)−θ
Aˆjt .
The share of high-skilled labor in the counterfactual equilibrium is given by
ξi
′
s,t = ξ
i
s,t−1
(
ω˙
′i
s,t
)1−ρ
(
x˙
′i
t
) 1−ρ
1−γi
.
Total expenditure in the counterfactual equilibrium is given by
X
′i
t = Ξ
(
ω˙′h,t
)1−γi (
ξ˙
′i
h,t
)γi (
L˙
′i
h,t
)1−γi
w
′i
h,t−1L
′i
h,t−1+
(
ω˙′l,t
)1−γi (
ξ˙
′i
l,t
)γi (
L˙
′i
l,t
)1−γi
w
′i
l,t−1L
′i
l,t−1 + ι
iχ′t,
with Ξ = 1
∑Nj=1
pi
′ij
t
(1+τ
′ij
t )
and χ′t = ∑Ni=1
(
ω˙
′i
h,t
)(
L˙
′i
h,t
ξ˙
′i
h,t
)1−γ
rit−1H
i.
Finally, the labor market condition of high-skilled labor is
ω˙
′i
s,t =
 1(
ξ˙
′i
s,t
)γi (
L˙
′i
s,t
)1−γi
(
(1− γi)ξ ′is,t
w
′i
s,t−1L
′i
s,t−1
∑Nj=1
pi
′ji
t X
′j
t
τ
′ji
t
) 11−γi .
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Appendix D
Appendix to chapter 4
D.1 Spatial Autoregressive Model
The decision of not using a Spatial error model has a theoretical foundation that
lies in the economic theory behind our analysis.
The use of a Spatial "y" model ("spatially lagged dependent variable", (Anselin,
2002)), such as a spatial autoregressive model (SAR) or a spatial lags model (SL)
would have been inconsistent because very difficult to justify with theory: it is
obscure how the electoral outcome in a certain municipality influences simulta-
neously the electoral outcome in other municipalities net of a number of controls.
Effectively, it can happen that a general factor (i.e. the regional governance) in-
fluences the votes of people living in neighboring municipalities, but this effect
should be captured by the introduction of regional fixed effects.
Secondly, a spatial "x" model (SLX) implies the existence of cross regressive
terms that affect the outcomes of neighboring places. This in turn implies that
the turnout in a certain municipality which is instrumented with weather in that
municipality has an effect on the turnout of neighboring municipalities. While
it is easy to claim that weather conditions can be similar across municipalities,
showing a common pattern in certain areas, it is puzzling that turnout rates in a
certain place simultaneously affects turnout of neighbors. Moreover, this effect
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should be relevant net of the introduction of regional fixed effects and the usual
set of controls.
Lastly, we discuss the spatial error model (SE). The use of this model is slightly
controversial because in principle it would suit perfectly our case by completely
eliminating any concern about the existence of a spatial pattern in the error term
of our specification (residuals of IV). Spatially autocorrelated error terms would
lead to inconsistent and inefficient estimates, hence the use of SE model would
account for this nuisance. The decision on whether to use the SE model has been
mainly based on the results of the spatial statistics computed, i.e. Moran’s I and
LISA; where, the analysis of the spatial dependence of the residuals show that
at the Regional level there is no significant spatial pattern that is worth noting,
while at Province level we have values of Moran’s I from a high 0.2 to a low 0.07.
The introduction of the first stage regression residuals of the neighboring places
- lagged residuals - in our IV model on the one hand would reduce the spatial
autocorrelation problem by reducing the standard errors, on the other would not
cause any significant change in the regression coefficients (because in the case it
has a significant impact, it would affect only consistency and efficiency, but not
unbiasedness). Since the robust standard errors in our IV specification are not
too big and given the Moran’s I values, we decide to stick to the normal IV model
without the superimposition of any structure (even one of spatial autocorrelation)
to the error term.
However, to be completely certain of our choice, we perform a SE model in
STATA using Provinces as weights; specifically, we firstly compute the residual
of the first stage regression in STATA, and subsequently we use this informa-
tion together with the weight files created (that weight the residuals of the first
stage of neighboring municipalities) to implement IV estimation. Results of the
SE model shown in Table 4 do not highlight any striking difference with respect
284
TABLE E.1: Spatial Error Model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First IV IV First IV IV
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00595*** -0.0139***
(0.00145) (0.00188)
Turnout -1.559*** 0.352 0.924*** -0.814***
(0.415) (0.256) (0.162) (0.151)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,131 7,131 7,131
F test . 16.82 20.67 . 54.74 35.42
R2 0.708 0.360 0.887 0.996 0.942 0.755
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
to the benchmark specification.
D.2 Complete tables
TABLE E.2: IV Complete
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL UDC LN SEL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00681*** -0.0147***
(0.00150) (0.00197)
Turnout -1.295*** -0.105 0.316* -0.0592 0.164 0.788*** -0.345***
(0.334) (0.261) (0.191) (0.159) (0.105) (0.170) (0.0970)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,111 7,131 7,131 7,131
R-squared 0.205 -0.242 0.379 -0.012 0.745 0.214 0.544 0.147 0.160
F test . 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.72 20.84 . 55.30 55.30
R2 0.692 0.462 0.882 0.534 0.854 0.647 0.995 0.930 0.836
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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TABLE E.3: IV Complete Females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL UDC LN SEL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00671*** -0.0150***
(0.00168) (0.00223)
Turnout -1.313*** -0.107 0.321 -0.0600 0.166 0.771*** -0.338***
(0.371) (0.266) (0.197) (0.161) (0.108) (0.173) (0.0972)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,111 7,131 7,131 7,131
F test . 15.98 15.98 15.98 15.98 16.10 . 45.26 45.26
R2 0.695 0.359 0.882 0.516 0.854 0.637 0.994 0.924 0.825
YES
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
TABLE E.4: IV Complete Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
VARIABLES Turnout PD PDL UDC LN SEL Turnout M5S SC
Rainfalls -0.00685*** -0.0142***
(0.00152) (0.00190)
Turnout -1.286*** -0.104 0.314* -0.0588 0.163 0.814*** -0.356***
(0.336) (0.259) (0.190) (0.158) (0.105) (0.176) (0.100)
Social Capital YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Altitude YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,106 7,111 7,131 7,131 7,131
F test . 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.31 20.40 . 56.11 56.11
R2 0.622 0.442 0.883 0.532 0.853 0.645 0.996 0.928 0.837
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
286
Bibliography
Abowd, J., Kramarz, F., and Margolis, D. (1999). High wage workers and high
wage firms. Econometrica, 67(2):251–333.
Addison, J. T., Portugal, P., and Vilares, H. (2015). Sources of the Union Wage
Gap: Results from High-Dimensional Fixed Effects Regression Models. IZA
Discussion Papers 9221, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
Ahlfeldt, G. M., Redding, S. J., Sturm, D. M., and Wolf, N. (2015). The economics
of density: Evidence from the berlin wall. Econometrica, 83(6):2127–2189.
Allen, T. and Arkolakis, C. (2014). Trade and the topography of the spatial econ-
omy. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(3):1085–1140.
Amador, J. and Opromolla, L. D. (2012). Product and destination mix in export
markets. Review of World Economics, forthcoming.
Amiti, M. and Weinstein, D. E. (2011). Exports and financial shocks. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 126(4):1841–1877.
Angrist, J. and Pischke., J. (2009). Mostly Harmless Econometrics; an Empiricists
Companion. Princeton.
Angrist, J. D. (1995). The economic returns to schooling in the west bank and gaza
strip. The American Economic Review, 85:1065–1087.
Anselin, L. (1995). Geographical Analysis, 27(2):93–115.
287
Anselin, L. (2002). Under the hood : Issues in the specification and interpretation
of spatial regression models. Agricultural Economics, 27(3):247–267.
Antras, P., Garicano, L., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2006). Offshoring in a knowl-
edge economy. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1):31–77.
Argote, L. and Ingram, P. (2000). Knowledge transfer: A basis for competi-
tive advantage in firms. Organizational behavior and human decision processes,
82(1):150–169.
Arkolakis, K. (2010). Market penetration costs and the new consumers margin in
international trade. Journal of Political Economy, 118(6):1151–1199.
Artopoulos, A., Friel, D., and Hallak, J. C. (2013). Export emergence of differen-
tiated goods from developing countries: Export pioneers and business prac-
tices in argentina. Journal of Development Economics, 105:19–35.
Artuç, E., Chaudhuri, S., and McLaren, J. (2010). Trade shocks and labor ad-
justment: A structural empirical approach. The American Economic Review,
100(3):1008–1045.
Artuç, E. and McLaren, J. (2015). Trade policy and wage inequality: A structural
analysis with occupational and sectoral mobility. Journal of International Eco-
nomics, 97(2):278–294.
Atkin, D., Khandelwal, A. K., and Osman, A. (2016). Exporting and firm per-
formance: Evidence from a randomized experiment. Quarterly Journal Eco-
nomics, Forthcoming.
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., and Hanson, G. H. (2013a). The china syndrome: Local
labor market effects of import competition in the united states. American
Economic Review, 103(6):2121–68.
288
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., and Hanson, G. H. (2013b). The Geography of Trade
and Technology Shocks in the United States. American Economic Review,
103(3):220–225.
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., and Song, J. (2014a). Trade adjustment:
Worker-level evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4):1799–1860.
Autor, D. H., Dorn, D., Hanson, G. H., and Song, J. (2014b). Trade adjustment:
Worker level evidence. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(4):1799–1860.
Autor, D. H., Katz, L. F., and Kearney, M. S. (2008). Trends in us wage inequality:
Revising the revisionists. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 90(2):300–323.
Baldwin, R. (1995). The eastern enlargement of the european union. European
Economic Review, 39(3-4):474–481.
Baldwin, R., Francois, J., and Portes, R. (1997). The costs and benefits of east-
ern enlargement: the impact on the eu and central europe. Economic Policy,
12(24):125–176.
Balsvik, R. (2011). Is labor mobility a channel for spillovers from multinationals?
evidence from norwegian manufacturing. Review of Economics and Statistics,
93(1):285–297.
Bassi, A. (2013). The indian rain dance of the incumbent: The effect of weather
beyond turnout. Not published.
Békés, G. and Muraközy, B. (2012). Temporary trade and heterogeneous firms.
Journal of International Economics, 87(2):232–246.
Bernard, A., Jensen, B., Redding, S., and Schott, P. (2012). The empirics of firm
heterogeneity and international trade. Annual Review of Economics, 4:283–313.
289
Bernard, A. B., Jensen, J. B., and Schott, P. K. (2006). Survival of the best fit: Ex-
posure to low-wage countries and the (uneven) growth of us manufacturing
plants. Journal of international Economics, 68(1):219–237.
Berton, F., Mocetti, S., Presbitero, A., and Richiardi, M. G. (2017). Banks, firms,
and jobs. IMF working paper No. 17/38.
Black, S. E. and Lynch, L. M. (1997). How to Compete: The Impact of Work-
place Practices and Information Technology on Productivity. NBER Working
Papers 6120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Blanchard, O. and Portugal, P. (2001). What hides behind an unemployment rate:
Comparing portuguese and u.s. labor markets. American Economic Review,
91(1):187–207.
Blinder, A. S. (2006). Offshoring: The next industrial revolution? Foreign Affairs,
85(2):113–128.
Bloom, N., Draca, M., and Reenen, J. V. (2011a). Trade Induced Technical Change?
The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity. CEP
Discussion Papers dp1000, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
Bloom, N., Draca, M., and Reenen, J. V. (2011b). Trade Induced Technical Change?
The Impact of Chinese Imports on Innovation, IT and Productivity. CEP
Discussion Papers dp1000, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
Bloom, N., Eifert, B., Mahajan, A., McKenzie, D., and Roberts, J. (2013). Does
management matter? evidence from india. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
128(1):1–51.
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Reenen, J. V. (2016). Managment as a technology?
NBER Working Papers 22327, National Bureau of Economic Research.
290
Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Van Reenen, J. (2012). The organization of firms across
countries*. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(4):1663–1705.
Bloom, N. and Van-Reenen, J. (2010). Why do management practices differ across
firms and countries? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 24(1):203–224.
Bonfim, D. and Dai, Q. (2012). Bank size and lending specialization. Working
Papers.
Borjas, G. (1987). Self-selection and the earnings of immigrants. NBER Working
Papers 2248, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Borjas, G. J., Grogger, J., and Hanson, G. H. (2012). Comment: On estimating elas-
ticities of substition. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1):198–
210.
Brandt, L., Biesebroeck, J. V., and Zhang, Y. (2012). Creative accounting or cre-
ative destruction? firm-level productivity growth in chinese manufacturing.
Journal of Development Economics, 97(2):339 – 351.
Broocks, A. and Van Biesebroeck, J. (2017). The impact of export promotion on
export market entry. Journal of International Economics, 107:19–33.
Bryan, G. and Morten, M. (2017). The aggregate productivity effects of internal
migration: Evidence from indonesia.
Burstein, A., Hanson, G., Tian, L., and Vogel, J. (2017). Tradability and the labor-
market impact of immigration: Theory and evidence from the u.s. Working
Paper 23330, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Cabral, L. and Mata, J. (2003). On the evolution of the firm size distribution: Facts
and theory. American Economic Review, 93(4):1075–1090.
291
Cahuc, P., Postel-Vinay, F., and Robin, J. (2006). Wage bargaining with on-the-job
search: Theory and evidence. Econometrica, 74(2):323–364.
Caliendo, L., Dvorkin, M., and Parro, F. (2017a). Trade and labor market dy-
namics: General equilibrium analysis of the china trade shock. mimeo, Yale
University.
Caliendo, L., Mion, G., Opromolla, L. D., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2015a). Produc-
tivity and organization in portuguese firms. Working Paper 21811, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Caliendo, L., Monte, F., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2015b). The Anatomy of French
Production Hierarchies. Journal of Political Economy, 123(4):809–852.
Caliendo, L. and Parro, F. (2015). Estimates of the trade and welfare effects of
nafta. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(1):1–44.
Caliendo, L., Parro, F., Rossi-Hansberg, E., and Sarte, P. (2017b). The impact of
regional and sectoral productivity changes on the u.s. economy. mimeo, Yale
University.
Caliendo, L. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2012). The impact of trade on organization
and productivity. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(3):1393–1467.
Cardoso, A. and Portugal, P. (2005). Contractual wages and the wage cushion
under different bargaining settings. Journal of Labor Economics, 23(4):875–902.
Carneiro, A., aes, P. G., and Portugal, P. (2012). Real wages and the business cycle:
Accounting for worker, firm and job-title heterogeneity. American Economic
Journal: Macroeconomics, 4(2):133–152.
Carneiro, A. J. M. and Portugal, P. (2006). Earnings losses of displaced workers:
Evidence from a matched employer-employee dataset. IZA DP No. 2289.
292
Chang, Y.-Y., Gong, Y., and Peng, M. W. (2012). Expatriate knowledge trans-
fer, subsidiary absorptive capacity, and subsidiary performance. Academy of
Management Journal, 55(4):927–948.
Chodorow-Reich, G. (2014). <p>the employment effects of credit market disrup-
tions: Firm-level evidence from the 2008-09 financial crisis</p>. Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 129:1–59. <p>Lead article</p>.
Chor, D. and Manova, K. (2012). Off the cliff and back? credit conditions and
international trade during the global financial crisis. Journal of International
Economics, 87(1):117 – 133. Symposium on the Global Dimensions of the Fi-
nancial Crisis.
Ciccone, A. and Peri, G. (2005). Long-run substitutability between more and less
educated workers: Evidence from us states, 1950–1990. The Review of Eco-
nomics and Statistics, 87(4):652–663.
Citrin, J., Schickler, E., and Sides, J. (2003). What if every- one voted? simulat-
ing the impact of increased turnout in senate elections. American Journal of
Political Science 47 (January): 75- 90.
Cosar, A. K. (2013). Adjusting to trade liberalization: Reallocation and labor
market policies. University of Chicago Booth School of Business, unpublished
manuscript.
Cos¸ar, A. K., Guner, N., and Tybout, J. (2016). Firm dynamics, job turnover,
and wage distributions in an open economy. The American Economic Review,
106(3):625–663.
Costinot, A. and Rodriguez-Clare, A. (2014). Trade theory with numbers: Quanti-
fying the consequences of globalization. Handbook of International Economics,
pages 197–261.
293
Council of the European Union (2012). Consolidated versions of the treaty on
european union and the treaty on the functioning of the european union.
Official Journal of the European Union, 55.
Das, M., Roberts, M., and Tybout, J. (2007). Market entry costs, producer hetero-
geneity and export dynamics. Econometrica, 75(3):837–873.
Davis, D. R. and Weinstein, D. E. (2002). Technological superiority and the losses
from migration. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.
DeNardo, J. (1980). Turnout and the vote: The joke’s on the democrats. The
American Political Science Review, 74(2):pp. 406–420.
DeNardo, J. (1986). Does heavy turnout help democrats in presidential elections?
American Political Science Review 80.
Desmet, K., Nagy, D. K., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2016). The geography of devel-
opment. In Press, Journal of Political Economy.
Desmet, K. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2014). Spatial development. The American
Economic Review, 104(4):1211–1243.
di Giovanni, J., Levchenko, A. A., and Ortega, F. (2015). A global view of cross-
border migration. Journal of the European Economic Association, 13(1):168–202.
Diamond, R. (2016). The determinants and welfare implications of us workers’
diverging location choices by skill: 1980-2000. American Economic Review,
106(3):479–524.
Dix-Carneiro, R. (2014). Trade liberalization and labor market dynamics. Econo-
metrica, 82(3):825–885.
Dix Carneiro, R. and Kovak, B. K. (2017). Trade liberalization and regional dy-
namics. American Economic Review, page forthcoming.
294
Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Row.
Dustmann, C. and Frattini, T. (2011). Immigration: the european experience.
Dustmann, C., Frattini, T., and Rosso, A. (2015). The effect of emigration from
poland on polish wages. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 117(2):522–
564.
Dustmann, C., Ludsteck, J., and Schönberg, U. (2009). Revisiting the german
wage structure. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(2):843–881.
Dustmann, C. and Meghir, C. (2005). Wages, experience and seniority. The Review
of Economic Studies, 72(1):77–108.
Eaton, J., Eslava, M., Krizan, C., Jinkins, D., and Tybout, J. (2012). A search and
learning model of export dynamics. (mimeo).
Eaton, J., Eslava, M., Kugler, M., and Tybout, J. (2008). The Organization of Firms
in a Global Economy, chapter The Margins of Entry into Export Markets: Evi-
dence from Colombia. Harvard University Press.
Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2001). Technology, trade, and growth: A unified frame-
work. European Economic Review, 45(4-6):742–755.
Eaton, J. and Kortum, S. (2002). Technology, geography, and trade. Econometrica,
70:1741–1779.
Eisinga, R., Grotenhuis, M. T., and Pelzer, B. (2012). Weather conditions and voter
turnout in dutch national parliament elections, 1971-2010. International Jour-
nal Biometeorology, 56(4):736–86.
Erikson, R. S. (1995). State turnout and presidential voting: A closer look. Ameri-
can Politics Quarterly 23 (October): 387-96.
295
European Union (2003). Documents concerning the accession of the czech re-
public, the republic of estonia, the republic of cyprus, the republic of latvia,
the republic of lithuania, the republic of hungary, the republic of malta, the
republic of poland, the republic of slovenia and the slovak republic to the
european union. Official Journal of the European Union, 46.
Fajgelbaum, P. D., Morales, E., Serrato, J. C. S., and Zidar, O. M. (2015). State taxes
and spatial misallocation. NBER Working Papers 21760, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Fallick, B., Fleischman, C. A., and Rebitzer, J. B. (2006). Job-hopping in silicon
valley: some evidence concerning the microfoundations of a high-technology
cluster. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(3):472–481.
Feenstra, R. C., Inklaar, R., and Timmer, M. P. (2015). The next generation of the
penn world table. The American Economic Review, 105(10):3150–3182.
Foley, C. F. and Manova, K. (2015). International trade, multinational activity, and
corporate finance. Annual Review of Economics, 7(1):119–146.
Frias, J. A., Kaplanz, D. S., and Verhoogen, E. A. (2009). Exports and wage pre-
mia: Evidence from Mexican employer-employee data. Columbia University
mimeo.
Friedrich, B. (2015). Trade Shocks, Firm Hierarchies and Wage Inequality. Eco-
nomics Working Papers 2015-26, Department of Economics and Business
Economics, Aarhus University.
Gabaix, X. and Landier, A. (2008). Why has ceo pay increased so much? The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123(1):49–100.
296
Galle, S., Rodriguez-Clare, A., and Yi, M. (2017). Slicing the pie: Quantifying the
aggregate and distributional effects of trade. Unpublished manuscript, Univ.
Calif., Berkeley.
Garicano, L. (2000). Hierarchies and the organization of knowledge in produc-
tion. Journal of Political Economy, 108(5).
Garicano, L. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2004). Inequality and the organization of
knowledge. American Economic Review, 94(2):197–202.
Gibbons, R. and Katz, L. (1992). Does unmeasured ability explain inter-industry
wage differentials? The Review of Economic Studies, 59(3):515–535.
Gomez, B. T., Hansford, T. G., and Krause, G. A. (2007). The republicans should
pray for rain: Weather, turnout, and voting in u.s. presidential elections. Jour-
nal of Politics, 69(3):649–663.
Greenstone, M., Mas, A., and Nguyen, H.-L. (2014). Do credit market shocks
affect the real economy? quasi-experimental evidence from the great reces-
sion and ‘normal’ economic times. Working Paper 20704, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Grofman, B., Owen, G., and Collet., C. (1999). Rethinking the partisan effects of
higher turnout: So what’s the question? Public Choice 99 (June): 357-76.
Grossman, G. M. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2008). Trading tasks: A simple theory
of offshoring. American Economic Review, 98(5):1978–1997.
Guadalupe, M. and Wulf, J. (2008). The flattening firm and product market com-
petition: The effect of trade liberalization. NBER Working Paper, 14491.
297
Guidolin, M. and La Ferrara, E. (2007). Diamonds are forever, wars are not: Is
conflict bad for private firms? The American Economic Review, 97(5):1978–
1993.
Guimarães, P. and Portugal, P. (2010). A simple feasible procedure to estimate
models with high-dimensional fixed effects. Stata Journal, 10(4):628–649.
Guiso, L. and Rustichini, A. (2011). Understanding the size and profitability of
firms: the role of a biological factor. CEPR Discussion Papers 8205, Centre
for Economic Policy Research.
Handley, K. and Limao, N. (2015). Trade and investment under policy uncer-
tainty: Theory and firm evidence. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy,
7(4):189–222.
Hansford, T. G. and Gomez, B. T. (2010). Estimating the electoral effects of voter
turnout. American Political Science Review, 104:268–288.
Hanson, G. H. and Slaughter, M. J. (2002). Labor-market adjustment in open
economies: Evidence from us states. Journal of international Economics,
57(1):3–29.
Hanson, G. H. and Slaughter, M. J. (2016). High-skilled immigration and the
rise of stem occupations in u.s. employment. Working Paper 22623, National
Bureau of Economic Research.
Helpman, E., Itskhoki, O., Muendler, M., and Redding, S. (2012). Trade and in-
equality: From theory to estimation. NBER Working Papers 17991.
Helpman, E., Itskhoki, O., and Redding, S. (2010). Inequality and unemployment
in a global economy. Econometrica, 78(4):1239–1283.
298
Hong, G. and Mclaren, J. (2016). Are immigrants a shot in the arm for the local
economy? mimeo, University of Virginia.
Hsieh, C.-T. and Klenow, P. (2009). Misallocation and manufacturing tfp in china
and india. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124(4):1403–1448.
Hubbard, T. and Garicano, L. (2007). The Return to Knowledge Hierarchies.
Working Papers 07-01, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
Hummels, D., Minor, P., Reisman, M., and Endean, E. (2007). Calculating tariff
equivalents for time in trade. USAID Report, March.
Hummels, D. L. and Schaur, G. (2013). Time as a trade barrier. The American
Economic Review, 103(7):2935–2959.
Iacovone, L. and Javorcik, B. S. (2012). Getting ready: Preparation for exporting.
University of Oxford mimeo.
Ichniowski, C., Shaw, K., and Prennushi, G. (1997). The effects of human resource
management practices on productivity: A study of steel finishing lines. The
American Economic Review, 87(3):291–313.
Iyer, R., Peydró, J.-L., da Rocha-Lopes, S., and Schoar, A. (2014). Interbank liq-
uidity crunch and the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007–2009 crisis.
Review of Financial Studies, 27(1):347–372.
Jiménez, G., Atif, M. M., Peydro, J.-L., and Saurina Salas, J. (2011). Local
versus aggregate lending channels: The effects of securitization on corpo-
rate credit supply. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1939774 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1939774.
299
Jiménez, G., Ongena, S., Peydró, J.-L., and Saurina, J. (2014). Hazardous times
for monetary policy: What do twenty-three million bank loans say about the
effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking? Econometrica, 82(2):463–505.
Johnson, G. E. (1997). Changes in earnings inequality: the role of demand shifts.
The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2):41–54.
Jones, C. (1995). R&d-based models of economic growth. Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 103(4):759–84.
Katz, L. F. and Murphy, K. M. (1992). Changes in relative wages, 1963–1987:
Supply and demand factors. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1):35–78.
Kennan, J. (2017). Open borders in the european union and beyond: Migration
flows and labor market implications. Working Paper 23048, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Kerr, P. S. and Kerr, W. R. (2011). Economic impacts of immigration: A survey.
Finnish Economic Papers, 24(1):1–32.
Khwaja, A. I. and Mian, A. (2008). Tracing the impact of bank liquidity shocks:
Evidence from an emerging market. American Economic Review, 98(4):1413–
42.
Klein, P. and Ventura, G. (2009). Productivity differences and the dynamic effects
of labor movements. Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(8):1059–1073.
Kondo, I. (2013). Trade reforms, foreign competition, and labor market adjust-
ments in the us. mimeo, Federal Reserve Board.
Kortum, S. S. (1997). Research, patenting, and technological change. Econometrica:
Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1389–1419.
300
Krugman, P. (1980). Scale economies, product differentiation, and the pattern of
trade. The American Economic Review, 70(5):950–959.
Krusell, P., Ohanian, L. E., Ríos-Rull, J.-V., and Violante, G. L. (2000a). Capital-skill
complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Econometrica,
68(5):1029–1053.
Krusell, P., Ohanian, L. E., Ríos-Rull, J.-V., and Violante, G. L. (2000b). Capital-
skill complementarity and inequality: A macroeconomic analysis. Economet-
rica, 68(5):1029–1053.
Kucheryavyy, K., Lyn, G., and Rodríguez-Clare, A. (2016). Grounded by gravity:
A well-behaved trade model with industry-level economies of scale. NBER
Working Papers 22484, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Lagakos, D. and Waugh, M. E. (2013). Selection, agriculture, and cross-country
productivity differences. American Economic Review, 103(2):948–80.
Liberti, J. M. (2017). Initiative, incentives, and soft information. Management
Science, 0(0):null.
Lind, J. T. (2013). Rainy day politics: An instrumental variables approach to the
effect of parties on political outcomes. Working paper.
Lourenço, R. and Rodrigues, P. M. (2015). House prices: bubbles, exuberance or
something else? evidence from euro area countries. Working Papers.
Manova, K., Wei, S.-J., and Zhang, Z. (2015). Firm exports and multinational
activity under credit constraints. Review of Economics and Statistics, 97(3):574–
588.
Martincus, C. V., Carballo, J., and Graziano, A. (2015). Customs. Journal of Inter-
national Economics, 96(1):119–137.
301
Martinez, M. D. and Gill., J. (2005). The effects of turnout on partisan outcomes in
u.s. presidential elections 1960-2000. Journal of Politics 67 (November): 1248-74.
Martins, P. S. (2009). Dismissals for cause: The difference that just eight para-
graphs can make. Journal of Labor Economics, 27(2):257–279.
Martins, P. S. and Opromolla, L. D. (2012). Why ex(im)porters pay more: Evi-
dence from matched firm-worker panels. Mimeo.
McLaren, J. (2017). Globalization and labor market dynamics. Annual Review of
Economics, 9(1):177–200.
McLaren, J. and Hakobyan, S. (2015). Looking for local labor market effects of
nafta. mimeo, University of Virginia.
Melitz, M. J. (2003). The impact of trade on intra-industry reallocations and ag-
gregate industry productivity. Econometrica, 71(6):1695–1725.
Menezes-Filho, N. A. and Muendler, M.-A. (2011). Labor reallocation in response
to trade reform. Working Paper 17372, National Bureau of Economic Re-
search.
Mion, G. and Muûls, M. (2015). The impact of ukti trade services on value of
goods exported by supported firms.
Mion, G. and Opromolla, L. D. (2014). Managers’ mobility, trade performance,
and wages. Journal of International Economics, 94(1):85–101.
Mion, G., Opromolla, L. D., and Sforza, A. (2016). The diffusion of knowledge via
managers’ mobility. CEPR working paper.
Mion, G. and Zhu, L. (2013). Import competition from and offshoring to china: A
curse or blessing for firms? Journal of International Economics, 89(1):202–215.
302
Monte, F., Redding, S. J., and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2015). Commuting, migration
and local employment elasticities. Working Paper 21706, National Bureau of
Economic Research.
Morales, E., Sheu, G., and Zahler, A. (2012). Gravity and extended gravity: Esti-
mating a structural model of export entry. Columbia University mimeo.
Moxnes, A. (2010). Are sunk costs in exporting country specific? Canadian Journal
of Economics, 43(2):467–493.
Munch, J. R. and Skaksen, J. R. (2008). Human capital and wages in exporting
firms. Journal of International Economics, 75(2):363–372.
Nagel, J. H. and McNulty, J. E. (1996). Partisan effects of voter turnout in sen-
atorial and gubernatorial elections. The American Political Science Review,
90(4):pp. 780–793.
OECD (2016). Taxing wages 2016.
Ossa, R. (2014). Trade wars and trade talks with data. The American Economic
Review, 104(12):4104–4146.
Ottaviano, G. I. and Peri, G. (2012a). Rethinking the effect of immigration on
wages. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1):152–197.
Ottaviano, G. I. P. and Peri, G. (2012b). Rethinking the effect of immigration on
wages. Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1):152–197.
Ottaviano, G. I. P., Peri, G., and Wright, G. C. (2013). Immigration, offshoring,
and american jobs. American Economic Review, 103(5):1925–59.
Paravisini, D. (2008). Local bank financial constraints and firm access to external
finance. The Journal of Finance, 63(5):2161–2193.
303
Paravisini, D., Rappoport, V., and Schnabl, P. (2015a). Specialization in bank lend-
ing: Evidence from exporting firms. Working Paper 21800, National Bureau
of Economic Research.
Paravisini, D., Rappoport, V., Schnabl, P., and Wolfenzon, D. (2015b). Dissecting
the effect of credit supply on trade: Evidence from matched credit-export
data. The Review of Economic Studies, 82(1):333–359.
Parrotta, P. and Pozzoli, D. (2012). The effect of learning by hiring on productivity.
RAND Journal of Economics, 43(1):167–185.
Persson, M., Sundell, A., and ’´Ohrvall Richard (2013). Does election day weather
affect voter turnout? evidence from swedish elections. Electoral studies,
(forthcoming on).
Radcliff, B. (1994). Turnout and the democratic vote. American Politics Quarterly
22 (July): 259-76.
Ramondo, N., Rodríguez-Clare, A., and Saborío-Rodríguez, M. (2016). Trade,
domestic frictions, and scale effects. The American Economic Review,
106(10):3159–3184.
Rauch, J. E. (1999). Networks versus markets in international trade. Journal of
international Economics, 48(1):7–35.
Redding, S. J. (2016). Goods trade, factor mobility and welfare. Journal of Interna-
tional Economics, 101:148–167.
Redding, S. J. and Rossi-Hansberg, E. (2016). Quantitative spatial economics.
Working Paper 22655, National Bureau of Economic Research.
304
Redding, S. J. and Sturm, D. M. (2008). The costs of remoteness: Evidence
from german division and reunification. The American Economic Review,
98(5):1766–1797.
Richards, G. S. and Duxbury, L. (2015). Work-group knowledge acquisition
in knowledge intensive public-sector organizations: An exploratory study.
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 25(4):1247–1277.
Schank, T., Schnabel, C., and Wagner, J. (2007). Do exporters really pay higher
wages? First evidence from German linked employer-employee data. Journal
of International Economics, 72(1):52–74.
Schnabl, P. (2012). The international transmission of bank liquidity shocks: Evi-
dence from an emerging market. The Journal of Finance, 67(3):897–932.
Silva, J. S. and Tenreyro, S. (2006). The log of gravity. The Review of Economics and
statistics, 88(4):641–658.
Song, J., Almeida, P., and Wu, G. (2003). Learning–by–hiring: When is mobility
more likely to facilitate interfirm knowledge transfer? Management science,
49(4):351–365.
Syverson, C. (2010). What determines productivity? NBER Working Papers
15712, National Bureau of Economic Research.
Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R., and de Vries, G. J. (2015a).
An illustrated user guide to the world input–output database: the case of
global automotive production. Review of International Economics, 23(3):575–
605.
Timmer, M. P., Dietzenbacher, E., Los, B., Stehrer, R., and Vries, G. J. (2015b). An
illustrated user guide to the world input–output database: the case of global
automotive production. Review of International Economics, 23(3):575–605.
305
Tombe, T. and Zhu, X. (2015). Trade, migration and productivity: A quantitative
analysis of china. Manuscript, University of Toronto.
Tsai, W. (2001). Knowledge transfer in intraorganizational networks: Effects of
network position and absorptive capacity on business unit innovation and
performance. Academy of management journal, 44(5):996–1004.
Verba, S. and Nie, N. H. (1972). Participation in America: Political Democracy and
Social Equality. New York: Harper & Row.
Wooldridge, J. M. (2009). On estimating firm-level production functions using
proxy variables to control for unobservables. Economics Letters, 104(3):112 –
114.
Young, A. (2013). Inequality, the urban-rural gap, and migration. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 128(4):1727–1785.
